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Abstract
My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individ-
uals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay ana-
lyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of
applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model
developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in
protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the
analysis.
The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaus-
tively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players
receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a “stochastic-coordination action”.
Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally dis-
tributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information
contained in the other player’s action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This
feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in
order to utilize the other player’s information, each player takes the “pivotalizing ac-
tion” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best re-
sponses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that
the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has appli-
cations in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace,
protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adop-
tion of a new technology.
My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision prob-
lem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolu-
tion. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is
preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of
uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status
quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other’s assessments of
the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that
the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics.
Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens
can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is
not too harsh and citizens’ private knowledge is accurate, then further communication
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reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the like-
lihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In par-
ticular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when
they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concern-
ing the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest.
Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punish-
ment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might
also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh,
that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma
1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be posi-
tively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression.
My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the in-
tensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that
the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should
not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccess-
ful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on
information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression
to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal
model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to in-
vestigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents’ contentious
actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here
as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of
the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude
of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the re-
lationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from
1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression
using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique al-
lows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and
revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence
support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the
likelihood of repression is non-monotone.
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Strategic Delegation of Pivotality
1.1 Introduction
This paper exhaustively analyzes a rich class of two-player, binary action, coordination
games with uncertain payoffs. Payoffs take the form depicted in Figure 1, where h, l and
w are common knowledge with h > l, and θ is normally distributed. Players receive
noisy, conditionally-independent private signals about θ, and then simultaneously decide
which action to take. The key feature of the game is that players receive the stochastic
coordination payoff θ if and only if they both take action 1.1 Consequently, for the other
player’s information to influence whether players receive the stochastic payoff, a player





0 h, h w, l
1 l, w θ, θ
Figure 1.1: Coordination Game.
This game captures the essence of many strategic economic and political settings.
The players could be firms receiving signals about the uncertain payoff θ that they would
receive if both adopt a new technology standard, or if both make infrastructure invest-
ments in a developing country. In a conflict game, the players could be countries receiv-
ing signals about payoffs from not attacking (Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2010)), or
from joint free trade in a tariff game; in a political protest/revolution/strike/coup game,
the signals could be about payoffs from overturning the status quo (Bueno de Mesquita
(2010b), Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010)); and in a political contribution game, the sig-
nals could be about payoffs to interest groups from supporting an untried challenger over
a known incumbent, when the challenger only wins if both interest groups support him.
Before characterizing equilibrium properties, one must confront several analytical
1Because optimal actions hinge on the net expected payoff from taking action 1 rather than 0, strategic
considerations and equilibrium behavior are identical if, instead, players receive the stochastic component
θ of payoffs unless both take action 1.
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challenges. First, the expected net payoff to a player from taking action 1 is not monotone
increasing in his own signal even if the other player adopts a monotone (cutoff) strategy.
In particular, the expected net payoff from action 1 declines for low values of the signal,
and only increases for sufficiently high signals. Consequently, it does not follow directly
that the best response to a cutoff strategy also takes a cutoff form. Nonetheless, we ex-
ploit the asymptotic properties of expected net payoffs and the total positivity (Karlin
(1968)) of the conditional distributions to show that the best response to a cutoff strategy
takes a cutoff form. That is, the game satisfies the single-crossing property for incomplete
information games (Athey (2001)).
Second, a player’s incentive to take action 1 need not increase when the other player
is more likely to take that action: best responses exhibit strategic substitutes if the other
player is sufficiently willing to take action 1; and exhibit strategic complements only if
the other player is not too willing to take action 1. The force for strategic complements
is that when player −i is more likely to take action 1, then player i is less likely to incur
the miscoordination cost h − l when he takes action 1. The force for strategic substitutes
is that when player −i is more willing to take action 1, then he does so following worse
and worse signals about the stochastic payoff θ. Thus, the expected value of θ when it is
received is reduced, and hence the attraction of action 1 to player i falls. Concretely, in a
revolution game, if one potential leader is willing to revolt even when he has the negative
signal that successful revolution leaders may subsequently be guillotined, this reduces the
attraction of revolt for another leader. When the other player is sufficiently likely to take
action 1, the likelihood of miscoordination is low, and the force for strategic substitutes
dominates.
Third, (two-sided) limit dominance does not obtain. That is, no matter how positive
is the signal that one player receives about θ, the optimality of action 1 always continues
to hinge on the information of the other player, because the other player can still receive
a sufficiently bad signal that induces him to take action 0.
The absence of global strategic complementarities and limit dominance gives rise to
analytical challenges. For example, one cannot appeal to the established properties of
symmetric supermodular games to conclude that equilibria are symmetric. Indeed, the
non-monotonicity of best responses opens up the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in
which one player adopts a low cutoff due to the other player’s high cutoff, and vice versa.
Nonetheless, we can bound the slope of best response functions from below by −1, which
implies that all cutoff strategy equilibria must be symmetric.
We exploit this symmetry to analyze the properties of cutoff equilibria by characteriz-
ing the expected net payoff from taking action 1 when both players adopt the same cut-
off. We establish that this expected net payoff is single-peaked. This implies that there
are at most two equilibria with finite cutoffs, which are summarized by the zeros of the
symmetric expected net payoff function. We then prove that two such equilibria exist if
and only if the payoff w from taking action 0 when the other player takes action 1 is not
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too large, i.e., when the “predatory payoff” is low. In addition, there is always an equi-
librium in which both players take action 0 independently of their signals: since h > l,
decisions to always take action 0 are mutual best responses.
We find that the low cutoff equilibrium (where players are most likely to take action
1) is stable and exhibits natural comparative statics: raising the miscoordination cost
h − l or raising the predatory payoff w, both reduce the likelihood that players take ac-
tion 1. In contrast, the high cutoff equilibrium is unstable and has the opposite, perverse
comparative statics. This suggests that the high cutoff equilibrium is not a plausible can-
didate for describing real world outcomes.
We show that the high cutoff equilibrium always features strategic complementari-
ties. In contrast, as long as w is not too large, the low cutoff equilibrium exhibits strategic
substitutes if and only if the miscoordination cost h − l is sufficiently low. This reflects
that (i) for any fixed cutoff, the desire to avoid miscoordination—the force for strategic
complements—falls with h− l, vanishing as h− l goes to zero, while the force for strategic
substitutes is unaffected, and (ii) as h − l falls, players take action 1 more, reducing the
likelihood of miscoordination, and reducing the expected value of θ conditional on players
receiving signals equal to their cutoff.
The strategic structure of the game allows a player to benefit from the other’s infor-
mation: when a player takes action 1, he receives the stochastic payoff θ if and only if
the other player’s signal about θ is sufficiently promising to induce him to take action 1,
too. In equilibrium, the cost of the option of having the other player’s signal determine
whether θ is received takes two forms. As a player takes action 1 more, (1) he is more
likely to incur the miscoordination cost h − l, and (2) by taking action 1 after receiving
lower signals, he risks receiving θ when the other player receives similarly low signals, in
which case the expected θ given their joint information may be less than the predatory
payoff w. When the miscoordination cost is small, the primary cost is the second cost:
a player must regret taking action 1 rather than action 0 whenever both players receive
signals close to their cutoffs.
With these insights in hand, we determine how outcomes are affected if players receive
public signals rather than private ones. We contrast the polar cases of public (perfectly-
correlated) signals and private (conditionally-independent) signals that feature the same
noise. Because public signals permit perfect coordination, one might speculate that there
always exists a public signal equilibrium in which both players are more likely to take ac-
tion 1 than in any private signal equilibrium. In fact, we establish that this is so if and
only if h − l is sufficiently large. In particular, if h − l is small enough that actions are
strategic substitutes at the private signal equilibrium, then players are more likely to take
action 1 in this equilibrium than in any public signal equilibrium. Indeed, similar results
obtain even if there are multiple public signals or public signals are less noisy than the
private ones. The intuition reflects two conflicting effects. With private signals, (1) play-
ers have an incentive to take action 1 more in order to permit conditioning whether θ is
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received on the other player’s signal, but (2) the fear of miscoordination leads players to
take action 1 less. When the miscoordination cost h− l is small, the first effect dominates,
and players take action 1 more in the private signal economy. The first effect is absent
with public signals so that even with arbitrary numbers of public signals, players never
regret taking action 1 in any pure strategy equilibrium.
One might then conjecture that even if players are more likely to take action 1 in the
private signal equilibrium, they must be less likely to receive the stochastic coordination
payoff θ due to the “miscoordination” that necessarily emerges with private signals. This
conjecture is also false. Whenever, in addition to h − l being small, E[θ] is slightly less
than w, players are more likely to simultaneously take action 1 in the private signal econ-
omy and receive payoff θ.
We also address welfare. We especially care about whether players are too likely or
too unlikely, from a welfare perspective, to take the action with the stochastic coordi-
nation payoff (action 1). That is, suppose players could commit to a common cutoff for
taking action 1: how would this cutoff compare with the equilibrium cutoff? Whether
a marginal reduction in the other player’s cutoff raises or lowers a best response hinges
on the miscoordination cost h − l. In contrast, welfare properties hinge on the sign of
w − l, i.e., on the difference in player payoffs when they “miscoordinate”. We show that
as long as it is ever socially optimal for players to take action 1, then in equilibrium, play-
ers do not take action 1 as often as is socially optimal if and only if w > l. Indeed, when
w > l, a player’s welfare would always be increased were the other player to reduce his
cutoff slightly below the equilibrium cutoff; even though when h − l is small, actions are
strategic substitutes, so that a player’s strategic response to such a change would be to
raise his cutoff.
The intuition for these welfare results is that when contemplating taking action 1, a
player internalizes the payoff l he receives when the other player takes action 0, but not
the payoff w that the other player receives. A social planner internalizes both payoffs, and
the difference w−l determines whether the player taking the action over- or under-weights
action 1 from the social planner’s perspective. When l = w, by maximizing his own ex-
pected payoffs, a player also maximizes the other player’s payoffs. However, when w > l,
a player who internalizes l does not take action 1 as often as the other player would like;
and when w < l, the opposite obtains. As most economic and political settings feature
w > l, we conclude that, in equilibrium, players do not take the action with the stochastic
coordination payoff often enough.
These results do not imply that a player’s expected utility always rises when the other
player takes action 1 more often. In particular, a player does not want to receive θ when
he receives a moderately positive signal, but the other player receives a very negative
one. When one player is too willing to take action 1, whether players receive θ depends
less and less on that player’s signal, thereby depriving the players of properly using that
player’s signal to determine whether players receive θ.
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Whether actions are strategic complements or strategic substitutes has important
welfare implications. For example, suppose one player’s predatory payoff w is increased
slightly. The direct, non-strategic welfare effect is positive. However, the player then takes
action 1 less. If actions are strategic substitutes, then the other player takes action 1
more; and this strategic effect reinforces the positive direct effect on welfare. However, if,
instead, actions are strategic complements, the other player takes action 1 less, and this
welfare-damaging behavior can swamp the direct positive welfare benefits: a player can be
harmed if his predatory payoff is increased.
Finally, we explore the possibility of equilibria in which strategies do not take a cutoff
form. While cutoff strategies are natural—players take action 1 if and only if they receive
sufficiently promising signals about its payoff—one can contemplate a broader class of
equilibrium strategies in which the set of signals for which a player takes action 1 needs
only be connected. We prove that symmetric equilibria can exist in which players take ac-
tion 1 if and only if their signals are in a bounded interval, (kL, kR). That is, players take
action 1 if and only if their signals are high, but not too high. We exploit the stability
properties of different cutoff equilibria to prove that whenever a bounded interval equi-
librium exists, (a) its lower bound kL is between the cutoffs k¯ and k of the low and high
cutoff equilibria, and (b) kL is less than E[θ]. It follows directly that (a) players are less
likely to take action 1 in a bounded interval equilibrium than in the low cutoff equilib-
rium, and (b) bounded interval equilibria can only exist when w and h − l are sufficiently
small.
The paper’s outline is as follows. Next, we describe economic and political settings in
which our analysis is relevant. We then discuss related literature. Section 2 presents the
model and basic properties of strategies, expected payoffs and equilibria. Section 3 de-
rives the strategic substitute/complement features of equilibria. Section 4 addresses wel-
fare. Section 5 contrasts public and private signal equilibria. Section 6 considers bounded
interval strategies. A conclusion and an appendix containing proofs follow.
1.1.1 Economic and Political Settings
We now expand on the economic and political games that our game structure captures.
Investment Games. The payoffs in Figure 1.2 correspond to an investment game in
which players receive signals about the uncertain payoffs that obtain if both invest (ac-
tion 1). The players could be multinationals receiving signals about the payoffs from joint
infrastructure investments in a developing country, where uncertainty about θ could re-
flect uncertainty about demand, economic stability, enforcement of property rights, gov-
ernment actions, etc. Alternatively, the players could be individuals contemplating rede-
veloping houses in the inner city, where regentrification can only make the neighborhood
safe if others also redevelop. So, too, it could be a technology adoption game, where firms
decide whether to pursue a new network/platform investment that only pays off if it is





no invest e, e l2, l1
invest l1, l2 θ − I, θ − I
Figure 1.2: Investment game.
platform, θ − I is the uncertain payoff if the new technology became the standard (I is an
investment cost), and l1 < e is the low payoff earned when the other firm does not try to
convert to the new technology; l1 = e − I, l2 = e would indicate that the investment in
the new platform was abandoned and wasted, and that the two firms continue to use the
old platform, while e > l2 > l1 would indicate that failing to coordinate on a common
platform hurts both firms, albeit hurting the firm that invests by more.
Calculus of Protest Games. The payoffs in Figure 1.3 correspond to a “calculus of
protest” game between players who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or
mount a protest/revolution/strike/coup based on private signals they receive about the
protest payoff θ. The protest only succeeds if both players act. If only one player acts,
the protest fails, the status quo is preserved, and the state sanctions the sole protestor




no protest q, q q, q − µ
protest q − µ, q θ, θ
Figure 1.3: Calculus of protest game.
which players are uncertain about the status quo payoff q, rather than θ.2
Conflict Games. The payoffs in Figure 1.4 correspond to a conflict game between two
countries that simultaneously must decide whether to be peaceful or attack (Chassang
and Padro´ i Miquel (2010)). The countries receive signals about the payoff pi from peace,
F is the payoff from a surprise attack on a peaceful neighbor (who receives S), and coun-
tries receive payoff W if both attack, where F > W > S. This payoff structure also cap-
tures a trade game between countries, where governments know the payoffs associated
with high tariffs, but are uncertain about the payoffs from mutual free trade. Here, “tar-
iff” corresponds to “attack” and “no tariff” corresponds to “peace”, and F > W > S
captures the fact that one country gains from a unilateral tariff at the other country’s
expense. These payoffs also correspond to a political contribution game between interest
2Status quo uncertainty introduces uncertainty about off-diagonal payoffs, but the difference in ex-
pected payoffs given signal si from protest vs. not, Pr(−i protests|si)E[θ − (q − µ)|si,−i protests]) − µ,
reflects the expected difference in θ − q, and not the source of uncertainty.
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groups, in which the interest groups must decide whether to support a known incumbent
or an unknown challenger, where the challenger only wins if both interest groups support
him. Here “incumbent” corresponds to “attack” and “challenger” corresponds to “peace”,
and F > W > S reflects that if the incumbent wins, he will reward a contributing interest





peace S, F pi, pi
Figure 1.4: Conflict game.
1.1.2 Literature Review
The coordination games literature largely focuses on games that feature global strategic
complementarities, i.e., “action monotonicity”, in which a player’s incentive to take an
action always increases when other players are more likely to take the same action. This
literature has two key branches: supermodular games and global games.
The supermodular games literature (see Topkis (1979, 1998), Milgrom and Roberts
(1990), or Vives (1990)) exploits lattice programming to characterize equilibria under
weak topological assumptions. The set of equilibria in supermodular games has a largest
and a smallest element, which facilitates welfare and comparative static analyses. See
Vives (1999) for an introduction, and Vives (2005) for a review.
In global games settings, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show that a unique equilib-
rium obtains when (a) players have dominant strategies whenever they receive sufficiently
extreme signals, i.e., two-sided limit dominance holds,3 and (b) the noise in private sig-
nals becomes vanishingly small. The global game structure has been applied to model
such phenomena as currency crises (Morris and Shin (1998)), pricing debt (Morris and
Shin (2004)), bank runs and financial contagion (Goldstein and Pauzner (2004, 2005),
Dasgupta (2004), Rochet and Vives (2004)), conflict and arms races (Baliga and Sjostrom
(2004), Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2010)), and revolutions (Boix and Svolik (2009),
Bueno de Mesquita (2010a), Edmond (2008), Egorov et al. (2009), Persson and Tabellini
3A very few papers consider games that, like ours, only feature one-sided limit dominance (Baliga and
Sjostrom (2004), Bueno de Mesquita (2010a), Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2010)). In fact, the payoff
structure of the stage game in Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2010) is identical to ours. However, they
analyze their dynamic game only when the noise in signals is vanishingly small; as a result, their game
features global strategic complementarities so that they can employ techniques from the supermodular
games literature. Mason and Valentinyi (2010) prove the existence and uniqueness of a monotone pure
strategy equilibrium for a class of Bayesian games that need not satisfy global strategic complementari-
ties or limit dominance. However, their key “uniform strict single-crossing” property does not hold in our
games.
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(2006)). Although Carlsson and van Damme (1993) do not impose global strategic com-
plementarities, the literature built on their work typically does (Chassang (2010), Frankel
et al. (2003), Hellwig (2002), Mathevet (2010), Morris and Shin (1998, 2001, 2003); Mor-
ris and Shin (2003) provide a review).4
In contrast, the games that we analyze give rise naturally to both strategic comple-
mentarities and strategic substitutes. The game’s coordination structure underlies the
standard strategic complement feature. Strategic substitutes arise due to the common
value nature of the stochastic payoff and the game structure, which together make each
player’s signal directly relevant for the other’s payoff. In particular, when one player is
too willing to take action 1, the other player can only protect himself against receiving
likely low values of θ when the other player receives a low signal by raising his cutoff for
taking action 1. This informational mechanism is very different from that in other mod-
els that feature both strategic complements and strategic substitutes (Clark and Polborn
(2006), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Karp et al. (2007)). In these models, strategic sub-
stitutes arise due to congestion externalities. For example, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)
explore bank runs and show how strategic substitutes emerge due to rationing after bad
realizations when enough players “run on the bank”.
1.2 The Model
Two players A and B must choose between two actions 0 and 1. Payoffs are symmetric
and are given in Figure 1.1. Payoffs h, l and w are common knowledge, with h > l, while
θ is unknown and uncertain. Players share a common prior that θ ∼ N(0, σ), where the
normalization of the mean to zero is without loss of generality. Each player i ∈ {A,B}
receives a private signal about θ, si = θ + νi, where νi ∼ N(0, σν) is distributed inde-
pendently from both θ and the noise ν−i in the other player’s signal. Players then simul-
taneously take actions. As θ is normally distributed, both θ > w and θ < h occur with
strictly positive probability, so sometimes players would like to coordinate on action 1,
and sometimes on action 0.
Strategies, expected payoffs, and equilibrium. A pure strategy for player i is a
function ρi mapping his signal s
i about θ into an action choice. That is, ρi : R → {0, 1},
where ρi(s
i) = 1 indicates that player i takes action 1, and ρi(s
i) = 0 indicates that i
takes action 0. The equilibrium concept is Bayes Nash, i.e., an equilibrium is a strategy
profile, (ρ∗A, ρ
∗
B), of mutual best responses, in which players update according to Bayes
rule upon receiving signals.
In much of our analysis, we focus on cutoff strategies, where a player j’s strategy is
summarized by a critical cutoff kj : player j takes action 1 if and only if j receives a suffi-
4Harrison (2003) considers a framework in which only strategic substitutes occur; Morris and Shin
(2005) consider a model in which actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, de-
pending on the sign of an exogenous parameter.
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ciently promising signal sj about its payoff θ, i.e.,
ρj(s
j) = 1 if sj > kj and ρj(s
j) = 0 if sj ≤ kj , for kj ∈ R ∪ {±∞}.
We adopt the convention that kj = ∞ indicates that ρj(sj) = 0, ∀sj , i.e., that player j
always takes action 0, and kj = −∞ indicates that player j always takes action 1.
We will prove in Lemma 1 that best responses to cutoff strategies always take a cutoff
strategy form, and that cutoff strategy equilibria always exist. Cutoff strategies are a sub-
set of the class of strategies in which player j takes action 1 if and only if sj ∈ (kjL, kjR):
cutoff strategies have kjR = ∞. We will provide conditions in Section 6 under which equi-
libria exist in which kjR < ∞. However, when such bounded interval equilibria exist, a
cutoff strategy equilibrium also exists in which (a) players take action 1 following lower
signals about θ (i.e., players are more likely to take action 1), and (b) player welfare is
strictly higher.
Player i’s expected payoff from action 1 given signal si about θ is
E[ρ−i(s−i) θ + (1− ρ−i(s−i)) l|si] = Pr(ρ−i = 1|si) E[θ|ρ−i = 1, si] + Pr(ρ−i = 0|si) l,
where −i refers to player “not i”. Player i’s expected payoff from action 0 is
E[ρ−i(s−i) w + (1− ρ−i(s−i)) h|si] = Pr(ρ−i = 1|si) w + (1− Pr(ρ−i = 1|si))h.
Comparing these expected payoffs reveals that given signal si and beliefs about the strat-
egy ρ−i of the other player, it is optimal for player i to take action 1 if and only if
Pr(ρ−i = 1|si) E[θ|ρ−i = 1, si]+(1−Pr(ρ−i = 1|si)) l > Pr(ρ−i = 1|si) w+Pr(ρ−i = 0|si) h.
Rearranging, it follows that player i should take action 1 if and only if
Pr(ρ−i = 1|si) (E[θ|ρ−i = 1, si]− w + h− l)− (h− l) > 0.
It helps to define µ ≡ h− l > 0 to be the net miscoordination cost of taking action 1 when
the other player takes action 0. Then, player i’s expected net payoff from taking action 1
rather than action 0 following signal si when player −i adopts strategy ρ−i, is
∆(si; ρ−i) ≡ Pr(ρ−i = 1|si) (E[θ|ρ−i = 1, si]− w + µ)− µ. (1.1)
If player −i adopts cutoff k−i, player i’s net expected payoff from action 1 becomes
∆(si; k−i) = Pr(s−i > k−i|si) (E[θ|s−i > k−i, si]− w + µ)− µ, (1.2)
where the structure of the game implies that ∆(si; k−i =∞) = −µ.
The signal si conveys information about both the likelihood that the other player
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takes action 1 and the value of θ. This interaction underlies many subtleties in the anal-
ysis: the expected net payoff from taking action 1 is not monotone in si (see Figure 1.2).
In particular, it falls in si for low values of si, but rises once si is sufficiently high. This
phenomenon occurs very generally for distributions that satisfy logconcavity and feature
an unbounded support from below. That is, the derivative of ∆(si; k−i) is:
dPr(s−i > k−i|si)
dsi
(E[θ|si, s−i > k−i]−w+µ)+Pr(s−i > k−i|si) d(E[θ|s
i, s−i > k−i]− w + µ)
dsi
.
When si is very low (negative), dPr(s
−i>k−i|si)
dsi
is a small positive number, but it multi-
plies a large negative number, E[s|si, s−i > k−i] − w + µ, which swamps the increase in
E[θ|si, s−i > k−i]−w + µ, and drives down ∆(si; k−i). However, eventually as si is raised,
the rise in E[θ|si, s−i > k−i]− w + µ reverses the impact and ∆(si; k−i) rises.
Figure 1.5: ∆ as a function of si. Parameters: σ = 10, σν = 1, w = 4, µ = 1.















a, and f ≡ 1− b
a
. (1.3)
These expressions enter the conditional distributions for θ and s−i. Recall that





θ is normally distributed conditional on si, with mean bsi and variance bσ2ν ;
s−i is normally distributed conditional on si, with mean bsi and variance a2;
If X is normally distributed with mean m and variance v, then E[X|X > L] = m +√
v φ(β)1−Φ(β) , where β =
L−m√
v
, and φ and Φ are the normal pdf and cdf.
Using these relationships, when players adopt cutoff strategies, we can solve for i’s ex-
pected payoff from action 1 given both the information contained in i’s signal si, and the
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information contained in the fact that player −i’s signal led him to take action 1,
E[θ|ρ−i = 1, si] = E
[




























































Substituting equation (1.4) for E[θ|s−i > k−i, si] in the net payoff equation (1.2) yields:
∆(si; k−i) = (1− Φ) (bsi + c φ












We now establish the properties of best responses given that the other player’s strat-
egy takes a cutoff form. Despite the fact that ∆(si; k−i) is neither monotonic nor globally
concave, we now prove that if player −i adopts a cutoff strategy, then it is necessarily
optimal for player i to do so, too. In addition, if −i always takes action 0, then i’s best
response is always to do the same.
Lemma 1. If player −i adopts a cutoff strategy with cutoff k−i, then player i’s best re-
sponse is also a cutoff strategy, ki(k−i). Further, (i) ki(k−i) ∈ R for k−i ∈ R, ki(−∞) =
w
b and k
i(∞) = ∞, (ii) ki(k−i) is continuous on R ∪ {±∞} and differentiable on R, and
(iii) limk−i→∞
k−i − b ki(k−i)
a =∞.
In the proof, we first exploit the asymptotic properties of ∆(si, k−i) (negative if si →
−∞, positive if si → ∞) and the continuity of expected payoffs in si to establish that
there exists a ki such that ∆(ki; k−i) = 0. The challenge is to establish that there is a
unique such ki: the fact that ∆(si; k−i) is not a monotonically increasing function of si
gives rise to the possibility of multiple solutions to the indifference condition ∆(ki; k−i) =






which together with the asymptotic properties of ∆(si, k−i) ensures that (a) there is a







One could instead employ Karlin’s Variation Diminishing Property (VDP) (Karlin
(1968)) to prove that the best response to a cutoff strategy takes a cutoff form. The proof
has two steps: (1) show that if player −i adopts a cutoff strategy, then player i’s expected
net payoff from action 1 has at most one sign change; then, (2) show that it changes sign
at least once from negative to positive. Let pi(θ; k−i) be i’s expected net payoff from ac-
tion 1 given θ and k−i:
pi(θ; k−i) ≡ Pr(s−i > k−i|θ)(θ − w) + Pr(s−i ≤ k−i|θ)(l − h). (1.6)




pi(θ; k−i) f(θ|si) dθ, (1.7)
where f(θ|si) is the pdf of θ conditional on si. By the Variation Diminishing Property of
totally positive functions (Karlin (1968)), if f(θ|si) is totally positive of degree n, denoted
TPn, and pi(θ; k
−i) has at most n− 1 sign changes, then ∆(si; k−i) has at most n− 1 sign
changes. Since f(θ|si) is a normal density, it is totally positive of degree n for all n ∈ N.
In particular, f(θ|si) is TP2: if pi(θ; k−i) has one sign change, then ∆(si; k−i) has at most
one sign change.
To show pi(θ; k−i) has a unique sign change, one mimics the proof of Lemma 1: one
exploits log-concavity of the conditional distribution of s−i given θ to show that pi(θ; k−i)
has a unique extremum, which is a minimum. Part (1) then follows from limθ→−∞ pi(θ; k−i)
< 0. Part (2) follows from limsi→−∞∆(si; k−i) < 0 < limsi→∞∆(si; k−i).5
Lemma 1 implies that there is always an equilibrium in which both players always
take the deterministic action—decisions to take action 0 are mutual best responses. This
is immediate: if player −i always takes action 0, then players never receive θ, and since
l < h, player i is hurt by playing action 1.
Strategic Complements and Substitutes. In most global games, actions are global
strategic complements. We next establish that our game does not have this feature. In
particular, strategic complements obtain if and only if players are not too likely to take
action 1. If player −i takes action 1 even when he receives a very low signal about its
coordination payoff θ, then this reduces player i’s willingness to take action 1: actions
become strategic substitutes, and decreases in k−i begin to increase player i’s best re-
sponse, ki. In essence, when k−i is too low, then unless player i raises his cutoff ki, he
is too likely to experience regret when payoff θ from action 1 is realized.
Proposition 1. There exists a critical cutoff k∗ such that if k−i > k∗, then ki and k−i
are strategic complements, and if k−i < k∗, then ki and k−i are strategic substitutes.
5 The literature (e.g., Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) or Dasgupta (2004)) typically uses limit domi-
nance to prove part (2), where it replaces limsi→−∞∆(s
i; k−i) < 0 < limsi→∞∆(s
i; k−i); Morris and Shin
(2003, p.110) use limit dominance to show there exists an x such that h(x, k, x) = 0.
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The rough intuition is that reducing k−i, (i) reduces the likelihood of miscoordination,
Pr(s−i < k−i|si), reducing the force for strategic complements, and (ii) lowers E[θ|s−i >
k−i, si], raising the force for strategic substitutes.
To establish this result formally, one must characterize the solution to ∆(ki(k−i), k−i) =
0, which leads to a highly non-linear differential equation for which explicit solutions do
not obtain. In the proof, we first observe that since ∂∆(k
i; k−i)
∂ki




∂k−i ). We next define δ(k
i; k−i) ≡ bki − w + µ+ c k−i−bkia , and establish that
sgn(∂∆(k
i;k−i)
∂k−i ) = −sgn(δ(ki; k−i)), which implies sgn( ∂k
i
∂k−i ) = sgn(δ(k
i; k−i)). To complete










φδ + a(1− Φ) .
Inspection reveals that dδ
dk−i is positive whenever δ is positive. This, together with the
asymptotic properties of δ, ensures that there exists a critical cutoff k∗ that determines
the sign of δ. That is, δ > 0 if k−i > k∗, and δ < 0 if k−i < k∗.
Possibility of Interim Regret. Some general aspects of any best response in which a
player sometimes takes action 1 are worth observing. If i does not take action 1, then i
never receives the stochastic payoff θ. If i instead takes action 1, then he receives θ pre-
cisely when −i receives a high signal s−i > k−i about θ; but when −i receives a low sig-
nal, s−i < k−i, player i receives the sure payoff l independently of θ. That is, by taking
action 1, player i makes player −i pivotal in terms of determining whether i receives the
stochastic payoff θ. By taking action 1, player i permits conditioning whether players re-
ceive θ on the information contained in the equilibrium outcome.
Players may reduce cutoffs for taking action 1 to facilitate conditioning whether they
receive θ on joint information. To highlight the extent to which players may do this, note
that whenever µ is small, player i must experience interim regret from taking action 1
conditional on the information contained in both players receiving signals ki and k−i:
given si = ki, s−i = k−i, player i regrets taking action 1 when −i does if and only if
E[θ|ki, k−i] < w. Most obviously, when µ = 0, then ki(k−i) solves
E[θ|s−i > k−i, ki(k−i)]− w = 0, (1.8)
and since E[θ|s−i > k−i, ki(k−i)] > E[θ|s−i = k−i, ki(k−i)], we have
E[θ|ki(k−i), k−i]− w < 0. (1.9)
By continuity, this interim regret result holds as long as µ is sufficiently small.
Asymmetric Equilibria. We next rule out asymmetric equilibria. Were actions global
strategic complements, then equilibria would necessarily be symmetric—reflecting the
monotonicity of best responses. It is harder to preclude asymmetric equilibria when ac-
tions can be strategic substitutes, in which case one player’s high cutoff for action 1 could
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Figure 1.6: ∆ as a function of si. Parameters: σ = 1, σν = 1, w = −2, µ = 1.
be consistent with the other’s low cutoff. Nonetheless, we now rule out any intersection
between the best response curves outside the 45 degree line. To do this, we establish that
∂ki
∂k−i > −1.
Proposition 2. There are no asymmetric cutoff rule equilibria.
Asymmetric equilibria can only possibly exist for k−i ∈ (−∞, k∗), where actions are
strategic substitutes. To show that ∂k
i
∂k−i > −1 is subtle. To do this, we show this bound
holds at the inflection points of ki(k−i), i.e., at the set {k∗∗ : ∂2ki
∂(k−i)2 |k−i=k∗∗ = 0}, ex-
ploiting the properties of an inflection point. As the derivative reaches a local extremum
at the (unique) inflection point, this suffices to prove the result.
It follows that our problem simplifies to that of characterizing all possible symmetric
equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which ki = k−i = k, for some k. Accordingly, we rewrite the
expected net payoff equation (1.5) under symmetry as:
∆1(k) ≡ ∆(k; k) = (1− Φ(fk)) (bk − w + µ) + cφ(fk)− µ, (1.10)
where the arguments of the normal probability terms simplify due to symmetry, as k
−i−bki
a
= 1−ba k = fk. By symmetry, (k, k) is an equilibrium if and only if ∆1(k) = 0.
Properties of ∆1(k). The next lemma establishes that ∆1(k) is single-peaked. In turn,
this shape bounds the maximum number of cutoff strategy equilibria.
Lemma 2. Under symmetry, the expected net payoff from action 1, ∆1(k), has a unique
global maximand, km. Also, limk→−∞∆1(k) = −∞ and limk→∞∆1(k) = −µ.
The single-peaked shape of the expected net payoff equation (1.10), ∆1(k), together
with the location of its maximum vis-a-vis the horizontal axis, determine the number and
relative locations of its zeros, which, in turn, characterize the symmetric equilibrium cut-
offs. See Figure 1.6.
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The next lemma describes how the predatory payoff w affects the maximum of the
expected net payoff, ∆1(k), from taking action 1. To emphasize the dependence of the
peak net payoff on w, we write ∆1(k;w) and km = km(w). Substituting for bk − w + µ
from equation (A.18) into equation (1.10), we can write this peak solely as a function of
km(w):







+ cφ(fkm)− µ, (1.11)
where the index m on ∆ emphasizes that we are evaluating the symmetric net expected
payoff from action 1 at its peak. We then have the following results:
Lemma 3. ∆m(km(w)) is strictly decreasing in w, while km(w) is strictly increasing.
There exists a unique w∗ such that ∆m(km(w∗)) = 0. Further, ∆m(km(w)) > 0 if w < w∗
and ∆m(km(w)) < 0 if w > w
∗.
When w is larger, player i gains more from taking action 0 when player −i takes ac-
tion 1, reducing the peak net payoff from taking action 1, ∆m. Inspecting the derivative
of ∆1 in equation (A.18), reveals that
dkm(w)
dw > 0, because the intersection that character-
izes the maximizer km(w) of the peak is shifted to the right. That is, as w increases, the
maximizer km(w) increases—at the peak, player i takes action 1 less frequently.
Mirroring the analysis of Lemma 3, we now derive the counterintuitive impact of rais-
ing the miscoordination cost µ = h−l. In particular, we establish that as the miscoordina-
tion cost increases, the maximizer km(µ) falls, i.e., player i takes action 1 more frequently.
We also characterize how w∗, which determines the number of equilibria, varies with µ.
Lemma 4.
1. Both ∆m(km(µ); µ) and km(µ) decrease in µ.
2. w∗ is a decreasing differentiable function of µ. Further, ∂w
∗(µ)
∂µ < 0.
3. If h = l so that µ = 0, there is a unique equilibrium in which action 1 is taken.
Further, limµ→0+ w∗(µ) =∞.
4. limµ→∞w∗(µ) = −∞.
5. There exists a unique µˆ > 0 such that w∗(µˆ) = w.
To see that ∆m(km(µ);µ) falls with µ, look at equation (1.10), and note that as a
pointwise function of k, ∆1(k) decreases with µ. Therefore, its maximum decreases in
µ. Inspecting the derivative of ∆1, equation (A.18), reveals the initially counterintuitive
result that dkm(µ)dµ < 0: although raising the predatory payoff w or increasing the cost
µ = h − l both reduce the peak net payoff from taking action 1, they have opposing ef-
fects on its maximizer. In particular, increasing µ implies that the maximizer has players
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taking action 1 more frequently. Reflection resolves the conundrum: when the miscoordi-
nation cost µ is raised, the peak must be at a point where miscoordination is less likely.
Concretely, in a protest setting, when the punishment µ for leading a failed protest is
raised, symmetric expected net payoffs are maximized when protests fail less often, which
requires that citizens be more likely to protest.
Proposition 3 collects the implications of the results that we have established.
Proposition 3. An equilibrium always exists in which players coordinate on action 0
with probability 1, and receive the deterministic coordination payoff h. There exists a
threshold w∗ such that if w > w∗, then only this equilibrium exists.
If w = w∗ then there is a unique equilibrium in which players take action 1 with posi-
tive probability. In this equilibrium, each player takes action 1 if and only if his signal
about θ exceeds km.
If w < w∗, then there are two equilibria in which action 1 is taken with positive proba-
bility. These equilibria are characterized by the solutions, k¯(w) and k(w), to the indif-
ference equation ∆1(k)=0, where k¯(w) < km < k(w). In these equilibria, a player takes
action 1 if and only if his signal exceeds the relevant threshold, k¯(w) or k(w).
Identical characterizations obtain if, instead, we vary the miscoordination cost µ =
h − l: there exist two equilibria in which action 1 is taken with positive probability if and
only if µ is sufficiently small.
Stability and Comparative Statics. We next show that the k¯ equilibrium is a plausi-
ble candidate for describing real world outcomes, whereas the k equilibrium is not. Propo-
sition 4 establishes that the k¯ equilibrium is stable, whereas the k equilibrium is not. We
then prove in Proposition 5 that the k¯ equilibrium, in which the players are most likely
to take action 1, features “natural” comparative statics: raising the predatory payoff w or
raising the miscoordination cost µ, which directly raise the attraction of action 0, in fact
cause players to take action 0 more often in equilibrium, i.e., k¯ increases, meaning that
players must see higher signals about θ in order to take action 1.
In sharp contrast, the k equilibrium has perverse comparative static properties: rais-
ing w or µ, raises the equilibrium likelihood that players take action 1. In essence, at the
k equilibrium, players take action 1 too infrequently: the k equilibrium is only supported
by an “excessive” likelihood of miscoordination. Thus, as we raise w or µ, which directly
reduce the attraction of action 1, the equilibrium must adjust to maintain the attraction
of action 1: player i must believe that player −i is more likely to take action 1, thereby
reducing the extent of miscoordination.
Proposition 4. The equilibria associated with k = ∞ and k¯ are stable, whereas the equi-
librium associated with k is unstable.
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Figure 1.7: Strategic Complements. Parameters: σ = 0.8, σν = 1, µ = −0.6, w = 0.7.
Proposition 5. Suppose that w < w∗, so that the k¯ and k equilibria exist. Then raising
the predatory payoff w or increasing the net miscoordination cost µ reduces the equilib-
rium probability of taking action 1 in the k¯ equilibrium, but raises the equilibrium proba-













1.3 Strategic Substitutes and Complements in Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the nature of strategic interaction between players in equi-
librium. In the lemma below, recall that k∗ is the critical cutoff that determines whether
actions are strategic complements or substitutes (see Proposition 1). We first prove that
when players are reluctant in equilibrium to take action 1, then best responses at the
equilibrium always exhibit strategic complementarities. Specifically, we show that k∗ < k,
where we recall that ki(k−i) is increasing in k−i for all ki > k∗. Lemma 5 then follows
immediately:
Lemma 5. The k equilibrium features strategic complementarities, i.e., k∗ < k.
In sharp contrast, in the equilibrium in which players are most likely to take action
1, strategies can be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes (see Figures 1.7
and 1.8). Proposition 6 reveals that at the k¯ equilibrium, actions are strategic substitutes
if and only if the miscoordination cost µ is sufficiently low. In the proposition, the role of
w small enough is solely to ensure that µ = 0 is “sufficiently low”.
Proposition 6. Suppose that w is sufficiently low, w ≤ 2cφ(0). Then the k¯ equilibrium
features strategic substitutes if and only if µ is sufficiently low.
The structure of the proof is first to note that at the high level of µ where there is a
unique equilibrium, the best response function has a slope of one (i.e., it is tangent to the
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Figure 1.8: Strategic Substitutes. Parameters: σ = 0.8, σν = 1, µ = 0.05, w = −0.5.
45 degree line) at the equilibrium, which implies that strategic complements obtain, i.e.,
k¯ > k∗. We then establish that strategic substitutes obtain when µ = 0, i.e., k¯ < k∗.
Lastly, we provide a monotonicity result in µ: reducing µ lowers k¯ and increases k∗. The
finding combines Propositions 1 and 5. Proposition 1 showed that ki(k−i) exhibits strate-
gic substitutes if and only if k−i is sufficiently low, and Proposition 5 showed that reduc-
ing µ lowers k¯. Therefore, reductions in µ eventually shift k¯ down to the range where best
responses exhibit strategic substitutes.
The logic reflects that reducing the miscoordination cost µ has two distinct effects:
1. In the k¯ equilibrium, it causes players to take action 1 more. Thus, (a) players are
less likely to miscoordinate, which reduces the force for strategic complements, and
(b) E[θ|si, s−i > k¯] falls, which raises the force for strategic substitutes.
2. It directly lowers the incentive to avoid miscoordination, which reduces the force for
strategic complements. In particular, when µ = 0, the force for strategic comple-
ments vanishes, ensuring that strategic substitutes obtain.
1.4 Expected utility, commitment and welfare
We now characterize welfare, and derive how equilibrium cutoffs compare with the one
that players would choose if, ex ante, they could jointly commit to following it.
We use li to denote a cutoff that player i adopts, which could be distinct from from
i’s best response cutoff, ki. Our goal is to characterize how player i’s expected utility
varies with li. To emphasize the generality of our welfare analysis, we subsume the nor-
mal distributions of signals and represent the pdf and cdf by the continuously differen-
tiable functions g and G, respectively. Then
Lemma 6. Player i’s ex-ante expected utility when player i adopts cutoff li and player −i
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adopts cutoff k−i is





(E[θ|si, s−i]−w+µ)g(si, s−i)dsids−i− (1−G(li)) µ+G(k−i) (h−w) +w.
(1.12)
To calculate player i’s expected utility from li in the neighborhood of i’s best response




(E[θ|si, s−i]− w + µ) g(s−i|si)ds−i − µ. (1.13)
Recall that given player −i’s cutoff k−i, player i’s best response, ki(k−i), solves
∆(ki(k−i), k−i) = 0.










(E[θ|li, s−i]− w + µ) g(s−i|li)ds−i − µ
)










(E[θ|si, k−i]− w + µ) g(si|k−i)dsi − (h− w)
)
= −g(k−i) (∆(k−i, li) + µ− (h− w))
= −g(k−i) (∆(k−i, li) + w − l). (1.15)
We next establish the key welfare result that in a neighborhood of finite equilibrium
cutoffs, if and only if w > l, player i’s welfare would be raised were player −i to take
action 1 slightly more often (i.e., to adopt a marginally lower cutoff for action 1).
Lemma 7. At any equilibrium with cutoffs li
∗
and l−i∗,




) (l − w).
The proof is immediate from equation (1.15) because, at equilibrium, ∆(l−i∗ , li∗) = 0.
The intuition for this result hinges on a comparison of how player i would evaluate player
−i’s action choice were he in −i’s shoes (i.e., seeing signal s−i, but not si). Player i inter-
nalizes the expected coordination payoffs (θ or h) when they both take the same action
in exactly the same way as player −i. However, player −i receives l when he takes action
1 and player i takes action 0, while player i’s payoff in this scenario is w. When w = l,
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the players’ miscoordination payoffs are the same, so i would make the same choices as −i
given −i’s information. Since player −i is best responding in equilibrium, player i’s payoff
must also be maximized by player −i’s best response. However, players weigh miscoordi-
nation payoffs differently when w 6= l, so that −i’s best response is no longer what player
i would have him select. In particular, when w > l, player −i internalizes the lower pay-
off l from taking action 1: from player i’s perspective, this causes player −i to take action
1 too infrequently. Conversely, when w < l, from player i’s perspective, player −i takes
action 1 too frequently.
In most economic scenarios, the predatory payoff w exceeds l. For example, in a protest
game, the player who initiates an unsuccessful protest by taking action 1 is punished by
the state; in a conflict game, the player who sticks to peace is hurt by the “surprise at-
tack”; and in an investment game, with miscoordination, the firm taking action 1 incurs
an additional investment cost.6
Thus, there is a limited link between whether equilibrium strategies are strategic sub-
stitutes or strategic complements (which hinges on the magnitude of µ = h − l), and
whether actions are payoff complements or payoff substitutes (which hinges on the mag-
nitude of w − l). This limited link underscores that strategic behavior reflects marginal
considerations, while payoff substitutes/complements reflect average considerations. That
is, the impact of a change in k−i on player i’s best response, reflects a consideration of ex-
pected payoffs conditional on the marginal signals s−i = k−i, si = ki, while the impact of
a change in k−i on player i’s expected utility reflects expectations over all signals that i
could receive conditional on k−i.
We next characterize the symmetric cutoff strategy ks that players would like to jointly
commit themselves to, ex ante. We establish that the consequence of Lemma 7 is that if
and only if w > l, players would be better off if they could jointly commit to taking ac-
tion 1 for lower signals than they do in equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Whenever it is ever socially optimal for players to take action 1 with






where ks < k¯ if and only if w > l.
The proof also shows that h ≤ min{w,E[θ]} is a sufficient condition for it to be so-
cially optimal to take action 1 with positive probability.








= sgn(l − w).
6An exception might be a civil war game, in which unarmed non-combatants suffer most (see, e.g.,
Kalyvas (2006)).
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We emphasize, however, that in contrast to most global games, where actions exhibit
global payoff complementarities due to the reduction in miscoordination, here player i’s
welfare is always harmed if player −i is too willing to take action 1: as k−i is reduced
more and more below ks, eventually player i is hurt because whether players receive θ
depends less and less on the information contained in −i’s signal via −i’s action choice.
In particular, as k−i → −∞, player −i completely deprives player i from conditioning
whether θ is received on their joint information, so that player i’s payoff given signal si
falls to max{E[θ|si], w}.
Strategic Complements/Substitutes and Welfare. We now highlight the useful-
ness of our strategic complement-substitute characterizations by showing how one can
combine it with our welfare findings to derive the welfare consequences of perturbing one
player’s payoffs, so that the payoff structure is slightly asymmetric. For example, sup-
pose we were to increase player i’s predatory payoff slightly from wi = w−i = w to




0 h, h wi, l
1 l, w−i θ, θ
Figure 1.9: Perturbed Payoffs
pected payoff and to cause i to raise his cutoff and take action 0 more often. But what
about the strategic effects? When strategic substitutes obtain, then player −i takes ac-
tion 1 more often when player i takes action 1 less often. The equilibrium is continuous in
, and Lemma 7 reveals that player i benefits when player −i reduces his cutoff and takes
action 1 more (provided w > l). Thus, with strategic substitutes, increasing wi marginally
benefits player i both directly and indirectly. But what happens when strategic comple-
ments obtain? To see most transparently that the negative indirect, strategic effect can
swamp the direct payoff gain, consider the nongeneric case where w is such that the max-
imal and minimal coordination equilibria correspond, i.e., k¯ = k = km. Then raising w
i
causes player i to take action 1 less often, player −i reciprocates by doing the same, and
this spirals so that in the resulting equilibrium players always take action 0.
More formally, differentiating player i’s expected utility with respect to wi at wi =
w−i = w, at the symmetric k¯ equilibrium, yields























The first term is the positive direct welfare effect, while the other terms comprise the
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strategic effect. The second term is zero because li∗ is a best response, and the third fol-
lows from Lemma 7. We have ∂l
i∗
∂wi
> 0,7 so that when w > l, all terms are positive with
strategic substitutes, as ∂l
−i∗
∂li∗ < 0. However, with strategic complements, 0 <
∂l−i∗
∂li∗ , and
hence the strategic term becomes negative. Next observe that equal reductions in h and l
keep their difference, µ = h − l, constant, leaving best responses and hence k¯ unchanged.
However, reducing h and l obviously reduce l − w. It follows that we can manipulate
the relative magnitudes of the direct and strategic effects so that either welfare effect can
dominate: depending on parameters, increasing wi can raise or lower player i’s welfare.
1.5 Public vs. Private Signals
In this section, we consider what happens when players receive public signals about θ
rather than private ones, and contrast equilibrium outcomes in these two scenarios. We
say that players receive public signals when both players receive the same signal, p = θ+ν
about θ, where ν ∼ N(0, σν) is independently distributed from θ.
With public signals, players can perfectly coordinate actions. As a result, in any pure
strategy equilibrium players never receive the low miscoordination payoff l.8 This coordi-
nation game still gives rise to many equilibria: following any signal p about θ, both i and
−i know the signal that each observed. Consequently, independently of the equilibrium
actions following other signals, if i believes that −i will take action 0 following signal p,
then i will take action 0; and by symmetry, this is also −i’s best response. This means
that it can always be part of an equilibrium for both i and −i to take action 0 following
any given public signal p.
The first question of interest is: following which signals p can it be part of an equi-
librium for both players to take action 1? If i believes that −i will take action 1, then i
bases his action choice on a comparison of w and the expected coordination payoff E[θ|p] =
bp from action 1. Thus, his best response is to take action 1 if and only if p > wb ≡ kp. In
any pure strategy equilibrium, both players must adopt the same action following any
signal p. Therefore, if p ≤ kp, neither player takes action 1. Moreover, following signal
p > kp, it is part of an equilibrium for both players to take action 1; and further, for
p > Kp ≡ max{wb , hb }, the expected payoff E[θ|p] from coordinating on action 1 exceeds
that from coordinating on action 0. Proposition 8 summarizes:
Proposition 8. Following a public signal p, in any pure strategy equilibrium:
Following a signal p ≤ kp = wb , players always take action 0.










> 0, since ∂∆(l
i∗;l−i∗,wi)





8Obviously, with perfect correlation in signals, whenever signal p is sufficiently high, we can support
mixing over actions due to the induced positive probability of coordination failure.
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Following a signal p > kp = wb either both players take action 0, or both players take
action 1.
In the equilibrium that maximizes player utility, players take action 1 if and only if p >
Kp ≡ max{wb , hb }.
Public signals allow players to perfectly coordinate their actions, so that players never
receive the low miscoordination payoff l in a pure strategy equilibrium. In contrast, in
any private signal equilibrium in which players take action 1 with strictly positive prob-
ability, players necessarily miscoordinate with strictly positive probability. One might
therefore conjecture that there always exists a public signal equilibrium in which play-
ers are more likely to take action 1 than in any private signal equilibrium. Indeed, this
result is immediate whenever µ is high enough that players never take action 1 in the pri-
vate signal economy. We now establish the far more interesting result that this conjecture
is false whenever µ is small enough:






) > 0, such that players are more
likely to take action 1 in the private signal k¯ equilibrium than in every public signal equi-
librium if and only if µ < µp. Indexing µp by w, we have ∂µ
p(w)
∂w < 0.
The extent to which action 1 is taken in the private signal economy reflects two con-
siderations that are present only in that economy. That is, with private signals,
1. Conditioning outcomes on the signals of both players has value, and player −i’s in-
formation can influence whether i receives θ only if i takes action 1. This raises the
attraction of taking action 1 in the k¯ equilibrium.
2. There is failed coordination, and thus a risk of incurring miscoordination cost µ =
h− l when a player takes action 1.
When µ is sufficiently small, the value of conditioning outcomes on both signals domi-
nates, so that players are more likely to take action 1 in the k¯ private signal equilibrium.
Phrased differently, to permit conditioning whether θ is received on s−i, player i must
take action 1, in effect buying the information contained in player −i’s equilibrium ac-
tion at the costs of (a) incurring µ when player −i takes action 0, or (b) receiving θ when
player −i also receives a marginal signal. In particular, equation (1.9) shows that when
µ is sufficiently small, then E[θ|si = k¯, s−i = k¯] < w. This simply reflects that with
private signals, when µ is small, the cost of the option of having the other player’s signal
influence whether players receive θ becomes that players must sometimes experience re-
gret when both receive signals si = s−i = k¯. Of course, when the miscoordination cost µ
is high enough, this result is reversed and players are more likely to take action 1 in the
kp public signal equilibrium.
We now quantify what it means for the miscoordination cost µ to be sufficiently small
in terms of strategic behavior.
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Proposition 10. Suppose that the miscoordination cost µ is small enough that the k¯ pri-
vate signal equilibrium features strategic substitutes. Then action 1 is more likely to be
taken in this private signal equilibrium than in any public signal equilibrium.
The comparisons in Propositions 9 and 10 are posed between two private signals and
one public signal with the same amount of noise. One might equally be interested in a
comparison between two private signals and two conditionally-independent public signals.
For example, this would be the relevant comparison if there is pre-play communication in
which the players reveal their signals to each other prior to taking actions. In this sce-
nario, each player has more information about θ when signals are public than when they
are private. One might conjecture that as a result, players are always more likely to take
action 1 with two public signals. This conjecture is false, even for arbitrary numbers of
public signals.
With n identically, independently distributed signals, the critical cutoff kpn on the av-
erage signal s¯ =
∑
j sj





= w. It follows directly that when-
ever w is negative, more public signals increase kpn, implying that core results in Propo-
sitions 9 and 10 would be reinforced by n > 1. But, even when w is positive, while the
cutoff kpn = w(1 +
σ2ν
nσ2
) for taking action 1 falls with the number of signals n, it always
strictly exceeds w. Therefore, kpn exceeds k¯ whenever µ is sufficiently small.
We should observe that while reduced noise always shrinks the cutoff |kpn| on public
signals, Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010) establish that the effect of noise is more compli-
cated with private signals. They show in the revolution-protest game where w = h that
increased noise raises the likelihood of taking action 1 whenever µ is sufficiently small and





. That is, the amount of noise that maximizes the
likelihood of taking action 1 sets the signal-to-noise ratio to 1√
2
. Thus, one can identify
simple sufficient conditions under which greater noise with private signals reinforces the
effect of µ sufficiently small to raise further the relative likelihood of taking action 1 in
the private signal economy.
The fact that action 1 is more likely to be taken in the k¯ private signal equilibrium
whenever µ is sufficiently small does not imply that players are more likely to succeed in
coordinating on action 1 in this equilibrium than in the kp public signal equilibrium. In
particular, sometimes only one player takes action 1 in the k¯ private signal equilibrium.
The questions then become, can private signals ever raise the likelihood that both players
coordinate on the action with stochastic payoff, i.e., action 1? And if so, what determines
whether public or private signals lead the players to receive the stochastic coordination
payoff θ more often? We now show that when the miscoordination cost µ = h− l is small,
the answers hinge on the size of w.
Let Ppri be the probability that both players take action 1 in the private signal k¯
equilibrium, and let Ppub be the probability that both players take action 1 in the pub-
lic signal kp equilibrium. We know that as w → −∞, the probability that both players
take action 1 goes to one, independently of the signal correlation, and that as w → ∞,
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the probability that both players take action 1 goes to zero. The next result signs how an
increase in w affects the sign of the difference between these probabilities in these limiting
scenarios. In particular, it shows that at both limits, raising w decreases the private-public








The proofs are non-trivial. To sign the difference in derivatives when w becomes suf-


















φ(x) ≤ 1− Φ(x) and some algebra to establish the result.
The following corollaries are immediate:
Corollary 2. For w sufficiently negative, the probability of coordinating on action 1 is
lower in any private signal equilibrium than in the kp equilibrium with public signals:
limw→−∞ Ppri(k¯(w))− Ppub(kp(w)) < 0.
Corollary 3. Suppose that µ = 0. For w sufficiently high, the probability of coordinat-
ing on action 1 is higher in the k¯ equilibrium of the private signal economy than in any
equilibrium with public signals: limw→∞ Ppri(k¯(w))− Ppub(kp(w)) > 0.
Analytically, for intermediate values of w, it is a challenge to characterize the relative
likelihoods of coordination on action 1 with private and public signals. However, numer-
ical investigations reveal that the qualitative content of these corollaries extend. Figures
1.10 and 1.11 present a typical relationship between w and the difference in the equilib-
rium likelihood of successful coordination on action 1 with private and public signals.
These numerical investigations indicate that, consistent with Figure 1.11, as long as µ
is sufficiently small (but not necessarily zero), there is always an interval of values of w
above E[θ] (but not too much greater, so that the optimality of action 1 is very sensitive
to the other player’s information) such that coordination on action 1 is more likely when
players receive private signals. In contrast, whenever w ≤ E[θ], coordination on action 1
is always more likely when players receive public signals.
1.6 Bounded Interval Strategies
In this section, we characterize equilibria for a broader class of equilibrium strategies in
which the set of signals for which players take action 1 needs only be connected, i.e., a
player takes action 1 if and only if si ∈ (kiL, kiR); a cutoff strategy has kiR =∞.
We say that player −i adopts the bounded interval strategy (k−iL , k−iR ), when
ρ−i(s−i) = 1 if and only if k−iL < s




R ∈ R. (1.16)
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Figure 1.10: Parameters: σ = 1, σν = 1, µ = 0.
Figure 1.11: Parameters: σ = 1, σν = 2, µ = 0.04.
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Let Γ[si; k−iL , k
−i
R ] be player i’s expected net payoff from taking action 1 when he receives
signal si and player −i adopts interval strategy (k−iL , k−iR ). From equation (1.1),
Γ[si; k−iL , k
−i
R ] = Pr(ρ−i = 1|si) (E[θ|ρ−i = 1, si]− w + µ)− µ (1.17)
= Pr(k−iL < s
−i < k−iR |si) (E[θ|k−iL < s−i < k−iR , si]− w + µ)− µ.
Substitute
Pr(k−iL < s
−i < k−iR |si) = Pr(s−i < k−iR |si)− Pr(s−i < k−iL |si)











into (1.17) to obtain
























To characterize player i’s best response when player −i adopts a bounded interval strat-
egy, it helps to rewrite Γ[si; k−iL , k
−i
R ] in a way that exploits the total positivity properties
of the normal distribution. Player i’s incremental return from taking action 1 given θ and
ρ−i = (k−iL , k
−i
R ) is
pi(θ; k−iL , k
−i
R ) ≡ (θ − w) Pr(k−iL < s−i < k−iR |θ) + (l − h) (1− Pr(k−iL < s−i < k−iR |θ))
= (θ − (w − µ)) Pr(k−iL < s−i < k−iR |θ)− µ. (1.19)
Then we can write player i’s net expected payoff from taking action 1 given signal si as





pi(θ; k−iL , k
−i
R ) f(θ|si) dθ, (1.20)
where f(θ|si) is the pdf of θ given si. By the Variation Diminishing Property of totally
positive functions (Karlin (1968)), if f(θ|si) is totally positive of degree n and pi(θ; k−i)
has r ≤ n − 1 sign changes, then Γ(si; k−iL , k−iR ) has at most r sign changes. Moreover, if
Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) has exactly r sign changes, then pi and Γ exhibit the same sequence of sign
changes as their arguments traverse their domains. Because f(θ|si) is a normal distribu-
tion, it is TPn for all n ∈ N; in particular, f(θ|si) is TP3.
Proposition 12. Suppose player −i adopts a bounded interval strategy, i.e., ρ−i(s−i) = 1
if and only if k−iL < s




R ∈ R. Then player i’s best response either
takes a bounded interval form or kiL =∞. That is, either
1. There exist kiL, k
i
R ∈ R with kiL < kiR such that player i’s best response is ρi(si) = 1
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if and only if kiL < s
i < kiR.
2. Or, player i’s best response is to always take action 0.
Further, player i’s best response is a bounded interval strategy if w is sufficiently low.
Figure 1.12: An interval equilibrium. The left panel depicts contour curves
Γ[kL; kL, kR] = 0, Γ[kR; kL, kR] = 0, and their intersections. The right panel depicts
Γ[si; kL = −9.98, kR = −1.88]. The figures together show that the interval equilibrium
(−9.98,−1.88) is a fixed point of the best response correspondence. Parameters: σ = 1,
σν = 1, w = −5, µ = 1.
Athey (2002), Friedman and Holden (2008), and Jewitt (1987) use VDP but only for
TP2 (i.e., they use the implications of MLRP) to establish the single-crossing property
under some integral transformations.9 However, to characterize non-monotone strategies,
we must extend the analysis to higher orders, here to TP3.
The necessary and sufficient condition for a symmetric bounded interval equilibrium
to exist is Γ[si; kL, kR] > 0 if and only if s
i ∈ (kL, kR). It is difficult to determine sharp
conditions on primitives that ensure the existence of a bounded interval equilibrium. How-
ever, the opposite type of existence characterization is possible: we can establish neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the symmetric bounded interval equilibrium associated
with (kL, kR) to exist for some set of primitive parameters.
Proposition 13. There exists a set of primitive parameters {µ,w, σ, σν} for which (kL, kR)
is a symmetric bounded interval equilibrium strategy if and only if kL < E[θ] = 0 and
|kL| > |kR|.
In the proof, we use Proposition 12 to show that the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for (kL, kR) to be a symmetric bounded interval equilibrium strategy is that Γ[kL; kL, kR]
9See, however, example 6 in Jewitt (1987).
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= Γ[kR; kL, kR] = 0. Since E[θ|si, kL < s−i < kR] increases in si, E[θ|si = kL, kL <
s−i < kR] < E[θ|si = kR, kL < s−i < kR]. Therefore, from equation (1.17), a player
with signal kL must believe he is more likely to receive θ than does a player with signal
kR, i.e., Pr(kL < s
−i < kR|kL) > Pr(kL < s−i < kR|kR). This requires that the peak
of the conditional density of s−i given kL, f(s−i|kL), be located closer to the middle of
the (kL, kR) interval than the peak of f(s
−i|kR), which happens if and only if |kL| > |kR|.
Given |kL| > |kR|, we find µ > 0 and w that simultaneously solve the two equations
Γ[kL; kL, kR] = Γ[kR; kL, kR] = 0, where we note that w << 0 will be required when
kL << 0. It is straightforward to numerically compute the fixed points of the associated
best response correspondence, Γ[kL; kL, kR] = Γ[kR; kL, kR] = 0, for parameterizations in
which such equilibria exist. Figure 1.12 depicts one such equilibrium.
We now turn to characterizing the properties of bounded interval equilibria relative
to properties of cutoff equilibria. We then use these results to derive upper bounds on the
magnitude of w for which bounded interval equilibria exist.
Proposition 14. If (kL, kR) is a symmetric bounded interval equilibrium strategy, then
k¯ < kL < k.
We establish that kL > k¯ via contradiction, exploiting the facts that (a) E[θ|si, kL <
s−i < kR] increases in kR, so the lower bound BRL((kL, kR)) characterizing the best re-
sponse to (kL, kR) decreases in kR, and (b) the stability of the k¯ equilibrium then ensures
that BRL((kL,∞)) > kL for kL < k¯. Analogously, we establish that kL < k exploiting the
fact that the k equilibrium is not stable.
This result immediately implies that players are strictly more likely to take action 1
in the k¯ cutoff equilibrium than in any bounded interval equilibrium. The twin require-
ments from Propositions 13 and 14 that kL < E[θ] = 0 and k¯ < kL < k imply that a
bounded interval equilibrium can only exist if k¯ < 0, which, in turn, imposes restrictions
on the primitives of the economy.
Corollary 4. If w ≥ 2cφ(0), then no bounded interval equilibrium exists.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper exhaustively characterizes the properties of a rich class of coordination games.
The key feature of these games is that either players receive the stochastic payoff only
when they both take a “stochastic coordination action” (action 1); or players receive the
stochastic component unless they both take a “deterministic coordination action”. Theo-
retically, our paper contributes to the global games literature by relaxing convenient but
restrictive assumptions of global strategic complementarities and two-sided limit dom-
inance, and by characterizing the equilibria at non-vanishing levels of uncertainty. We
also develop a novel approach to characterize the properties of non-monotone equilibria
that can be employed in other settings. From an applied viewpoint, our paper provides
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a tractable analytical framework that captures the essence of strategic behavior in many
important economic and political settings.
The strategic structure of the games we study is such that: (1) To exploit the infor-
mation in the other player’s signal, a player must take the “pivotalizing action” (action
1) that, in effect, delegates to the other player whether deterministic or stochastic payoffs
are received. By making the other player pivotal, a player facilitates conditioning whether
a stochastic payoff is received on their joint information. (2) When a player is too will-
ing to take the stochastic coordination action, he deprives the other player from optimally
conditioning whether the stochastic payoff is received on their joint information. This re-
duces the other player’s incentive to take the stochastic coordination action, and consti-
tutes the force for strategic substitutes.
Both of these strategic considerations also exist in broader classes of games. For ex-
ample, consider the payoffs in the investment game in Figure 1.7, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Carls-
son and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003) consider the case where α = 1,
which implies that actions are global strategic complements, while α = 0 is a special case
of our framework. However, the same strategic considerations that arise when α = 0 also
arise when 0 < α < 1, as when the other player does not invest, this damps the con-
sequences of θ for the player who invests. As such, the other player’s equilibrium action
contains information about θ that can be exploited. Thus, (1) the same strategic delega-
tion considerations emerge, so that each player becomes more willing to invest to facili-
tate conditioning the full receipt of the stochastic payoff on the other player’s signal; and
(2) if one player is too willing to invest, this eventually reduces the other player’s willing-
ness to invest, i.e., strategic substitutes obtain.
no invest invest
no invest 0, 0 0, θ − k
invest αθ − k, 0 θ, θ
We highlight some substantive implications of these strategic considerations. For ex-
ample, whether a player’s welfare increases or decreases when his predatory payoff w > l
increases can hinge on whether equilibrium actions are strategic substitutes or comple-
ments: when strategic substitutes, his welfare increases; when strategic complements, the
strategic effect can decrease his welfare. We also show that in order to exploit the infor-
mation in the other player’s signal, whenever miscoordination costs are sufficiently small,
players take the stochastic coordination action more often when they receive private sig-
nals rather than public ones, even though public signals allow players to circumvent mis-
coordination.
The obvious next step in the research agenda is to investigate strategic behavior when
there are more than two players. Extensions to N > 2 players in which the stochastic
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coordination payoff is realized only if all players take the same action are routine. Such
a unanimity requirement may be reasonable in some contexts, where N is small, but not
when N is large. Relaxing the unanimity requirement, so that the stochastic payoff is re-
alized if and only “enough” players take the stochastic coordination action, gives rise to
free-riding incentives that complicate analysis.10 Still, the economic forces that we de-
scribe remain present as long as when the stochastic payoff is realized, players who take
the stochastic coordination action receive a higher payoff than players who do not (that
offsets the free-riding incentive).
10Such free riding shows up, for example, in the costly voting literature (see e.g., Krasa and Polborn
(2009)), but that literature considers a private value setting with conditionally independently-distributed
binary preference shocks so there is no conditioning on the information in the equilibrium outcome, and
the strategic considerations that we investigate do not emerge. Conversely, the strategic voting and jury
literature (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999)) feature a common value structure so that agents
internalize the information contained in equilibrium outcomes when choosing actions, but there is, in
essence, no cost for voting against a majority, so that even with a richer (continuous) signal structure than
the binary signal structure that this literature considers, strategic interactions would simplify, as actions
would always be strategic substitutes.
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Chapter 2
Collective Action with Uncertain
Payoffs: Coordination, Public
Signals and Punishment Dilemmas
“Revolution, like Saturn, devours its own children”.1 Many leaders of successful revolu-
tions and political protests later experience far worse outcomes than they could reason-
ably have expected under the status quo. Nonetheless, many individuals in different times
and countries endanger their lives trying to overthrow authoritarian regimes. These ob-
servations suggest great uncertainty about the outcome of tremendous changes that come
with successful revolutions. So too, there can be extensive uncertainty in citizens’ assess-
ments of the status quo due to propaganda and state censorship that limit reliable infor-
mation dissemination to citizens.
The literature on collective action has focused on the uncertainties about the regime’s
ability to repress collective action (Boix and Svolik 2009; Edmond 2008), the costs of col-
lective action (Persson and Tabellini 2006; Lohmann 1994b), and the number of dissidents
willing to revolt (Lohmann 1994b, Bueno de Mesquita 2010a). In particular, the litera-
ture has largely overlooked uncertainties about the status quo and the alternative (revo-
lution) that is the focus of our analysis. These uncertainties may matter little for staunch
revolutionaries whose sole focus is on overthrowing a regime. However, often most ordi-
nary citizens are uncertain even about whether the status quo is “bad” enough, and the
alternative “good” enough, to make successful revolution desirable. The contribution of
this paper is to integrate uncertainty about payoffs into a model of collective action, and
investigate the implications of the strategic interactions that emerge.
We model the “calculus of protest” of individuals who must decide whether to sub-
mit to the status quo or mount a revolution based on their personal assessments about
the value of the status quo. The model features two representative citizens, A and B, who
can challenge the status quo by mounting a revolution. Each citizen receives a private
signal about the uncertain payoff from living under the status quo.2 They then decide
whether to revolt. The revolution succeeds if and only if both citizens revolt, in which
case citizens receive the revolution payoff. Otherwise, the status quo prevails, and a citi-
zen who participates in a failed revolution is punished.
This strategic environment gives rise to a complicated strategic calculus for citizens.
1“Die Revolution ist wie Saturn, frisst ihre eigenen kinder”(from Georg Bu¨chner’s play, Danton’s
Death.)
2Citizens could instead be uncertain about the revolution payoff, or about the difference between the
status quo and revolution payoffs. The models are strategically equivalent because optimal actions hinge
on the difference in expected payoffs.
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Citizen A realizes that his assessment of the status quo is not accurate, and might “ac-
cidentally” be much better or much worse than what the status quo really is. However,
citizen A understands that citizen B revolts only after receiving bad signals about the
status quo. Because revolution does not succeed without citizen B’s participation, this
helps citizen A to avoid overturning the status quo as a result of his wrong assessment,
which would result in a state of revolution worse than the status quo. Similarly, if citizen
A has a moderate assessment of the status quo,he might still revolt to allow the revolu-
tion to succeed when citizen B forms a worse assessment about the status quo, and hence
revolts.
These observations have two distinct consequences: (1) If citizen B is too willing to
revolt—if he revolts even after receiving very good signals about the status quo, he de-
prives citizen A of effectively conditioning the overturn of the status quo on the aggregate
information contained in both citizen A’s and citizen B’s assessments; that is, if citizen
A’s assessment of the status quo is bad and he revolts, revolution succeeds even when
citizen B’s assessment of the status quo is so good that, conditional on their joint infor-
mation, the expected value of the status quo is much better that the value of revolution.
Therefore, when a citizen is too willing to revolt, the other citizen’s incentive to revolt
is reduced. (2) A citizen may revolt even when her personal assessment based solely on
her private signal of the status quo is so good that were the other citizen’s assessment
as good,he would actually prefer that the revolution fails (and he be punished)—rather
than be joined by the other citizen and proceed to a successful revolution. As a result,
sometimes revolution succeeds when both citizen are, indeed, worse off under the state of
revolution. That is, “interim regret” given joint information is an intrinsic characteristic
of collective action when actors receive private signals about uncertain payoffs and they
cannot fully communicate their information. By revolting even when he thinks the status
quo is not that bad, a citizen “buys” the option to have the other citizen’s information
determine whether the status quo is replaced—at the costs of (i) sometimes being the sole
revolter and being punished, and (ii) sometimes experiencing “interim regret”.
Several counter-intuitive results emerge. (1) One might think that limiting citizens’
information about the status quo and about each others’ assessments of the status quo
would reduce their incentives to revolt: such limitations (a) reduce citizens’ abilities to
assess “bad” news about the status quo, and (b) reduce their information about each
other’s information, which decreases their ability to coordinate and avoid punishment.
We show that this intuition is not always true. In particular, we identify sufficient con-
ditions under which more accurate information decreases incentives to revolt. Related to
Magaloni’s (2010) assessment in the context of election fraud that “limited information
about fraud might actually end up working against the autocrats (Magaloni 2010, 761)”,
we establish that keeping the citizens behind “the veil of ignorance” is a double-edged
sword. In fact, less information about the status quo can increase citizens’ incentives to
revolt because (a) their less informative signals about the status quo reduce the weight
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placed on “good” signals about the status quo, and (b) when citizens have more accurate
assessment of each other’s information, they do not need to “buy” access to each other’s
information by revolting more, as described above.
(2) A common theme in the literature is that public signals, which generate common
knowledge, increase citizens’ incentive to revolt and raise the likelihood of collective ac-
tion (e.g., Chwe 2000, 2001; Egorov et al. 2009). However, we establish that, as long as
failed revolution is not punished too harshly, citizens revolt more when they receive pri-
vate signals than when they receive public signals. The intuition reflects the netting of
two conflicting effects: (a) With public signals, citizens coordinate perfectly, avoiding the
risk of punishment for participation in a failed (uncoordinated) collective action, whereas
with private signals, there is always fear of mis-coordination and punishment. (b) With
private signals, citizens don’t know each others’ assessments of the status quo, and hence
a citizen has an incentive to revolt in order to facilitate conditioning the outcome on the
other citizen’s assessment. This incentive does not exist with public signals because citi-
zens know each others’ information. When the punishment for failed revolution is small,
the second effect dominates, and each citizen revolts more with private signals (than with
public signals) because he can gain more from conditioning the outcome on their joint in-
formation than he risks in punishment.
Indeed, despite the mis-coordination that necessarily emerges with private signals,
citizens may be so much more likely to revolt in the private signal society that the proba-
bility of a successful revolution may also be higher. In particular, there is more successful
revolution when citizens receive private signals if the punishment for failed revolt is suf-
ficiently low and the ex-ante expected payoff from revolt is only slightly less than the ex-
ante expected status quo: in such a situation, the value of conditioning outcomes on joint
information is high relative to the punishment for mis-coordination.
(3) One might conjecture that because harsher punishments deter collective action,
they must reduce the probability that the state actually has to suppress a revolt. Sur-
prisingly, this is not always so. In fact, harsher punishment can increase the incidence of
punishment. We call this Punishment Dilemma 1. The reasoning reflects two conflicting
mechanisms. When the state punishes failed revolt more harshly, this reduces the likeli-
hood that any given citizen revolts. However, it also raises the probability that following
any given signal that induces one citizen to revolt, the other citizen does not join in, al-
lowing the state to suppress the revolt. In particular, when failed revolters are not pun-
ished harshly, slightly harsher punishments raise the probability of observing repression
because coordination in revolt is impaired. In contrast, when the punishment is already
harsh, further increases in the severity of punishment make revolt so unlikely that the
probability of failure/repression also falls. We present the empirical and normative impli-
cations of this finding.
Punishment Dilemma 1 has implications for a state’s choices of how harshly to punish
dissent. Contemplate a state that does not punish dissent harshly, presumably due to the
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high costs. Were that state to increase the level of punishment, Punishment Dilemma 1
indicates that the state would also have to repress dissenters more frequently. This indi-
rect frequency effect magnifies repression costs, making repression less attractive to the
state. This suggests an explanation for why states that do not punish dissent harshly,
tend not to increase punishment in the future. This finding is consistent with the robust
empirical finding that past repression is the key explanatory variable in explaining vari-
ations in repression after controlling for other relevant variables (Davenport 1996, 2007a,
2007c; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
Punishment Dilemma 1 also implies that the frequencies of repression and protest
can be positively or negatively correlated. In particular, when punishment levels are low,
the probability of protest falls as the probability of repression increases, implying a nega-
tive correlation between protest and repression. In contrast, when punishment levels are
higher, the correlation becomes positive. We call this Punishment Dilemma 2. This result
provides a theoretical lens through which to view the empirical research on the “punish-
ment puzzle”(Davenport 2007c) that finds conflicting relationships between the frequen-
cies of repression and protest.
Methodologically, our paper provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of col-
lective action with uncertain payoffs. We prove that as long as the punishment for par-
ticipating in a failed revolt is not too high, three equilibria in cutoff strategies exist. The
two equilibria that feature revolution are distinguished by the probability with which rev-
olution occurs—in essence, by the critical cutoffs that determine whether a citizen revolts.
We argue that the “high revolution” equilibrium is the reasonable outcome because it is
stable in best responses, and features natural comparative statics properties (the proba-
bility of revolution is increasing in the revolution payoff and decreasing in the punishment
for participating in a failed revolution). In contrast, the “low revolution” equilibrium is
unstable, and features the opposite, perverse comparative statics. We also demonstrate
that our qualitative findings extend to settings in which one citizen (or group of citizens)
on her own has a (small) chance of leading a successful revolution, even without the par-
ticipation of others. In such settings, a citizen recognizes that although punishment may
be less likely because the revolution might succeed even when he revolts alone, the other
citizen’s information cannot be utilized as much either because it has a smaller impact on
the ultimate success or failure of a revolution.
The paper’s outline is as follows. Next, we review related models of collective action
and coordination and discuss the sources of payoff uncertainty in collective action. Sec-
tion 2 presents the model and basic properties of strategies, expected payoffs and equilib-
ria. In section 3, we discuss punishment dilemmas and accommodation inertia. Section 4




Our model is related to the literature on collective action and coordination. One branch
of this literature builds on Olson’s (1965) seminal contribution, to explore free-riding is-
sues in revolution and contentious politics (Leeson 2010; Lichbach 1995, 1998; Tullock
1971; Van Belle 1996; see also Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). To focus on the implications of
payoff uncertainty, we abstract from free-riding issues and uncertainty about the “tech-
nology of revolution” that have been so extensively studied. Another branch builds on
Schelling’s tipping point model (Schelling 1969, 1971). In this model, observing enough
individuals choosing an action can tip optimal actions, causing other individuals to take
the action (see Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1989, 1991; and especially Lohmann (1994a,
1994b) who extends Kuran’s model to integrate learning and intertemporal information
aggregation in a signaling context).
In terms of appearances, our paper is closest to the collective action literature that
features a global game structure (Boix and Svolik 2009; Edmond 2008; Egorov et al. 2009;
and Persson and Tabellini 2006). In its most general form, a global game is an incomplete
information game in which players receive private information/signals about unknown
and uncertain payoff-relevant parameters of the game (Carlsson and van Damme 1993).
However, the global games literature typically features (a) global strategic complementar-
ities and (b) (two-sided) limit dominance (Chassang 2010; Frankel et al. 2003; Mathevet
2010; Morris and Shin 1998, 2001, 2003; Chamley 1999; Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
assume limit dominance, but not global strategic complementarities), neither of which
hold in our framework. Therefore, the techniques and findings of this literature cannot
transfer to our setting.
Global strategic complementarities, also known as “action monotonicity”, refers to
strategic settings in which a player’s incentive to choose an action always increases with
the likelihood that other players take the same action. Strategic complementarities arise
in many coordination games. For example, Edmond (2008) shows that complementarities
arise naturally when there is uncertainty regarding the technology of revolution (see also
Boix and Svolik 2009). In Edmond’s model, a regime is overturned if enough citizens act
against it, and each citizen receives a private signal about the threshold of anti-regime
participation above which the regime collapses. Strategic complementarities emerge be-
cause revolting is more attractive when the revolution is more likely to succeed, and the
revolution is more likely to succeed when other citizens are more likely to revolt. In con-
trast, the structure of our game, in which players receive signals about the uncertain
status quo or revolution payoffs, gives rise to both strategic complementarities and sub-
stitutes: When a citizen is unlikely to revolt, the other citizen’s best response features
strategic complements; however, when a citizen is likely to revolt, the other citizen’s best
response features strategic substitutes (see Proposition 15).
Two-sided limit dominance refers to strategic environments in which each player has
a dominant strategy when his signal about the stochastic parameter of the game is suf-
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ficiently high or low. That is, a player’s optimal action does not depend on the actions
of other players when he receives very “good” or very “bad” news/signal. In our game,
when a citizen receives a very good signal about the status quo, he has a dominant strat-
egy not to revolt, independently of whether the other citizen revolts. However, when he
receives a bad signal, his optimal decision depends on what the other citizen does because
if he revolts alone, revolution fails and he is punished. That is, one-sided limit dominance
emerges naturally.
From a technical standpoint, the absence of global strategic complementarities and
two-sided limit dominance gives rise to analytical challenges. For example, due to the ab-
sence of global strategic complementarities, asymmetric equilibria may exist; and the lack
of two-sided limit dominance deprives us of the convenience of working with a compact
subset of types. There are very few papers that analyze incomplete information coordi-
nation games that do not satisfy two-sided limit dominance (Baliga and Sjostrom 2004;
Bueno de Mesquita 2010a; Chassang and Padro i Mequel 2008), and almost all games an-
alyzed in this literature feature global strategic complementarities.3
Our paper builds on the analysis in Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011). That paper
considers a broader class of games, establishing key foundational properties. In particular,
it establishes that cutoff rule equilibria exist and are necessarily symmetric, it provides
stability and strategic substitutes/complements characterizations, and a welfare analysis.
We include proofs of overlapping results here for completeness, as they are derived in a
different setting.
2.0.2 Uncertainty in Collective Action
In this section, we discuss two types of uncertainties that dissidents (actors) face in most
collective action settings. Although the arguments apply to a wide range of collective ac-
tion settings, including revolutions, strikes, coups, and protests, we focus on a revolution
setting in order to crystallize ideas. We divide uncertainties into two broad categories ac-
cording to the sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about the “technology of revolution”
and uncertainty about the payoffs of revolution and/or status quo. Bueno de Mesquita
(2010b) independently develops a similar categorization.
Uncertainty about the “technology of revolution” refers to the uncertainty in the rela-
tionship between the dissidents’ actions and the success of revolution. The typical exam-
ple is uncertainty about how the number of citizens who revolt affects the probability of
success, which also depends on the strength of the regime about which citizens have only
partial knowledge (e.g., Boix and Svolik 2009; Edmond 2008).
While not dismissing the relevance of uncertainty about the “technology of revolu-
tion”, our paper focuses on the effects of payoff uncertainty. There is massive historical
3Goldstein and Pauzner’s (2005) study of bank runs is an exception. However, the source of strategic
substitutes in their game is very different from ours—strategic substitutes emerge due to the congestion
effects associated with a bank run, and is not informational in nature. See Shadmehr and Bernhardt
(2010) and Bueno de Mesquita (2010b) for discussions.
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evidence underscoring the importance of payoff uncertainty. Uncertainty about the pay-
offs of (successful) revolution is a robust feature of contentious politics. In fact, it is nec-
essary to reconcile the dire fates of many revolutionaries during the “reigns of terror”4
following the success of revolutions in which they had endangered their lives. We posit
that if these revolutionaries knew that they would be imprisoned, tortured, executed, and
“devoured” by the new regime that they themselves brought about, they would not have
sacrificed so much for its cause under the old regime. Such reigns of terror are so abun-
dant that some consider it part of “the anatomy of revolution” (Brinton 1965). We briefly
discuss examples from Iran, Russia, and France.
In the years preceding the 1979 Iranian Revolution, many groups from different back-
grounds and political orientations fought the Pahlavi regime along with the religious op-
position. Both Marxists and Muslims with leftist tendencies were active in the armed
struggle against the Pahlavi regime, and subject to heinous forms of repression and tor-
ture. So, too, both non-religious Liberals and religious Liberals with secular agendas had
a long history of resistance against the dictatorship of the Pahlavis (Abrahamian 1982;
Milani 1994). However, shortly after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, followers
of Khomeini monopolized power, excluding and purging the left and liberals as “counter-
revolutionary”, and embarking upon a wave of prosecutions and summary trials that con-
victed thousands to death, and more to imprisonment (Abrahamian 1989, 1999, 2008).
“The toll taken among those who had participated in the revolution was far greater than
that among the royalists. This revolution—like others—had devoured its own children.
(Abrahamian 2008, p.181)”
Following the 1917 October Revolution, Bolsheviks excluded from power Mensheviks,
Social Revolutionaries, and liberals without whom the 1917 February Revolution would
not have happened. Exclusion was followed by the brutal repression of many who had
played a crucial role in the October Revolution. In March 1921, the sailors and other in-
habitants of the Kronstadt naval base, who had supported the Bolsheviks in the October
Revolution, rebelled against the one-party rule of the Bolsheviks. They were ruthlessly
suppressed by the Red Army (Fitzpatrick 1994, p.94-5); Riasanovsky and Steinberg 2005,
p.475). Later in “The Great Terror” of the thirties, Stalin and his “cult of personality”
expelled, exiled, imprisoned, and executed hundreds of thousands of party members in-
cluding prominent Bolsheviks such as Bukharin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, and Trotsky
(Conquest 1990; Fitzpatrick 1994; McCauley 2008; Riasanovsky and Steinberg 2005).
The massacre of The June Days following the 1848 French Revolution is another ex-
ample. Workers and leftists had played a decisive role in the 1848 February Revolution
that overthrew the July Monarchy and brought about the Second Republic. However, by
June 1848, these revolutionaries had reached the conclusion best described in a poster
that appeared on the walls of Paris, “Citizens! On the February barricades, the men we
4The Reign of Terror refers to a period following the 1789 French Revolution during which the Ja-
cobins and their followers under the leadership of Robespierre executed thousands of “enemies of the
revolution”, many of whom were staunch revolutionaries such as Danton.
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had installed as members of the provisional government promised us a democratic and so-
cial republic.... In four months, what they have done? They have violated their oaths, for
they have not kept their promises. (Tilly and Lees 1975, p.170)” A “miniature civil war”
ensued between the workers, on one side, and the Paris National Gard and army, on the
other, which lasted from June 23 to 26. It took a toll of about 4,500—some 1,300 from
the “forces of order”, the rest from the insurgents. The workers were defeated, about
11,000 arrested and some 4,500 sent to distant regions or jailed. The massacre of June
Days was followed by repression of the left and encroachment on civil liberties, which cul-
minated in the Bonaparte 1851 coup (Fortescue 2005; Merriman 1978; data are from Tilly
and Lees 1975, Traugott 1985).
Uncertainty about the status quo is also significant. States manipulate information
via propaganda and censorship. Sometimes states attribute failures to exogenous factors
beyond their control, for example, to conspiracy plans of foreign powers and their spies.
Other times, they find scapegoats, and punish them as incompetent and corrupt bureau-
crats in the state apparatus. It is difficult for citizens to identify the causes of bad out-
comes especially when information is manipulated, and evidence is confounding. Even
after attributing a failure to the state, one must identify the responsible actors who often
blame each other. This latter source of uncertainty resembles the presumption in the no-
tion of “clarity of responsibility”, i.e., there is often uncertainty about who in the govern-
ment bears the responsibility for a bad outcome (Powell 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993;
see Tavits (2007) for the effect on corruption, and Bueno de Mesquita and Landa (2008)
for a formal model).5 “Clarity of responsibility” seems to be an intrinsic problem in both
democracies and dictatorships, and is one source of the uncertainties involved in citizens’
assessments of the status quo.
Examples of the above mechanisms abound. Following the bloody uprising in Tabriz,
Iran, in February 1978 organized by Islamic opposition, Mohammad Reza Shah made a
speech claiming that communist agents instigated the protest. After the establishment of
Islamic Republic, the new regime repeatedly accused the leftist opposition as Russian or
American agents (Abrahamian 1999). In Russia, following the aborted 1917 June upris-
ing, the Bolsheviks, Lenin in particular, were accused of being German agents. After seiz-
ing power, the Bolsheviks, in particular, Stalin continued a similar practice. Accusations
were followed by show trials, “undeniable evidence”, “public confessions” and recanta-
tions followed by executions (Conquest 1990; Fitzpatrick 1994; Riasanovsky and Steinberg
2005). More informed people can often, but not always,6 discard such accusations, but
5A form of this idea has been developed in the contentious politics literature. It states that for
grievances to be directed toward the state, dissidents must identify the state, as opposed to local ac-
tors, as the source of their discontent. Discussing the emergence of modern social movements, Tarrow
(1998) argues that “as the activities of nation states expanded and penetrated society, they also caused
the targets of collective action to shift from private and local actors to national centers of decision making.
(Tarrow 1998, p.72)” (see also Parsa 2000, p.12-21; and Tilly 1986).
6See Abrahamian (1999, 186-87) for the reaction of different opposition groups to the trials of commu-
nist Tudeh Party leaders in the Islamic Republic.
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ordinary citizens often lack the knowledge and means to evaluate a state’s claims.
Economic failures provide another example. An economic crisis might be caused by
the bad economic policies of incompetent or corrupt statesmen, but it also might be due
to an international economic recession beyond their control or the “greedy” actions of the
business sector. The state often blames the latter sources for its failed economic policies.
For example, following the oil boom of the early 1970’s, Iran entered a period of economic
crisis featuring exceptionally high inflation. The crisis was mainly the result of state eco-
nomic policy of monetary expansion and ambitious long-term development projects. In
response, the regime accused “profiteers” and embarked on an anti-profiteering campaign
against entrepreneurs, bazaaris, and even small businessmen and shopkeepers (Abra-
hamian 1982, 497-8; Milani 1994, 97; Parsa 2000, 206-7).
Reports on human rights practices by human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch or US State Department also highlight the un-
certainties involved in assessing the human rights practices of a state. These reports re-
veal that even they have problems acquiring reliable information such as credible eye-
witnesses, reliable evidence such as films of incidents of repression, etc. that can confirm
a human rights violation. Even in confirmed cases, such information is not easily accessi-
ble to many ordinary citizens. Davenport and Ball’s (2002) finding that different sources
of information (newspapers, human rights NGOs, and eyewitnesses) present different and
biased “views to a kill” is another indication of the uncertainties involved (see also Dav-
enport 2010).
2.1 The Model
There are two risk-neutral citizens, A and B, who can challenge the status quo by mount-
ing a revolution. The value s of the status quo is uncertain. The citizens share a prior
that s is normally distributed with a mean that we normalize to zero and a standard de-
viation of σ. Each citizen i ∈ {A,B} receives a private signal about the status quo payoff
si = s + νi, where νi ∼ N(0, σν) is independently distributed from s and the noise in the
signal of the other citizen, νj . The revolution succeeds if and only if both citizens revolt,
in which case each citizen receives a payoff R. If only one citizen revolts, the revolution
fails and the status quo is preserved. In this case, the revolting citizen is punished receiv-
ing payoff s − µ, where µ > 0 is the sanction imposed, while the other citizen receives the
status quo payoff s. See Figure 2.1.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, s is realized and citizens receive their pri-
vate signals. Then citizens simultaneously decide whether to revolt. Finally, payoffs are
realized.
A pure strategy for citizen i is a function σi mapping i’s private signal s
i into a deci-
sion about whether to revolt. That is, σi : S → {0, 1}, where σi(si) = 1 indicates that
citizen i revolts, and σi(s





revolt R,R s− µ, s
no revolt s, s− µ s, s
Figure 2.1: Strategic form representation.
profile, (σ∗A, σ
∗
B), of mutual best responses, where citizens update according to Bayes rule
upon receiving signals.
When deciding whether to revolt, a citizen compares the expected payoff from revolt
with that of no revolt given his signal and belief about the other citizen’s strategy. Ob-
viously, citizens have no incentive to revolt if the status quo is sufficiently good. Thus,
a natural restriction on strategies is that they take a cutoff form. That is, citizen i, i ∈
{A,B}, revolts if and only if he receives a signal si about the status quo that is below
some level ki:
σi(s
i) = 1 if si < ki and σi(s
i) = 0 if si ≥ ki,
where ki = −∞ indicates that σi(si) = 0 for all si, and ki = ∞ indicates that σi(si) = 1
for all si. In the rest of the paper, we focus on cutoff strategies. It is optimal for a citizen
to revolt if and only if his expected payoff from revolt exceeds that of no revolt, i.e., if
and only if his expected net payoff from revolt is strictly positive. Given his signal si and
citizen j’s cutoff strategy with associated cutoff kj , citizen i’s expected payoff from revolt
is
Pr(sj < kj |si) R+ Pr(sj ≥ kj |si)(E[s|si, sj ≥ kj ]− µ),
where the index j refers to citizen “not i”. Pr(sj < kj |si) is the probability that citi-
zen j revolts from the standpoint of citizen i, in which case i receives R when i revolts.
E[s|si, sj ≥ kj ] − µ is citizen i’s expected value of the status quo conditional on his signal
and the information contained in citizen j’s decision not to revolt: abstention from revolt
by citizen j contains information about the status quo because that decision is based on
a signal conveying positive information about the status quo: σj(s
j) = 0 if and only if
sj ≥ kj . The sum of the first two terms represents citizen i’s expected payoff from revolt.
If citizen i does not revolt, then i receives the status quo for sure, so that i’s expected
payoff is the expected status quo given only the information in his signal, E[s|si]. There-
fore, given his signal si and citizen j’s cutoff kj , citizen i revolts if and only if
Pr(sj < kj |si) R+ Pr(sj ≥ kj |si)(E[s|si, sj ≥ kj ]− µ) > E[s|si], (2.1)
Substituting E[s|si] = Pr(sj ≥ kj |si) E[s|sj ≥ kj , si] + Pr(sj < kj |si) E[s|sj < kj , si] into
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equation (2.1) reveals that citizen i revolts if and only if
∆(si; kj) ≡ Pr(sj < kj |si) (R+ µ− E[s|sj < kj , si])− µ > 0, (2.2)
where ∆(si; kj) is citizen i’s expected net payoff from revolt given his signal si and cit-
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Here, α is the signal-to-noise ratio, and the other expressions enter conditional distribu-
tions and expectations as described in the Appendix. In particular, from equation (B.1)
in the Appendix,











Substituting equation (2.4) for E[s|sj < kj , si] into equation (2.2) yields:
∆(si; kj) = Φ
(
kj − b si
a
)
(R+ µ− b si) + cφ
(




Figure 2.2: ∆ as a function of si. Parameters: σ = 10, σν = 1, µ = 1, R = −2, kj = 1.
Figure 2.2 depicts a typical net expected payoff ∆(si; kj) as a function of signal si.
Observe that ∆(si; kj) is a non-monotone and non-concave function of si. However, de-
spite the non-monotonicity and non-concavity of the expected net payoffs, we show that
if j adopts a cutoff strategy in which he revolts with positive probability, then i’s best re-
sponse also has that feature. In addition, if j never revolts, then i’s best response is never
to revolt (see Lemma 18 in the Appendix).
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Figure 2.3: Best response of citizen i as a function of the cutoff of citizen j. Parameters:
σ = 0.8, σν = 1, µ = 0.1, R = 0.5.
The complex nature of the citizens’ strategic interactions can be highlighted using the
concepts of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. Actions are strategic comple-
ments when an increase in the action by one citizen raises the attraction of the action to
the other citizen; and actions are strategic substitutes when the opposite is true (Tirole
2001; Bulow et al. 1985). In contrast to the popular class of coordination games in which
best responses exhibit global strategic complementarities (e.g., Morris and Shin 2003;
Vives 1999, 2005), best responses in our game feature both strategic complementarities
and strategic substitutes. In particular, Proposition 15 shows that when citizen j is too
likely to revolt, the attraction to citizen i of revolt is reduced, so that further increases
in kj reduce i’s best response, ki. That is, a player’s best response is non-monotone (see
Figure 2.3).
Proposition 15. There exists a critical cutoff k∗ ∈ R that determines whether actions
are strategic complements or substitutes: if the other citizen is unlikely to revolt, i.e.,
kj < k∗, then actions are strategic complements; and if the other citizen is more likely
to revolt, i.e., kj > k∗, then actions are strategic substitutes.
The intuition reflects two conflicting effects. (1) When citizen j revolts more, if citizen
i revolts, he is more likely to be joined by citizen j, and hence less likely to be punished.
This increases citizen i’s incentive to revolt, and constitutes the force for strategic com-
plements. (2) However, when citizen j revolts more, i.e., increases his revolution cutoff
kj , it means that he revolts after receiving better signals about the status quo. Therefore,
from citizen i’s viewpoint, if the revolution succeeds, it is more likely that the overturned
status quo turned out to be better than the revolution outcome. This informational ef-
fect, which is absent in standard global game settings, decreases citizen i’s incentive to
revolt, and constitutes the force for strategic substitutes. What we show is that as citi-
zen j revolts more and more, the force for strategic complements falls, and eventually, is
dominated by the force for strategic substitutes.
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An alternative way to see why strategic substitutes must dominate whenever the other
citizen is too willing to revolt is to observe that given any signal si at which citizen i re-
volts, the desirability of a revolution outcome can always be reversed by the information
that citizen j receives: given si, there exists a signal sjN such that i prefers that j abstain
from revolt should j receives a more promising signal sj ≥ sjN about the status quo.
That is, if j’s signal about the status quo is so much better, i prefers a failed revolution
in which he is punished, receiving E[s|si, sj ≥ sjN ] − µ, to a successful revolution in which
he receives R. It follows that if sjN ≤ kj and j increases kj , i.e., he revolts even more, this
reduces citizen i’s incentive to revolt because the revolution is going to succeeds at more
realizations of sj at which i prefers the revolution to fail.
The non-monotonicity of best responses reveals that the nature of the players’ strate-
gic interactions is very different from when players receive signals about the technology
of revolution, e.g., about the probability that a revolution would succeed, or about the
minimum mass of participants necessary to overthrow a regime (Boix and Svolik 2009;
Edmond 2008; Egorov et al. 2009). In games with uncertainty only about the technology
of revolution, optimal actions are always strategic complements, whereas with uncertainty
about payoffs, optimal actions can be strategic substitutes.
Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010) prove that even though best response functions are
not monotonic, i.e., ki(kj) is non-monotone in kj , asymmetric cutoff rule equilibria do
not exist. Thus, our problem simplifies to one of characterizing symmetric equilibria, i.e.,
equilibria where ki = kj = k, for some k ∈ R ∪ {±∞}. Under symmetry, the expected net
payoff, equation (2.5), for k ∈ R becomes:
∆1(k) ≡ ∆(k; k) = Φ(fk) (R+ µ− bk) + cφ(fk)− µ, (2.6)




a k = fk. By symmetry, a finite ordered pair of cutoffs (k, k) summarize
an equilibrium if and only if ∆1(k) = 0. As a result, to characterize equilibria that fea-
ture revolution, it suffices to characterize the zeros of the symmetric expected net payoff
function ∆1(k). We show that ∆1(k) is single-peaked, that is, it has a unique maximand,
km ∈ R. Moreover, ∆1(k) becomes negative as k approaches ±∞. This shape limits the
number of zeros to, at most, two: When the maximum of ∆1(k) is positive, there are two
zeros (see Figure 2.4); when the maximum is zero, it is the unique zero; and when the
maximum is negative, there is no equilibrium with revolution. This maximum is increas-
ing in the value of revolution R, so that the maximum of ∆1(k) is positive if and only if
R is sufficiently high.7 Therefore, generically, the game features either two equilibria with
revolution or no equilibrium with revolution. Proposition 16 formalizes this argument.
Proposition 16. It is always an equilibrium for citizens never to revolt. There exists a
7Alternatively, one can show that fixing other parameters, two equilibria with revolution exist if and
only if the cost µ imposed on a citizen who leads a failed revolt is sufficiently small.
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Figure 2.4: ∆ as a function of si, R large enough for equilibrium with revolution. Param-
eters: σ = 1, σν = 0.8, µ = 1, R = 2.
threshold R∗ for the revolution payoff R such that if R < R∗, then only the no revolution
equilibrium exists.
If R = R∗ there is a unique equilibrium with revolution. In this equilibrium, citizens
revolt if and only if they receive signals below km.
If R > R∗, there are two equilibria with revolution. The cutoffs for revolution, k(R) and
k¯(R), in these equilibria are the solutions to the indifference equation, ∆1(k)=0, where
k(R) < km < k¯(R), and km is the unique maximand of ∆1(k).
We next derive basic properties of each equilibrium,8 showing, in particular, that the
low revolution equilibrium, k(R), is an implausible candidate for describing real world
outcomes.
Proposition 17. The “no revolution” equilibrium and the “high revolution” k¯ equilib-
rium are stable. In contrast, the “low revolution” k equilibrium is unstable. Increasing the
payoff from revolution or lowering the punishment for participating in an unsuccessful rev-
olution raises the probability of revolution in the k¯ equilibrium, but reduces the equilibrium













whenever R < R∗, so that the high and low revolution equilibria exist.
The high revolution equilibrium features “natural” comparative statics: raising the
payoff from a successful revolution or reducing the punishment raises the equilibrium like-
lihood of revolution, as it induces citizens to revolt following higher signals si about the
8Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010) also establish that the low revolution always exhibits strategic com-
plementarities, but the high revolution equilibrium only exhibits strategic complementarities if the pun-
ishment for participating in a failed revolution is sufficiently severe. They also discuss the welfare implica-
tions of strategic complements/substitutes.
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status quo. In sharp contrast, the low revolution equilibrium has the opposite compar-
ative static properties—increasing the payoff R from a successful revolution or reducing
the punishment µ for an unsuccessful revolution reduces the likelihood of revolution. The
intuition for the low revolution’s perverse comparative statics is that it features so little
revolution that actions are strong strategic complements: as we increase R, then to keep
revolution from becoming “too attractive” [to support consistent best responses], a citizen
must believe that the other citizen is less likely to revolt, so that miscoordination is more
likely.
These results lead us to focus our analysis on the “high revolution equilibrium” with
equilibrium cutoff k¯. We next highlight that the comparative static results imply that in
two societies that differ solely in how harshly failed revolters are punished, conditional on
any signal si leading to revolt, revolution is less likely to succeed in the harsh punishment
society. Further, the unconditional probability that a revolt succeeds falls with µ. That
is, harsher punishments do reduce the probability that a government is overthrown. We
now establish an even stronger result.
Corollary 5. (Weak Punishment Dilemma) In the high revolt equilibrium, consider two
levels of punishment µ1 and µ2 for a failed revolt, where µ1 > µ2. Then, in the high pun-
ishment society 1, the probability the revolt succeeds given signal k¯(µ1) is strictly less than
the probability a revolt exceeds following the higher signal k¯(µ2) in the low punishment so-
ciety: the likelihood the marginal revolter is punished is increasing in the severity of the
punishment for participating in a failed revolution.
On first reflection, this result might seem like a dilemma—when the punishment for
participating in a failed revolution is higher, one might think that individuals would want
to be “more secure” before they revolt, and hence the incidence of punishment should
materialize less frequently. However, this cannot happen in equilibrium. Individuals, in-
deed, revolt less as punishment increases, which reduces the likelihood of punishment.
However, a greater symmetric reluctance to revolt implies that the marginal revolter—
the revolter with signal k¯—is less likely to be joined by his fellow citizen, which increases
the likelihood of punishment. This latter effect is dominant for the marginal revolter and
raises the likelihood of punishment. This dilemma is “weak” because it only applies to
the marginal revolter, but it is a precursor to stronger results about the overall likelihood
of punishment that we discuss in Section 3.1 on Punishment Dilemmas.
Next, we investigate how the amount of noise in the private signal, σ2ν , affects the like-
lihood of revolution. This variance is related to the level of communication among citi-
zens (see Dewan and Myatt (2007, 2008)): reduced noise means that citizens have more
precise assessments of the status quo and of each others’ assessments. This latter observa-
tion ties σ2ν to communication among citizens, and hence to the strength of civil society,
which facilitates communication among citizens.
Comparative statics with respect to σ2ν are more challenging than those for R and µ
because σ2ν has direct and indirect effects on the likelihood of revolution. The direct effect
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is to change the distribution of signals. The indirect effect is to change the net expected
payoff from revolt via the improved coordination, which determines citizens’ incentives
to revolt. One might think that reducing the noise in the private signal always facilitates
coordination and thus increases the incentive to revolt. Surprisingly, this intuition is not
always true. Proposition 18 provides sufficient conditions under which a reduction in the
noise in signals necessarily reduces citizens’ incentives to revolt.
Proposition 18. Suppose (1) the signal-to-noise ratio in private signals is large enough,
α > 1√
2
, and (2) the punishment level is small enough that k¯ > 0, i.e., µ < c φ(0)Φ(0) + R.
Then, as the noise in private signals increases, citizens revolt more: ∂k¯
∂σ2ν
> 0.
This result resembles Magaloni’s (2010) assessment in the context of election fraud in
autocracies that “limited information about fraud might actually end up working against
the autocrats (Magaloni 2010, p.761).” In Magaloni (2010), the underlying mechanism is
the strategic consideration of an opportunistic opposition that can call for protest even if
the election is “clean”, and is followed by “radical voters” who non-strategically follow the
opposition’s call for protest.9
In sharp contrast to Magaloni, our result is based on the strategic considerations of
fully rational players in the general context of coordination games with incomplete infor-
mation. To understand the intuition for Proposition 18, write the indifference condition
describing the k¯ equilibrium as:
Pr(sj < k¯|k¯) (R− E[s|k¯, sj < k¯])− Pr(sj ≥ k¯|k¯) µ = 0. (2.7)
Substituting E[s|k¯, sj < k¯] from equation (B.1) in the Appendix yields
∆1(k¯) = Φ(fk¯)













− (1− Φ(fk¯)) µ = 0. (2.8)
The mechanism that underlies our result consists of three distinct effects: a direct,
non-strategic effect and two indirect, strategic effects.
The non-strategic effect emerges because noisier signals make it harder to infer the




si = k¯, and raises his weight 1 − b on the prior. When k¯ exceeds the prior E[s] = 0, more
noise means that a positive signal si = k¯ > E[s] = 0 is now less likely to reflect a better
status quo, which raises incentives to revolt.
The strategic effect arises because noisier private signals make it harder for citizens to
infer each other’s signal, i.e., V ar(sj |si) = a2 increases. This indirect, strategic effect has
two elements:
9“Rather than assuming a great degree of voter sophistication—as in signaling models in which equilib-
rium involves both rational strategic choices and consistency of beliefs,” Magaloni (2010, p.760) “assumes
that the voters take cues from their parties as an informational shortcut and that their cues are filtered
through their own preconceptions about the regime.”
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1. The effect on the likelihood, from a citizen’s perspective, that the other citizen re-
volts, Pr(sj < k¯|si = k¯) = Φ(fk¯).
2. The effect on the “value” of having the other citizen’s information influence the out-
come.
When k¯ > 0 and the signal-to-noise ratio is high enough, both strategic effects increase
citizens’ incentives to revolt. To understand why, observe that:
(1) There are two effects of increasing σ2ν on citizen i’s assessment of citizen j’s prob-
ability of revolt, when i receives signal si = k¯: a variance effect and a mean effect. Recall
that sj |(si = k¯) ∼ N(bk¯, a2). Increasing σ2ν reduces citizen i’s ability to infer citizen j’s
signal, i.e., a2 increases. When k¯ > 0, this variance effect reduces Pr(sj < k¯|si = k¯) =
Φ( k¯−bk¯a ), which is consistent with the naive intuition that noisier signals should reduce
incentives to revolt. However, more noise also reduces citizen i’s confidence in his own sig-
nal, i.e., E[sj |si = k¯] = bk¯ falls. When k¯ > 0, this mean effect implies that the likelihood
that the other citizen receives a bad signal rises, offsetting the variance effect. When the
signal-to-noise ratio α exceeds 1√
2
, the mean effect dominates the variance effect. It fol-
lows that greater noise raises the probability that citizen j revolts.
(2) Greater noise also affects the value of citizen j’s private information to citizen i.
On the one hand, greater noise makes it more likely that citizen j information diverges
from citizen i’s, which raises its value to i. On the other hand, greater noise reduces the
accuracy of citizen j’s information, which reduces its value to i. The first effect is cap-











.10 The second effect is captured by a decrease in α1+2α , which
decreases E[s|si = k¯, sj < k¯]. When the signal-to-noise ratio exceeds 1√
2
, the first effect
dominates, increasing citizen i’s incentive to act in such a way that citizen j’s information
can influence the outcome, that is, to revolt more.
That noisier private signals raise the incentives to revolt does not imply that they
also raise the probability of a successful revolution, because the joint distribution of sig-
nals also changes with σ2ν . Nonetheless, we can identify conditions under which the prob-
ability of revolution conditional on the value of status quo, Pr(σi = 1, σj = 1|s), indeed
increases as signals become noisier.
Corollary 6. Under the conditions of Proposition 18, there exists an η > 0 such that
the equilibrium probability of successful revolution conditional on the value of status quo,
Pr(si < k¯, sj < k¯|s), is increasing in σ2ν , for all signals s > k¯ − η.
The interesting content of the corollary is that more noise raises the likelihood of suc-
cessful revolution following “accurate” signals—the signals that led to revolt turn out
to correspond with values of the status quo that are equal to or worse than the signals
received—even though when µ is small, and R < E[s] = 0, citizens experience ex post
regret when the revolution, in fact, succeeds.
10This is most obvious when k¯ ≥ 0, however, it can be shown to be true for k¯ < 0 as well.
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2.2 Punishment Dilemmas and Accommodation Inertia
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the intensity of repression, the
likelihood of repression, and the likelihood of protest. We show that two puzzling dilem-
mas arise: one for the relationship between the intensity of repression and the likelihood
of repression (Punishment Dilemma 1), and another for the relationship between the like-
lihood of repression and the likelihood of protest (Punishment Dilemma 2). The first
dilemma states that the relationship between the intensity of punishment/repression and
the likelihood of its application is single-peaked: increasing punishment/repression can in-
crease the frequency of its application. The second dilemma states that the relationship
between the probability of punishment/repression and that of protest is single-peaked:
the frequencies of the incidents of repression and protest can be positively or negatively
correlated.
We define repression as coercive measures employed by the state to inflict costs on
citizens for political activities that sought to overturn the status quo. These costs can
include punitive actions such as imprisonment, physical assault and torture, and other
forms of repressive actions.11 The probability of punishment/repression, Prep, is the prob-
ability that an incidence of repression occurs, i.e., that a citizen is punished. Punishment











φ(si, sj)dsidsj , (2.9)
where φ(si, sj) is the joint pdf of si and sj . The first integral is the probability of a suc-
cessful revolution, and the second is the probability that neither citizen revolts.
We next establish a somewhat surprising relationship between the level of punish-
ment/repression µ and the likelihood of repression. When the punishment for seeking
to overturn the status quo is modest, making the punishment slightly harsher raises the
likelihood of repression/punishment. It is only after the state raises the punishment suffi-
ciently that harsher punishments start to decrease the likelihood that punishment is actu-
ally realized.12
Proposition 19. (Punishment Dilemma 1) The probability of punishment is increasing
11In a more general conceptualization, repression refers to “forms of coercive sociopolitical control used
by political authorities against those within their territorial jurisdiction (Davenport (2007a) cited from
Goldstein (1978))”, or alternatively, as any action by the state that “raises the contender’s cost of col-
lective action (Tilly (1978, 100))”. It includes coercive measures such as restrictions on civil liberties
that aim to prevent dissenting activities. This “preventive” mechanism implicitly exists in our model as
citizens, in their “calculus of protest”, account for the possibility of being punished for active dissent.
However, our conceptualization of repression—as coercive measures that inflict costs on a citizen for dis-
senting activities aiming to change the status quo—is distinct from coercive measures such as restrictions
on civil liberties and political rights. Muller and Weede (1990) use terms “structural” and “behavioral” to
distinguish between these two types of repression.
12An implicit premise in the proposition is that R + 2φ(0) > 0, else µ¯ is negative; the result still holds if
µ < 0, which could be interpreted as the state buying off revolters.
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in the punishment µ for µ < 2φ(0)c + R ≡ µ¯(R, σ2ν , σ2), and decreasing in µ for µ >
µ¯(R, σ2ν , σ
2).
The result reflects conflicting effects: increasing µ reduces the unconditional probabil-
ity that an individual revolts, which tends to reduce the probability of punishment (re-
pression). However, increasing µ also lowers the conditional probability that one citizen
revolts conditional on the other citizen revolting, which tends to increase the probability
of punishment/repression. When µ is small, the latter effect dominates, while when µ is
large, the former effect dominates.
Proposition 19 implies a single-peaked (inverted U-shaped) relationship between the
probability of repression and the intensity of repression (see Figure 2.5). There are at
least three implications of this proposition for our understanding of claims made about
repression:
(1) Deterrence Effect of Harsher Repression: Harsher punishments reduce citizens’
incentives to revolt, and hence the frequency of protest. (Davenport 2007c) “The Law of
Coercive Responsiveness” concludes that since citizens protest less, the frequency of re-
pression must be reduced as there is less threat to the state. Therefore, harsher repression
would not only deter protest, but it would also reduce the incidence of repression. This
posited deterrence effect would suggest an important empirical implication: “repression”
is systematically underestimated because it deters dissenting activities that provoke re-
pression.
The deterrence argument posited would also have a normative implication. One might
argue that although harsher punishment/repression might be “unfair” and inhumane to
the unlucky persons who are punished, it does mean that fewer people will be subject to
repression. As a result, harsher repression can raise social welfare.
Proposition 19 reveals that these arguments are not completely correct. The propo-
sition reveals that when the intensity of punishment/repression is not too high, harsher
punishment/repression raises the probability that repression materializes. This mitigates,
but does not erase, the selection problem discussed above, and undermines the “utili-
tarian” argument that advocates harsher punishment or repression as the lesser of two
“evils”.
(2) Accommodation Inertia: In response to the threat of revolution, states employ a
combination of repression and accommodation. Both accommodation and repression are
costly, and a state selects an optimal policy that minimizes the expected costs of main-
taining the status quo (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Moore 2000; Shad-
mehr 2010). That is, the state compares the expected costs of accommodation with the
expected costs of repression, which depend on the intensity of repression µ and the fre-
quency of its application. It is costlier for the state to apply repression more frequently;
and it is plausible that more repressive actions, i.e. higher µ, are more costly.13
13One can imagine conditions under which implementing more repressive actions costs less than less
repressive actions; for example, lacking resources to detain dissidents, a state might resort to execution.
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Figure 2.5: Punishment Dilemma 1. Parameters: σ = 1, σν = 1, R = 0.
Now, suppose that the state initially employs a low punishment µ < µ¯; and that
for some reason, e.g., an increase in the value of revolution R, the likelihood of revolt in-
creases. To neutralize this threat, the state can increase the punishment µ. However, such
a response has direct and indirect costs. The direct cost is simply the cost of employing
a higher µ. The more interesting, indirect cost reflects the fact that a moderate increase
in punishment also leads to more frequent application of costly repressive acts. Therefore,
the state has less incentive to resort to more intense repression if it is not already highly
repressive, i.e., already employing µ > µ¯. That is, accommodation has inertia. This result
is consistent with the empirical finding that past repression is the key [but non-causal] ex-
planatory variable in explaining variation in repression after controlling for other relevant
variables (Davenport 1996, 2007a, 2007c; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
(3) Punishment Dilemma 2: The third implication of Proposition 19 concerns the
relationship between the frequencies of the incidents of repression and protest. (i) One
might argue that a higher frequency of repression increases the cost of protest, and hence
reduces the frequency of protest. Therefore, the frequencies of protest and repression
must be negatively correlated. Alternatively, (ii) one might argue that repression only
occurs when there is protest. When the frequency of protest increases, so does the fre-
quency of repression. Therefore, these frequencies must be positively correlated. While
both arguments seem plausible, we show that both are false.
The first argument is based on the false premise that a higher frequency of repression
raises the cost inflicted on a protester. This assessment is the result of confusing the fre-
quency of repression—the frequency with which repression occurs—with the intensity of
repression—the cost inflicted on a citizen. The second argument is based on the presump-
tion that protest always instigates repression. However, when dissidents are sufficiently
strong, e.g., large in numbers, it might not be optimal for the state to employ repression,
or repression might not be a viable option to neutralize the threat.
However, we believe that in many real world situations, the costs of higher µ are greater.
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We show that there exists a punishment level µˆ such that for µ > µˆ, threats of re-
pression deter all protest. Moreover, when the intensity of repression is intermediate,
µ¯ < µ < µˆ, the likelihood of both protest and repression are both decreasing in µ; con-
sequently, they will be positively correlated in a cross-section of societies characterized by
punishment costs in this range. However, when punishment costs are lower, µ < µ¯, the
correlation is negative. That is, at low intensities of repression, the probability of protest
falls as the probability of repression rises. See Figure 2.6. Before we formally state this
finding in Proposition 20, we must first define protest and calculate its probability.
Protest is the incidence of an attempt by citizens to overthrow the status quo, inde-
pendently of whether it succeeds or fails. That is, protest occurs if at least one citizen
revolts. By Proposition 16, the probability of protest in the high revolution equilibrium,






φ(si, sj)dsidsj , (2.10)
where φ(si, sj) is the joint pdf of si and sj .
Proposition 20. (Punishment Dilemma 2) Denote the probabilities of protest and repres-
sion by Ppro and Prep respectively. Suppose the payoff from revolution is sufficiently high,
−2cφ(0) < R. Then




dµ > 0. That is, raising µ reduces the frequency of protests, but
raises the frequency of observing repression.
If µ¯ < µ < µˆ, then
dPpro
dµ < 0, and
dPrep
dµ < 0. That is, raising µ reduces both the
frequency of observing protest and the probability of observing repression.
If µ > µˆ, then citizens never revolt, so that Ppro = Prep = 0.
We now provide a comparative static analysis when the punishment for participating
in a failed revolution is not so harsh that it discourages all revolution, i.e., when µ < µˆ.
Proposition 21. Suppose µ < µˆ and −2cφ(0) < R. Then,
1. The higher is the payoff R from revolution, the greater is the set of societies with





2. Suppose the noise rises in the signals citizens receive. Then if and only if the signal-
to-noise ratio, α, is sufficiently high (signals are sufficiently informative), does this
increased noise enlarge the set of societies (R,µ, σ2) for which harsher punishments
raise the equilibrium probability of punishment:
∂µ¯
∂σ2ν





Figure 2.6: Punishment Dilemma 2. Prep(µ) and Ppro(µ) as we vary µ from high to low.
Parameters: σ = 1, σν = 1, R = 0.
Proposition 19 implies a single-peaked relationship between the probability of repres-
sion and the intensity of repression (see Figure 2.5), and Proposition 21 characterizes how
the peak is affected by the primitives—the value of successful revolution, the level of sig-
nal noise and the informativeness (signal-to-noise ratio) of signals—of the model.
Our finding that the relationship between the likelihood of protest and repression de-
pends sensitively on the primitives of the society may explain why empirical research on
the dissent-repression nexus obtains findings that are sensitive to the settings. Indeed,
Davenport’s (2007c) review of this literature finds that “Sometimes the impact of re-
pression on dissent is negative; sometimes it is positive; sometimes it is represented by
an inverted U-shape; sometimes it is alternatively negative and positive; and sometimes
it is nonexistent.” Our analysis provides insights into how and when such varying out-
comes can obtain, and suggests the importance of obtaining measures of the primitives
that could provide a coherent rationale for these findings.
2.3 Public vs. Private Signal Equilibria
In this section, we consider how equilibrium outcomes are affected when citizens receive
public signals about the status quo, rather than private ones. We say that citizens receive
public signals when, rather than receiving conditionally-independent signals about the
status quo, citizens receive the same signal, p = s + ν, where ν ∼ N(0, σν) is distributed
independently from s. With perfectly-correlated signals, citizens can perfectly coordinate
actions: as a result, in any pure strategy equilibrium, they never incur costs from a failed
revolution. Still this game has many pure strategy equilibria: following any signal p, both
i and j know the signal that each observed, so that if i believes that j will not revolt fol-
lowing signal p, then i will not revolt. Symmetric reasoning for j ensures that it can al-
ways be part of an equilibrium for both i and j not to revolt following any given signal
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p.
However, if i, instead, believes that j will revolt, then i bases his action choice on a
comparison of the revolution payoff, R, with the expected payoff from the status quo,
E[s|p] = bp: his best response is to revolt if and only if p < Rb ≡ kp. In any pure strategy
equilibrium, both citizens must adopt the same action following any signal p, i.e., strate-
gies must be symmetric. Thus, if p ≥ kp, neither citizen revolts. Moreover, if p < kp, then
it is part of an equilibrium for both citizens to revolt; and further, conditional on signal
p < kp, their payoff R from revolution exceeds their expected payoff E[s|p] from the sta-
tus quo. Proposition 22 summarizes the implications.
Proposition 22. Following a public signal p, in any pure strategy equilibrium:
If p ≥ kp = Rb , then the citizens never revolt.
If p < kp = Rb then either both citizens never revolt, or both citizens revolt.
In the equilibrium that maximizes citizen utility, citizens revolt if and only if p < kp.
Corollary 7. In the public signal equilibrium that maximizes citizens’ utility, the proba-
bility of revolution falls with the noise σ2ν in the public signal if and only if R < E[s].
We next contrast equilibrium outcomes in the best public signal equilibrium where
citizens revolt if and only if p < kp, with those that obtain with private signals in the
high revolution equilibrium, where citizen i revolts following signal si if and only if si < k¯.
One might conjecture that because public signals allow citizens to perfectly coordinate
their actions and avoid punishment for failed revolt, citizens would be more likely to re-
volt when signals are public rather than private. Indeed, this result is immediate when-
ever punishment for a failed revolution is high enough that citizens never revolt with pri-
vate signals. We now establish the surprising result that this conjecture is false whenever
punishment costs for participating in a failed revolution are small enough:







> 0, such that there is
more revolution in the private signal k¯ equilibrium than in every public signal equilibrium
if and only if µ < µp.
The extent of revolution in the private signal setting reflects two considerations that
are present only in that setting. On the one hand, with distinct private signals, condition-
ing outcomes on both signals has value, and the information of citizen j only influences
outcomes if i revolts: ceteris paribus, this induces i to revolt more in the high revolu-
tion equilibrium. On the other hand, private signals lead to failed coordination, so that
there is a risk of participating in a failed revolution and incurring the punishment cost µ.
Which effect dominates hinges on the level of punishment µ vs. the value from condition-
ing outcomes on their joint signals. Indeed, when µ is sufficiently small, k¯ > R, imply-
ing that there is more revolution with private signals than in an economy with arbitrarily
many public signals.
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Figure 2.7: Parameters: σ = 1, σν = 1, µ = 0.
The fact that private signals lead to more revolution whenever µ is sufficiently small
does not imply that there are more successful revolutions. In particular, sometimes only
one citizen revolts, in which case the revolution fails. The questions then become, can
private signals raise the likelihood of a successful revolution? And if so, what determines
whether public or private signals lead to more successful revolutions? We now show that
the answers hinge on the size of the payoff R from a successful revolution.
Proposition 24. For R sufficiently high, the probability of a successful revolution is
higher in the high revolution equilibrium with public signals than in any equilibrium with
private signals: limR→∞ Ppri(k¯(R))− Ppub(kp(R)) < 0.
Suppose the punishment cost is µ = 0. Then, for R sufficiently low, the probability
of a successful revolution is higher in the high revolution equilibrium with private signals
than in any equilibrium with public signals: limR→−∞ Ppri(k¯(R))− Ppub(kp(R)) > 0.
Analytically, it is a challenge to characterize the relative likelihoods of successful rev-
olution with private and public signals for intermediate values of R. However, numerical
investigations reveal that the qualitative content of these corollaries extend. Figures 2.7
and 2.8 present a typical relationship between R and the difference in the likelihood of
success with private and public signals. Quite generally, we find that in the realistic sce-
nario where R is less than the expected status quo, but not too much less, there is always
a range of R such that as long as µ is sufficiently small, successful revolutions are more
likely when citizens receive private signals, as in Figure 2.8.
These results contrast with the general theme in the literature that public signals cre-
ate common knowledge and thereby increase collective action (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita
and Downs 2005; Chwe 2000, 2001; Egorov et al. 2009; Dewan and Myat 2007, 2008). For
example, Egorov et al. (2009), in their analysis of media freedom and state censorship,
argue that “a negative media report [is a public signal that] not only makes individual
citizens aware of the dictator’s incompetence, but it also makes the dictator’s incompe-
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Figure 2.8: Parameters: σ = 1, σν = 2, µ = 0.04.
tence common knowledge, which is critical for a successful revolution. Revolutions in-
volve a coordination problem: a citizen takes part in a revolt against an incumbent only
if he knows that others will join a revolt”. When the media send a negative public sig-
nal, “each citizen knows that his or her misery is shared by others, and everyone is suf-
ficiently unhappy to make an uprising against the incumbent worthwhile (Egorov et al.
2009, 467).” Our results reveal that although these views hold within the context of those
models studied, they are not general in nature. In particular, we show that when private
signals of others contains relevant information about payoffs, private signals can give rise
to more collective action despite the direct hindering effect of the strategic uncertainties
associated with miscoordination and lack of common knowledge that has been the focus
of the literature.
2.4 Conclusion
Uncertainty about payoffs is a central feature of collective action in contentious contexts
such as protests and revolutions. Substantial payoff uncertainty is necessary to reconcile
the many occasions throughout history where active participants in successful revolution
were subsequently imprisoned, tortured or killed. Despite its real world prominence, pay-
off uncertainty in collective action has gone largely unstudied, primarily due to the inher-
ent analytical challenges.
We confront these challenges head on by integrating payoff uncertainty into a model
of collective action. We model the “calculus of protest” of individuals who must decide
whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution given their private signals
about the status quo.
We show how uncertainty about payoffs gives rise to rich strategic considerations.
When determining whether to revolt, a citizen must not only infer the value of the status
quo, but also the signals and hence likely actions of the other citizen. The complicated
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interactions between these considerations means that the expected net payoff from revolu-
tion, which captures a citizen’s incentive to revolt, does not even decline monotonically as
the citizen’s assessment of the status quo improves. Nonetheless, we are able to provide a
full characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
Typically models of collective action with uncertainty focus on the uncertainty about
the technology of revolution (see Boix and Svolik 2009; Edmond 2008), where citizens are
uncertain about how broad the support for revolution must be to successfully overthrow a
regime. Such uncertainty naturally gives rise to global strategic complementarities, where
revolution becomes a more attractive action when more citizens revolt.
The payoff uncertainty that we model gives rise to a completely different form of strate-
gic calculus for citizens. When a fellow citizen is too willing to revolt, he deprives the
other citizen from optimally conditioning the outcome on their joint information about
the relative values of the status quo and revolution. This lowers the other citizen’s ex-
ante expected payoff, and reduces her willingness to revolt—actions become strategic sub-
stitutes.
We then show that the strategic interactions between citizens who receive private sig-
nals alters our basic understanding of the impact of common knowledge and public sig-
nals on citizens’ incentives to revolt. Researchers such as Chwe (2000), (2001) and Egorov
et al. (2009) have focused on settings where common knowledge always raises collective
action because it eliminates risk of punishment due to miscoordination. We highlight
how private signals about payoffs give rise to an additional consideration. We prove that
when failed revolters are not punished too harshly, then with private signals each citi-
zen revolts more often that he would based solely on her own information. By doing so,
a citizen “buys” the option of having the other citizen’s private information determine
whether revolution succeeds or the status quo prevails. As a result, sometimes citizens
overthrow the status quo even though the revolution is worse than the status quo given
their collective information. An implication is that citizens may be more likely to revolt
with private signals than public signals. Indeed, we show that despite the miscoordination
and failed revolt that necessarily ensues with private signals that citizens may be so much
more likely to revolt with private signals that successful revolution becomes more likely.
Our analysis also sheds light on empirical relationships found by researchers regard-
ing punishment and repression. In particular, we highlight two punishment dilemmas:
harsher punishment might increase the incident of punishment (Punishment Dilemma 1),
and the likelihood of protest and repression (punishment) can be positively or negatively
correlated (Punishment Dilemma 2) (see Davenport 2007c for a review the literature).







The occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, the dissidents
should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of un-
successful repression. And yet, repression happens frequently over time and space and
under various institutional settings. In this paper, I propose an explanation based on
asymmetry of information between the state and the dissidents. State actors are not fully
informed about the dissidents’ resources, and consequently about their potential to chal-
lenge the state. Similarly, the dissidents’ information about the state’s repressive capac-
ities is incomplete. In such an asymmetric information environment, the state and dissi-
dents base their actions on expectations about each other’s behavior. In particular, the
dissidents mobilize when the expected gain from protest outweighs the risk of repression.
Like other gamblers, sometimes they are unlucky and the costs of repression are suffi-
ciently low that the state responds with repression.
A surprising implication of this observation, which constitutes the main contribution
of this paper, is that the relationship between grievance and repression is non-monotone.
That is, the likelihood of repression might decrease as the magnitude of grievances in-
creases. The following simple scenario conveys the key insight of the underlying mecha-
nism. When dissidents’ grievances are low, the state can easily satisfy them with minor
concessions, and hence the state is less likely to resort to costly repressive actions. Ex-
pecting a favorable response from the state, the dissidents mobilize, demanding that their
grievances be satisfied. When grievances are high, to satisfy dissidents, the state would
have to make major concessions at the cost of its interests. Therefore, it is more likely
to respond with repression. The dissidents expect such an aggressive response. How-
ever, the value of the status quo is so low that the expected gains of the unlikely success
makes it worthwhile to risk repression. Thus, they hope for the best and mobilize. In con-
trast, at intermediate levels of grievance, the expectation of repression deters mobilization.
At intermediate levels of grievance, the risk of repression is too high relative to the low-
grievance case, whereas the expected gains from success are too low relative to the high-
grievance case, and hence, to avoid repression, dissidents abstain from challenging the
state. When there is no mobilization, there is no repression, as there is no threat to the
state (“The Law of Coercive Responsiveness”, Davenport (1995, 2000, 2007c)). This mo-
bilization behavior of the dissidents implies that repression is most likely when grievances
are high or low; that is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repres-
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sion might decrease.
This benign description conceals the more complicated relationship between grievances
and repression: the relationship depends on how the value of the status quo and the like-
lihood of repression vary with grievances relative to each other. Greater grievances both
tend to increase dissidents’ incentives to mobilize by reducing the value of the status quo,
and tend to decrease dissidents’ incentive to mobilize by increasing the likelihood of re-
pression. I provide a formal model to investigate these confounding effects on the equilib-
rium likelihood of repression. However, I show that only mild assumptions are required to
deliver the finding that dissidents mobilize when the grievances are high or low, but ab-
stain from challenging the state when grievances are moderate. As a result, repression is
more likely when grievances are high or low.
The recent unrest in Iran provides a telling illustration. Following the release of the
official results of the June 2009 presidential election in Iran that announced Ahmadi-
Nejad’s victory, protestors poured into the streets, protesting election fraud and demand-
ing a re-election. State responded with repression. The news of killings, forced confes-
sions, torture and rape by government agents added to the people’s grievances. However,
repression dampened protests, and within a few months the unrest was contained. In par-
ticular, there was no major protest in June 2010, the first anniversary of the election, as
oppositionists abstained from challenging the state in anticipation of repression. “ ‘I un-
derstand why people are no longer willing to pour on to the streets,’ said the mother of
a female student activist, who did not want to be named for fear of exposing her jailed
daughter. ‘If you do so, you can be sure to face any kind of punishment, either being ar-
rested, raped, killed or anything else. I don’t think people will come out in the numbers
we saw last year’ ” (The Guardian, June 9, 2010)1.
Surprisingly, one month later in July 2010, the Tehran bazaar went on strike in re-
sponse to the state attempt to increase taxes by 70%. The state conceded, and announced
a reduction of tax increase to only 30%. Despite this concession and the threat of repres-
sion, the strike continued as merchants demanded further tax cuts. “ ‘Pro-government
forces have circulated through the bazaar, sometimes trying to force vendors to open by
breaking their locks’, said one merchant, who like others interviewed for this article spoke
on condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. ‘Business has been very bad, and the
merchants want to force the government to drop the tax increase completely,’ he said.
‘The economy has been very bad, and the merchants do not think that the taxes should
increase at all’ ”(The New York Times, July 2010)2.
Both the bazaar merchants and the oppositionists had grievances against a repres-
sive state. The former grievance was about a tax increase and the latter grievances were
about election fraud and brutal repression. The merchants’ demand was to reduce the




sponsible for the brutal repression of peaceful demonstrators. Although the grievances
of these two groups are along different “dimensions”, let us presume that we can collapse
grievances into a one-dimensional space. Then it seems plausible that those whose votes
were “stolen”, their family members and friends killed, beaten, imprisoned, tortured, or
raped, and face a state that increasingly encroaches on political and civil liberties have
more grievances than relatively rich merchants who face a tax increase. Yet, the mer-
chants committed collective action and went on strike despite the threat of repression,
whereas the oppositionists abstained from challenging the state. Why? My model pro-
vides an explanation. The oppositionists’ grievances were high (a re-election that could
change the government, and the exposure of government agents responsible for unspeak-
able acts of repression, which would imply state acknowledgment of forced confessions,
torture, and rape), and hence they expected the state to respond with repression. There-
fore, they abstained from challenging the state and did not mobilize. In contrast, The
merchants’ grievances were low/small, and hence they expected the state to concede.
Therefore, they risked potential repression and mobilized to challenge the state. The
bazaar protest ended with government concession. However, not all attempts of mobiliza-
tion to address relatively small grievances lead to accommodative state responses. For ex-
ample, in late April-early May 2010, the state responded with arrests and intimidation to
the Teachers Trade Union plan for demonstration in observation of the National Teacher’s
Day (May 2).3 The repression of Tehran bus drivers following their attempt to unionize
to address their work-related grievances in 2005 is another example.
I build a simple model of contentious politics with two actors, a state and a group
of citizens. The state seeks to maintain the status quo, whereas citizen would like to im-
plement an alternative. More generally, we can think about the setting as a “zero-sum
game” between a group of citizens and the state who have divergent preferences over a
one-dimensional policy space, in which the status quo and the alternative correspond
to the implementation of the state’s and the citizens’ ideal policies respectively. I define
grievance as the difference between the values of the status quo and the alternative to
the dissidents, or alternatively, as the distance between the ideal policies of the state and
the citizens. The citizens can challenge the state by collective action demanding the im-
plementation of the alternative. However, a serious challenge to the state requires exten-
sive preparation and organization: e.g., information about available resources and poten-
tial allies should be gathered, inter-personal and inter-organizational networks should be
constructed and maintained, “collective action frames” should be identified and formed,
and “the strategy of protest” should be identified (Benford and Snow (2000); Diani and
McAdam (2003); Gamson (1975); McAdam (1999); McAdam et al. (1996); McAdam et
al. (2004); McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977); Morris (1984); Snow and Benford (1992);




Carthy (2003)). Such preparations do not happen instantly, but rather in several stages
through which dissidents prepare, innovate, and learn. To address these features, I divide
the contentious process into two stages: an early stage in which dissidents choose whether
to mobilize (mobilization stage), and an advanced stage in which they can impose a seri-
ous threat to the state (revolution stage) (Tilly (1978)).
Mobilization sets the stage for revolution, and creates a tangible threat to the state.
In response, the state can make concessions or resort to repression, where repression is de-
fined as “forms of coercive sociopolitical control used by political authorities against those
within their territorial jurisdiction (Davenport (2007a) cited from Goldstein (1978))”, or
alternatively, as any action by the state “which raises the contender’s cost of collective ac-
tion (Tilly (1978, p. 100))” (See also Davenport (2000, p. 5-7)). In this stage, the move-
ment is weak and can be contained by sufficient repression or concession. However, if the
state response is “too little” or “too late”, the movement expands and becomes strong
enough to overthrow the state or to force the state to fully satisfy dissident demands.
Once hundreds of thousands of protesters pour into the streets and demands become rad-
icalized, the fate of the state and its unpopular polices are in the hands of the dissidents,
not the administrative or the repressive apparatus of the state. I call this the revolution
stage.
However, even when the state can suppress unrest, repression is costly (Tarrow (1998,
p. 83-5)). The magnitude of the cost depends on several factors including state repres-
sive capacity (Goodwin (2001); Tilly (1978, 2006); Tilly and Tarrow (2007)), geogra-
phy (Fearon and Laitin (2003)), democratic institutions (“The Domestic Democratic
Peace”, Davenport (2007b, 2007c); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005)), international pres-
sure (Hafner-Burton (2005); Hathaway (2007); Vreeland (2008)), and whether the state
elite are divided (O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986); Tarrow (1998)). The state has a vast
bureaucratic apparatus to assess these costs, and hence state actors are informed about
the costs of repression that play a significant role in their decision regarding whether to
repress or to concede. In contrast, dissidents are poorly informed about those costs, and
consequently about the state response to mobilization. Dissidents assess the likelihood of
different state responses based on their expectations about the state repression costs. This
asymmetry of information is the essence of the model and the main driving force for the
results.
Similarly, revolution is costly to dissidents. To sustain mobilization and force a re-
sisting state to implement full-fledged reforms consumes significant resources (Gamson
(1975); McAdam (1999); McAdam et al. (1996); McAdam et al. (2004); McCarthy and
Zald (1973, 1977); Morris (1984); Tarrow (1998); Tilly (1978, 1986, 1996, 2004); Tarrow
and Tilly (2007); Zald and McCarthy (2003)). In addition, the chaos and the breakdown
of law and order in the process of overthrowing a non-yielding state disrupts the economy,
production, and trade. The magnitude of these costs also depends on dissidents’ resources
and capabilities. However, the state is less informed than the dissidents about these re-
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sources, and consequently about the costs of revolution, which in turn affect dissidents’
behavior. Therefore, the state assesses the likelihood of the dissidents’ reaction to a re-
pression or concession policy based on expectations about these costs.
To be more precise, one has to recognize that the dissidents themselves are not well-
informed about their potential resources and capabilities in the early stages of protest.
Unlike the state, the dissidents lack an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus to assess po-
tential and available resources. One function of early protest activities is to assess and
estimate material resources, potential powerful allies, and the magnitude of support base
(e.g., Lohmann (1994b)). However, if the movement sustains, the dissidents’ understand-
ing of their resources improves, and consequently so does their information about the
costs of revolution. That is, the protest process involves learning. In the mobilization
stage, dissidents are much less informed about their resources and the costs of revolution
than in the revolution stage.
I formulate the model with inequality as the salient grievance factor. However, I em-
phasize that the mechanisms in play apply to any grievance factor over which the state
and dissidents have conflicting interests. This approach has several advantages: (i) in-
equality is a much debated normative issue and its relationship with repression is impor-
tant from a normative standpoint; (ii) it facilitates communication by casting the argu-
ments in terms of a concrete grievance factor; (iii) due to the availability of inequality
datasets, the empirical imports of the theoretical results are more direct; (iv) the model
remains close to formal models that address the relationship between inequality and de-
mocratization (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2006); Boix (2003); Leven-
toglu (2005, 2007)). Therefore, comparisons are easier and the import of results for that
literature is clearer.
The relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repres-
sion depends on the expectations of the dissidents and the state regarding the costs of re-
pression and revolution. I characterize this relationship under the empirically relevant,
mild assumption that repression costs have a strict unimodal distribution. This mini-
mal assumption requires that the uninformed party has a most likely candidate for the
value of unknown parameter (e.g., costs of repression), and the likelihood of other val-
ues declines the further they are from the most likely candidate. I show that given this
modest structure, repression is more likely when the magnitude of grievances is high or
low. In contrast, when dissidents’ grievances are moderate, the threat of repression de-
ters mobilization, and hence removes the necessity of state response, which potentially
can be repression. That is, the effect of grievances on the likelihood of protest and re-
pression is mediated through the dissidents’ expectations of the state response and the
likelihood of success. Conditional on dissidents’ mobilization, the likelihood of repression
does monotonically increase with the magnitude of grievances as more grievances require
more costly concessions. However, the unconditional effect of grievances on repression
is mediated through the dissidents’ decision whether to challenge the state, and hence
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is non-monotone because dissidents abstain from mobilization for intermediate levels of
grievances.
The model fits squarely within the framework of collective action developed in Tilly’s
(1978) influential work, From Mobilization to Revolution. As described in the scenario
above, the result is based on the strategic considerations of dissidents who are “acting
strategically as they contend with the object of their claim [, i.e., the state]”. The equilib-
rium outcome is the result of numerous rounds of reasoning in the decision-making pro-
cesses of dissident and state actors, where each “actor reasons from outcomes to appropri-
ate interactions, from interactions to likely outcomes, or more plausibly both at once.” I
depart from the typical setting of contentious politics by integrating information asymme-
tries into the strategic interactions of the state and the challengers. In this enriched set-
ting, “claimants” (dissidents) and the “object of claim” (state) “read possibilities differ-
ently, because each has limited information concerning the other’s resources, capabilities,
and strategic plans and because each comes to the encounter from a somewhat different
history of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2004, p. 139)).”
To focus on the main mechanism, I abstracted from other interesting mechanisms
identified in the literature. The main limitations stem from two simplifying assumptions:
unitary actors and limited time horizon. Modeling dissidents as a unitary actor does not
allow addressing collective action problems (Olson (1965); Tullock (1971) ; Lichbach (1995,
1998)), coordination problems (Boix and Svolik (2009); Bueno de Mesquita (2010a, 2010b);
Edmond (2008); Persson and Tabellini (2006); Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010a, 2010b))
and the role of networks (Diani and McAdam (2003); Chwe (2000, 2001)), coalition for-
mation (Parsa (2000); Foran (2005)), divisions among opposition groups (Lust-Okar (2005)),
scale shift (Tarrow and McAdam (2005)), and mechanisms such as diffusion and conta-
gion (Buenrosto et al. (2007)), brokerage (Diani (2003)), certification, and boundary ac-
tion (McAdam et al. (2004); Tilly and Tarrow (2007)). Modeling the state as a unitary
actor pushes aside “the instability of current political alignments” among state actors,
“the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers” (Tarrow (1998); Tilly
and Tarrow (2007)), the interactions between the hard-liners and soft-liners (O’Donnell
and Schmitter (1986)), and factionalism (Goldstone et al. (2010)). The limited horizon
curbs our ability to endogenize the actors’ beliefs based on their history of interactions,
address repression-dissent nexus, and address short-term interactions as a part of the
broader dynamics of the interactions between dissidents and the state that can lead to
and include revolutions, civil wars, national disintegration, and democratization (Gold-
stone et al. (2010); McAdam et al. (2004)).
The findings of this paper have repercussions for empirical studies of repression. For
example, if the relationship between the likelihood of repression and the magnitude of
grievances depends on the distribution of costs4, then one must estimate these distri-
4The relationship depends on the priors. However, imposing rational expectations requires the priors
over costs to match the distributions of costs. If the rational expectation assumption is relaxed, one needs
to somehow estimate the players’ prior beliefs about the costs.
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butions that might vary over the units of analysis. Alternatively, one might be able to
estimate the dissidents’ expectation of the state response from the past interactions be-
tween the state and dissidents (Kedziora (2009)). Whichever solution one takes, positing
a direct effect of grievances on mobilization, and hence on repression is an oversimplifi-
cation that ignores the strategic interactions between dissidents and the state, which has
long been emphasized in the political process theories of social movements and protest
(McAdam (1999); McAdam et al. (1996); McAdam et al. (2004); McCarthy and Zald
(1973, 1977); Muller et al. (1991); Tarrow (1998); Tilly (1978, 1986, 1996, 2004, 2006);
Tarrow and Tilly (2007); Zald and McCarthy (2003); see also Lichbach (1987, 1998)).
This view confronts the current implicit theme in the repression literature that grievance
breeds repression through increasing the likelihood of unrest. This argument constitutes
the dominant rationale for the effect of economic development on state repression.5 For
example, in their seminal paper, Poe and Tate (1994) cite Mitchell and McCormick (1988)
to argue that “the poorest countries, with substantial social and political tensions cre-
ated by economic scarcity, could be most unstable and thus most apt to use of repres-
sion in order to maintain control. (Mitchell and McCormick (1988, p. 478)” To further
strengthen this “straightforward” logic, they refer to Henderson (1991) to contend that
“it is only logical to think that, with a higher level of development, people will be more
satisfied and, hence, less repression will be needed by the elites. (Henderson (1991, p.
126))” More recently, Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005) argue that “when a state’s level
of economic development is low, citizens have a greater incentive to resort to conflict in
order to improve their lot, and they have less to lose by doing so than when development
is higher. (Bueno De Mesquita (2005, p. 447))” Reviewing the findings of the literature
on the effects of economic development on repression, Davenport (2007c) states that a re-
curring rationale in the literature is that “fewer resources enhance the need for coercive
behavior by increasing societal grievances [my emphasis] and limiting the authorities abil-
ity to use alternative mechanisms for political control. (Davenport (2007c, p. 14))”
I investigate the relationship between inequality (the magnitude of grievances) and
the likelihood of repression (CIRI’s Political Integrity Abuse (Cingranelli and Richards
(2008))) in all country-years from 1981 to 1999 for which data is available. The empiri-
cal evidence indicate a non-monotonic relationship between the magnitude of grievances
(inequality) and the likelihood of repression even after controlling for various relevant
variables. The empirical investigation is challenging because the relationship between the
magnitude of grievances (inequality) and the likelihood of repression depends on the dis-
tributions of the costs of repression and revolution that vary over country-years, but are
not observable given the available data. Therefore, one must avoid imposing excessive
5There are a few exceptions. For example, Davenport (2007b) argues that fewer resources deprive the
state (as opposed to subjects) from non-repressive means of influence such as “bribery, higher wages,
and welfare payments.... Additionally, when societies are poor and populations are large, it is likely that
citizens would be dissatisfied with this situation and predisposed toward joining movements seeking to
challenge or transform the political-economic situation. As a preventive [my empahsis] measure, therefore,
authorities use repressive behavior in these situations as well (Davenport (2007b, p. 87))”.
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parametric specifications, but rather to allow for flexible relationships between variables,
and let the data uncover the existing interactions. In view of this argument, I use a gen-
eralized additive model (GAM) with a thin-plate splines (TPS). This statistical model
allows for both a flexible relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression,
and a flexible interaction between inequality and the proxy for repression and revolution
costs (income per capita). A major motivation for my paper is to inform the empirical
studies on the determinants of repression and collective action, and to encourage relevant
data collection projects and more rigorous empirical investigations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I propose a rational choice approach to
contentious politics that combines the insights from both grievance-based and political
process theories. Section 3 presents the model in which the cost of repression is the pri-
vate information of the state, and the cost of revolution is unknown until the revolution
stage. In section 4, I analyze the model in which the cost of revolution is common knowl-
edge. In section 5, I integrate a mobilization cost into the model. Section 6 analyzes two
extensions of the model. The first extends the binary repression policy to a continuous
choice in which the state can decide how much to repress. The second analyzes a model
in which the cost of revolution is the private information of the dissidents from the early
stage of protest. In section 7, empirical evidence is presented. Section 8 concludes. All
the proofs are in the Appendix C.
3.1 Combining Grievance-based and Political Process Theories: A
Rational Choice Perspective
This approach reconciles grievance-based and political process theories of domestic con-
flict, and integrates the synthetic theory into the study of “state repression and polit-
ical order”. The grievance-based theory of protest, also known as “discontent perspec-
tive”(Muller (1995)) and “strain theory” (Snow et al. (2005)), encompasses both absolute
and relative deprivation theories (Davies (1962); Gurr (1968, 1970); For recent reviews
see Useem (1998) and Buechler (2004)), and states that grievance is the basic, instigat-
ing cause of protest and violence, and hence more grievance breeds more protest. That is,
there is a monotonic relationship between the levels of grievances and protest. In particu-
lar, “monotonic linkage between the level of economic development or income inequality
and violence seem to fit with deprivation approaches [absolute or relative deprivation]
(Weede (1987, p. 97))”. In contrast, political process approach contends that dissidents
are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of performing “contentious actions”
that challenge the state. These costs and benefits are determined by the dissidents’ or-
ganizational resources, political opportunity structure, and the dissidents’ “framing” of
their claims in the dynamic context of repeated interactions between “claimants” and
their “object of claim”, which features innovation, learning, and mutual feedbacks from
environment that constrain contentious actions, and contentious actions that change the
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environment. “Rational people do not often attack well-fortified opponents when oppor-
tunities are closed (Tarrow (1998, p. 77))”, where opportunities refer to those consistent
“dimensions of political environment that provide incentives for collective action by af-
fecting people’s expectations for success or failure (Gamson and Meyer 1996). (Tarrow
(1998, p. 76-7))” In this view, variations in aforementioned determinants of cost-benefit
calculus of collective action, rather than grievances, explain the variations in the incidents
of contentions actions (McAdam (1999); McAdam et al. (1996); McAdam et al. (2004);
McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977); Muller et al. (1991); Tarrow (1998); Tilly (1978, 1986,
1996, 2004, 2006); Tarrow and Tilly (2007); Zald and McCarthy (2003); see also Lichbach
(1987, 1998)).6
However, empirical evidence for both theories is mixed. A decade-long debate on
whether grievances, and inequality as a particular source of grievance, have a direct, un-
mediated effect on violent protests was concluded by a consensus between the main con-
tenders, Muller and Weede, that such a direct effect is, at best, negligible (Muller (1985);
Muller and Seligson (1987); Weede (1981, 1987); Muller and Weede (1990, 1993, 1994);
see Muller and Weede (1993, 1994) for the final consensus; for controversies see Muller
(1986) and Weede (1986), Muller et al. and Midlarsky (1989), Wang and Dixon et al.
(1993). See also Miller et al. (1977)). In a recent review of “protests and political op-
portunities”, Meyer (2004) argues that “the premises of the political process approach,
at least as articulated by the scholars testing them, generally do not perform well. (Meyer
(2004, p. 131))” For example, discussing Goodwin’s (2002) test of political opportunity
theory that covers “a wide variety of social movements”, Meyer (2004) concludes that
“the aggregate results raise troubling questions” as “Goodwin (2002) reports that one
or more of the political opportunity variables he considers appear in only slightly more
than half” of his cases (Meyer (2004, p. 132)). McCammon’s (2001) study of labor in US
and Snow et al’s (2003) study of homeless protest across US cities are two other examples
that point to grievances, rather than political opportunities or organizational resources of
the dissidents, as the cause of protest (See also Robertson (2007)).
I contend that such “mixed” empirical findings are the result of narrow interpreta-
tions of grievance-based and political process theories that present them as competing,
rather than complementary. In reality, both the magnitude of grievances and the oppor-
tunities of collective action matter. In some cases such as the African-American protests
from 1930 to 1970 covered in McAdam’s (1999) seminal book, the salient feature of grievances
were racial segregation and political rights, which remained relatively constant until the
6Interests and threats were an integral part of Tilly’s 1978 influential book, From Mobilization to Rev-
olution, which could encompass grievances. However, in his later works, and in the literature in general,
interests, threats, and grievances were pushed aside as it is clear in Tilly’s 1986 book The Contentious
French. However, the re-emphasis on the concept of threat since the 1990’s should be interpreted as bring-
ing grievances and interests back to the political process theories. In Meyer’s (2004) words, “Kriesi et al.
(1995) remind the reader that the state can invite action by facilitating access, but it can also provoke
action by producing unwanted policies and political threats, thereby raising the costs of inaction. (Meyer
(2004, p. 131))” Goldstone and Tilly’s (2001) concept of “current threat” can effectively be renamed as
grievance.
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mid-1960’s. In such cases, the variation in dissent activities are derived from resource
mobilization, political opportunity structure, and other variables discussed mainly under
the rubric of political process theory. However, in other cases such as Snow et al. (2003)
study of homeless protest across US cities, grievances vary significantly and explain the
variation in the outcome. Assessments such as “discontent is ever-present (Jenkins and
Perrow (1977, p. 251))” or “grievances and disaffection are a fairly permanent and recur-
ring feature of the historical landscape (Oberschall (1978, p. 298))” are simply wrong.
The rational choice perspective advocated here calls for the unification of these two ap-
proaches: grievances provide the incentive to perform collective action; however, in their
“calculus or protest”, actors also account for the likelihood of success, which is deter-
mined by factors such as available resources and political opportunity structure. That
is, grievances interact with factors that determine the likelihood of success to determine
whether actors mobilize and perform collective action.
The Repression-Protest Nexus. The vast, but inconclusive empirical literature on the
effect of repression on protest provides an interesting medium to illustrate the power of
this synthesis. “Sometimes the impact of repression on dissent is negative (Hibbs 1973);
sometimes it is positive (Fransisco 1996, Lichbach & Gurr 1981, Ziegenhagen 1986); some-
times it is represented by an inverted U-shape (Muller 1985); sometimes it is alternatively
negative or positive (Gupta and Venieris 1981, Moore 1998, Rasler 1996); and sometimes
it is nonexistent (Gurr & Moore 1997). (Davenport (2007c, p. 8))” (See also Francisco
(2004, 2005, 2009) and Inclan (2009)) If one takes simple interpretations of the grievance-
based and political process theories, these results are puzzling. According to grievance-
based approach, repression increases grievances, and hence should increase protest. Ac-
cording to political process theory, repression contracts the political opportunity struc-
ture, which increases the costs of collective action, and hence decreases protest.7 In a ra-
tional choice approach, however, repression increases both grievances and the cost of col-
lective action both of which matter in the actors’ decision-making process. The increase
in grievances tends to increase the incentive for collective action, whereas the increase in
the costs of protests tends to decrease that incentive. Which effect dominates depends
on the magnitude of marginal changes that vary from case to case, which can potentially
explain the variations in the observed outcome (See also Muller and Weede (1990, 1994);
and Muller and Seligson (1987)).
Formal Models of Contentious Politics. My model formalizes this rational choice
perspective that combines the main insights of both grievance-based and political pro-
cess theories to analyze the dissidents’s behavior. Then I integrate the state response
to provide a more complete picture of the interactions between the dissidents and the
state. The early formal models of contentious politics typically analyzed only one side
of the dissidents-state interactions. Lichbach (1987) provides a formal model that takes
7Lichbach’s (1987) explanation that dissidents switch between violent and non-violent dissent activi-
ties in response to repression has no bearing in explaining the overall level of protest that includes both
violent and non-violent activities.
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the state’s behavior as given, and studies the dissidents’ decision to perform violent or
non-violent contentious actions.8 In contrast, Moore (2000) takes the dissidents’ actions
as given, and analyzes the state response.
Recent formal models of democratization, however, study the mutual interaction be-
tween the state and the citizens (Acemoglue and Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2006);
Boix (2003); Leventoglu (2005, 2007); Rosendorff (2001)). Nevertheless, their approach
in modeling the dissidents’ behavior resembles the grievance-based theories, and does not
integrate the insights of political process approach (Guigni et al. (1998); Slater (2009)).
In particular, these models9 imply that more grievances (which is modeled as the ex-
tent of inequality) (1) increase the citizens’ incentives to revolt, which in turn increase
the threat to the state, and (2) raise the cost of concession. As a result, more grievances
(higher levels of inequality) breed more repression. In Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000b)
words: “Our model also shows that repression is more likely to be used when inequality
is higher because the cost of democracy to the rich is greater in a more unequal society
(Acemoglu and Robinson (2001b, p. 685)).” Similar conclusion is derived from Boix’s
(2003) model.10
The underlying reason is simple, and at first glance, a technical matter: In these mod-
els, the rich move first and decide whether to repress or to concede (redistribute or de-
mocratize), and hence these models do not “allow” the poor to strategically decide not to
challenge the state in order to avoid repression, i.e., these models lack the “mobilization
stage”. By adding a mobilization stage, my model allows for a richer set of strategic in-
teractions between the state and dissident that draws from both grievance-based and po-
litical process theories. As I discussed before, this modification is not a technical matter,
and indeed, has significant substantive implications for our understanding of contentious
politics: The relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of re-
pression is non-monotone, that is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood
of repression might decrease.
8There is a vast literature that abstracts from the state’s decision, but relaxes the unitary actor as-
sumption on the side of the dissidents and scrutinizes the interactions among them. This body of liter-
ature covers a wide range of topics including collective action problem (Olson (1965); Lichbach (1995)),
information dissipation, contagion, and network effects (Buenrosto et al. (2007); Chwe (2000, 2001);
Lohmann (1994b)), and signaling and coordination problem under incomplete information (Boix and Svo-
lik (2009); Bueno de Mesquita (2010a, 2010b); Edmond (2008); Lohmann (1993); Persson and Tabellini
(2006); Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010a, 2010b)). For “the critical importance of the state response” see
Wilkinson (2009).
9Rosendorff (2001) is an exception.
10Boix (2008) extends his original model (Boix (2003)) such that first, the wealthy decide whether to
establish an authoritarian regime or accept democracy; second, the poor decide whether to acquiesce or
revolt; then, the wealthy decide whether to repress or not repress. Although this model potentially could
reveal the non-monotone relationship between inequality and repression, specific conditions and the infor-
mation structure under which Boix solves the model does not uncover the non-monotonicity.
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3.2 The Model
There is a continuum 2 of individuals distinguished by their income. A continuum 1 is
rich who receive share θ > 12 of the income of the society, y, and a continuum 1 is poor
who share the rest.11 The poor can challenge the unequal distribution of income by mount-
ing revolution. However, in order to revolt the poor must mobilize first. If they mobilize,
the rich can possibly contain the unrest with repression or concession. They can repress
the mobilized poor, in which case the poor get 0, and mobilization ends. Alternatively,
they can concede by redistributing their income via distortionary taxation. If the rich
concede, the poor have the choice of expanding the mobilization to revolution or of end-
ing the unrest. If they revolt, they share the whole income and the rich get 0. However,
revolution and repression are costly. Revolution destroys a fraction µ ∈ [0, 1] of the poor’s
income, and repression ruins a proportion ω ∈ [0, 1] of the rich’s income. The cost of re-
pression, ω, is private information of the rich. The poor have a prior F : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
over ω. Cost of revolution, µ, is public, however, it only reveals after the rich’s decision to
repress or concede. The rich and the poor have a prior G : [0, 1] → [0, 1] over µ. F and
G are twice differentiable cumulative distribution functions. All aspects of the game are
common knowledge. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The cost of repression, ω, is realized, and the rich are informed.
2. The poor decide whether to mobilize. If they do not mobilize the game ends.
3. If the poor mobilize, the rich decide to repress or distribute at their choice of tax-
rate. If they repress the game ends.
4. The cost of revolution, µ, is realized.
5. The poor decide whether to revolt.
6. payoffs are realized.
Strategies and Equilibrium. The strategy of the poor is whether to mobilize and whether
to revolt. More formally, the poor’s strategy is a pair σp = (γ1, γ2) consisting of a mobi-
lization strategy γ1, and a revolution strategy γ2 . The mobilization strategy is an action
γ1 ∈ {0, 1} with γ1 = 0 and 1 corresponding to no mobilization and mobilization re-
spectively. The revolution strategy is a function γ2(t, µ) : [0, 1]
2 → {0, 1}, mapping
the tax-rate and the cost of revolution to a decision whether to revolt, with γ2 = 0 and
1 corresponding to no revolution and revolution respectively. The strategy of the rich is
whether to repress, and at what tax-rate to redistribute. More formally, the strategy of
the rich is an ordered pair σr = (s, t) ∈ {0, 1} × [0, 1], with s = 0 and 1 corresponding
to repress and not repress respectively, and t is the tax-rate. The equilibrium concept is
11The equal size of the rich and the poor population has no substantive effect on the results, and is
made merely to simplify the presentation of the model.
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Figure 3.1: The game tree. M , r, and R stand for mobilize, repress, and revolt respec-
tively. The first payoff is the poor’s and the second is the rich’s. yp(t) and yr(t) are
after-tax incomes of the poor and the rich respectively.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), i.e. an equilibrium is a strategy profile, (σˆp, σˆr), of
mutual best responses at every subgame of the game, given the information available at
each decision node.
I apply backward induction to solve the game. To decide whether or not to revolt,
the poor compare their expected payoffs from revolt and not revolt given the tax-rate,
t, set by the rich. The value to the poor if they do not revolt is their after-tax income
yp(t, θ) = (1 − t)(1 − θ)y + 12 ty. The expected value of revolution to the poor is (1 − µ)y.
Thus, the poor revolt if and only if yp(t, θ) < (1− µ)y. That is,




Because the focus of this paper is on the role of inequality on protest and repression, I as-
sume that in a fully equal society no one revolts. That is, when θ = 12 the expected value
of living under such an egalitarian status quo exceeds the expected payoff of revolution,
i.e. (1 − µ)y ≤ yp(t, 12), or more concisely, 12 ≤ µ. The following assumption formally
states this rationale.
Assumption 1: 12 ≤ µ, i.e. G(12) = 0.
If the poor mobilize, the rich must decide how to respond to the threat of revolution. In
their decision, the rich account for the expected behavior of the poor. If the rich believe
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that the cost of revolution is very high, they can infer that a mild redistribution prevents
revolution. Otherwise, more serious actions may be required to avoid revolution. If the
rich choose to redistribute, they choose a tax-rate that maximizes their expected payoff,
E[V r(t)], which implicitly contains the expected behavior of the poor following the redis-
tribution:
E[V r(t)] = Pr(revolt|t) 0 + (1− Pr(revolt|t)) yr(t, θ)
= (1− Pr(revolt|t))
(





in which yr(t, θ) = (1− t)θy + 12 ty is the payoff to the rich given inequality θ and tax-rate
t, and Pr(revolt|t) is the probability that the poor revolt conditional on a redistribution





















Substituting equation (3.3) in equation (3.2), the tax-rate that maximizes the expected
payoff of the rich solves
max
t∈[0, 1]














Denote the income share of the rich by x, which implies that the income share of the poor
is 1− x. Therefore, equation (3.1) simplifies to
γ2 = 1 if and only if x > µ. (3.5)
That is, the poor revolt if and only if the income share of the rich is sufficiently high that
the gain from revolution, y − (1 − x)y = xy, exceeds its cost, µy. At tax-rate t and in-
equality level θ,
x = (1− t)θ + 1
2
t. (3.6)
Observe that x is strictly decreasing in t, thus, t ∈ [0, 1] implies x ∈ [12 , θ]. The one-to-
one relationship between x and t implies that the rich’s tax-rate decision is equivalent to
choosing their share of income. Therefore, the optimization problem of the rich, expres-







Lemma 8 characterizes the solution to the redistribution optimization of the rich, expres-
sion (3.7), for which Assumption 2 guarantees a unique solution.
Assumption 2: g(x) is log-concave on (12 , 1).






has a unique solution x¯ corresponding to the tax-rate t¯ such that
x¯ =
θ ; θ ∈ [12 , x∗]x∗ ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1] and t¯ =
0 ; θ ∈ [12 , x∗]θ−x∗
θ−1/2 ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1],
(3.8)
in which





x is the income share of the rich, hence, x = θ corresponds to the original distribution
of income which indicates no redistribution. When inequality is low, the poor have little
incentive to revolt because the net benefit of revolting is low. Anticipating this behavior,
the rich expect low probability of revolution, and do not redistribute. That is, the rich
prefer taking the risk of revolution, G(θ), to redistributing their wealth. In contrast, when
inequality is high, the poor have a greater incentive to revolt and the probability of rev-
olution is high. Anticipating this, the rich are willing to implement limited redistributive
policy to reduce the chance of revolution.
However, facing the threat of mobilized poor, the rich can also resort to repression to
prevent revolution. To decide whether to repress or to concede, the rich compare their ex-
pected payoff of repression, (1− ω)θy, to the highest expected payoff that can be achieved
by redistribution, which, by Lemma 8, is (1−G(x¯))x¯y. The following lemma characterizes
the equilibrium behavior of the rich who are facing the mobilized poor.
Lemma 9. Facing the threat of revolution from the mobilized poor, the rich repress the
poor if and only if the cost of repression is less than a threshold, i.e., ω < ω¯, where
ω¯ =
G(θ) ; θ ∈ [12 , x∗]1− (1−G(x∗))x∗θ ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1]. (3.10)
Otherwise, the rich redistribute at a tax-rate t¯ defined in Lemma 8.
When the cost of repression is sufficiently low, the rich respond by repression to the
threat of revolution imposed by the mobilized poor. Otherwise, they redistribute at a tax-
rate that sufficiently mitigates the probability of revolution to maximize their expected
payoff. The substitution between redistribution and repression that appears in the re-
sponse of the rich to the poor’s insurgency is a manifestation of the fact that repression
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and redistribution are two instruments available to the rich to keep the “poor threat” in
check.
The poor take into account the likelihood that the rich respond by repression when
deciding whether to mobilize or not. The expected payoff of mobilization to the poor,
E[V p(M)], depends on their expectation of the response of the rich, which depends on
the cost of repression that is the private information of the rich. Therefore, the poor can
only count on the expected behavior of the rich. If the rich repress, which happens with
probability Pr(repress), the poor get zero. Otherwise, their payoff depends on the redis-
tribution policy of the rich and the cost of revolution, which is unknown to them in the
mobilization stage. Formally,
E[V p(M)] = (1− Pr(repress)) y [Pr(revolt)(1− E[µ|revolt]) + (1− Pr(revolt))(1− x¯)].
(3.11)
Observe that in calculating their expected payoff of revolution conditional on mobiliza-
tion, (1 − Pr(repress))Pr(revolt)(1 − E[µ|revolt])y, the poor account for the informa-
tion contained in the incidence of revolution about the cost of revolution, E[µ|revolt]. Al-
though the poor do not know the cost of revolution in the mobilization stage, they know
that if the cost will be too high, they will not revolt.
From Lemma 8, the equilibrium behavior of the rich implies that if they do not re-
press, they redistribute at a tax-rate that the poor’s share of income becomes 1 − x¯. An-
ticipating this in the mobilization stage, the poor expect to revolt if and only if µ < x¯
(expression (3.5)). Therefore, conditional on rich not repressing, they expect revolution
with probability Pr(µ < x¯) = G(x¯). Moreover, from Lemma 9, Pr(repress) = Pr(ω <
ω¯) = F (ω¯). Substituting these observations in equation (3.11) yields
E[V p(M)] = (1− F (ω¯)) [G(x¯)(1− E[µ|µ < x¯]) + (1−G(x¯))(1− x¯)] y,
in which x¯ and ω¯ are defined in equations (3.8) and (3.10) respectively. Define s(x¯) =
s(θ, x∗) as the poor’s expected share of income if they mobilize. That is,
s(x¯) = s(θ, x∗) ≡ (1− F (ω¯)) [G(x¯)(1− E[µ|µ < x¯]) + (1−G(x¯))(1− x¯)], (3.12)
hence, E[V p(M)] = s(θ, x∗) y.
The poor mobilize if and only if their share of income under status quo, 1 − θ, is less
than their expected share of income from mobilization. That is, if and only if 1 − θ <
s(θ, x∗). The latter depends on the response of the rich and the cost of revolution both
of which are unknown to the poor in the mobilization stage, therefore, the poor have to
decide based on their expectations. If the rich repress, mobilization is aborted and the
poor become worse off, receiving a payoff of zero. This happens if and only if the cost of
repression is sufficiently low, i.e. if ω < ω¯, which happens with probability F (ω¯). Oth-
erwise, the poor’s payoff depends on the redistribution policy of the rich and the cost
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of revolution. If the cost of revolution is sufficiently low, i.e. if µ < x¯, which happens
with probability G(x¯), the poor mount a revolution and cultivate the whole share of in-
come that survives the revolution. In the mobilization stage, this share is expected to be
1−E[µ|µ < x¯]. However, there is a chance, 1−G(x¯), that the cost of revolution will be so
high that the poor are better off to stop mobilization short of revolution for the redistri-
bution that the rich offer, and end up with a share 1−x¯ of income. ω¯ and x¯ correspond to
the rich’s decision whether to repress and how much to redistribute as discussed in Lem-
mas 8 and 9. The following lemma formally states these findings.
Lemma 10. The poor mobilize if and only if 1− θ < s(θ, x∗), in which
s(θ, x∗) =







[G(x∗)(1− E[µ|µ < x∗]) + (1−G(x∗))(1− x∗)] ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1].
A general analytic characterization of the poor’s mobilization strategy in equilibrium
is a challenge because the “mobilization calculus” of the poor involves an analysis of the
distribution composition F (G(θ)), interaction terms, and the truncated mean E[µ|µ < θ]
(See Lemma 10). Therefore, it is necessary to make specification assumptions about the
distributions of the revolution cost, G(µ), and the repression cost, F (ω). A standard
specification candidate that facilitates the derivation of analytic results is the uniform dis-
tribution. In Proposition 25, I assume uniformity for both F and G to solve for the poor’s
mobilization strategy in equilibrium, and investigate its implications for the relationship
between repression and inequality.
Proposition 25. Suppose F and G are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and [12 , 1] respec-
tively. in equilibrium,




If ω < 1− 12θ , the rich repress. Otherwise, they redistribute at a tax-rate t¯ = 1.
Redistribution decreases the income share of the rich, x, but it also decreases the
probability of revolution, G(x). When the cost of revolution, µ, is uniformly distributed
on [12 , 1], the probability of revolution is G(x) = 2x− 1. Therefore, the expected marginal
cost of keeping a larger share of income, g(x)x = 2x, always exceeds its expected marginal
benefit, 1 − G(x) = 2 − 2x, hence, the rich are better off to fully redistribute their in-
come should they decide not to repress. However, if the cost of repression is sufficiently
small, the rich indeed choose to repress. Nevertheless, when the poor have no a priori in-
formation about the cost of repression, i.e., ω ∼ U [0, 1], the expected gain of a complete
redistribution is worth taking the risk of being repressed, and hence they mobilize.
Sometimes, the poor are lucky and the cost of repression is so high that, to avoid rev-
olution, the rich choose full redistribution over repression. In other times, the poor suffer
74
repression. In neither case does mobilization transforms into revolution. Moreover, the
higher is inequality, the higher is the opportunity cost of full redistribution to the rich,
and hence the higher is their incentive to respond to the threat of revolution by repres-
sion. The following corollary formally states this finding.
Corollary 8. Suppose F and G are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and [12 , 1] respec-
tively. In equilibrium, repression happens with probability Pr(repress) = 1 − 12θ , which is
strictly increasing in the level of inequality. That is, the higher is the level of inequality,
the higher is the probability of repression.
Proof: Immediate from Proposition 25. 2
Even though it facilitates analytic solutions, the uniform prior is an excessively strong
assumption because it implies no a priori information about uncertain variables. The
information contained in the prior interactions between the challengers and the propo-
nents of status quo, their previous experience, and various other sources of information in
a society imply that the challengers should consider some costs of repression more likely
than the others. Similarly, the rich should find some values of the revolution cost more
probable than the others. A more natural specification is to assume strict unimodality
or strict log-concavity. With such priors, an uninformed player believes that some value
(the mode) of the uncertain variable is most probable, and although the realization of any
value within the support is possible, the probability of a realization is lower the further it
is from the most likely outcome. I relax the uniformity assumption by replacing unifor-
mity of F by the more natural but more challenging strict unimodality in Proposition 26.
First, I state a formal definition of strict unimodality.
Definition: A distribution is strictly unimodal if and only if there is a unique point, y∗,
in its support such that its cumulative distribution function is strictly convex for y < y∗,
and strictly concave for y > y∗.
Proposition 26. Suppose G is uniform, and F is strictly unimodal. In equilibrium, the




If f(0) < 1, the poor either always mobilize or there exist θ1 and θ2 with
1
2 < θ1 <
θ2 < 1 such that the poor mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (12 , θ1) ∪ (θ1, 1). That is, the
poor mobilize when inequality is low or high, but not when it is intermediate, i.e. θ ∈
[θ1, θ2].
If f(0) > 1, there exists θ3 with
1
2 < θ3 < 1 such that the poor mobilize if and only if
θ ∈ (θ3, 1]. That is, the poor mobilize if and only if inequality is high.
If ω < 1− 12θ , the rich repress. Otherwise, they redistribute at a tax-rate t¯ = 1.
As discussed following the Proposition 25, when the cost of revolution is distributed
uniformly, the rich fully redistribute their income if they choose not to repress, in which
case the poor receive half of the income of the society, i.e. x¯ = 1 − x¯ = 12 . However, if
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the cost of repression is sufficiently low, i.e. when ω < 1 − 12θ , mobilization is followed
by repression leaving the poor with payoff 0. As inequality increases the status quo, i.e.
(1 − θ)y, becomes less attractive to the poor raising their incentive to revolt and to mobi-
lize. However, higher inequality also makes redistribution less attractive to the rich, and
increases the probability of repression, i.e. F (1 − 12θ ), which decreases the expected gain
from mobilization, i.e. (1− F (1− 12θ ))12 .
When inequality is high, the high reward of full redistribution, i.e. 1 − x¯y = 12y, to-
gether with the low value of status quo, i.e. (1 − θ)y, make it worthwhile for the poor
to take the risk of repression, and hence they mobilize. In contrast, when inequality is
low, the value of status quo is already high, and hence the net gain from mobilization, i.e.
(12 − (1− θ))y = (θ− 12)y, is small. However, the likelihood of repression is also low. When
f(0) < 1, this likelihood raises sufficiently slower than the net gain from mobilization and,
hence, it worth for the poor to take the risk of repression. As inequality further increases,
if the risk grows fast enough, it exceeds the net gain at some level of inequality deterring
the poor from mobilization in the intermediate levels of inequality. But if the risk grows
slowly with inequality, the expected gain from mobilization always surpasses its risk, and
hence the poor always mobilize. When f(0) > 1, the likelihood of repression at low levels
of inequality, although small in absolute value, is sufficiently high relative to the small net
gain of mobilization thst the poor do not mobilize. In any case, the net gain from mobi-
lization eventually exceeds the risk of repression as inequality increase further, and makes
mobilization an optimal strategy at sufficiently high levels of inequality. See Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: With uniform G and strictly unimodal F , the poor mobilize if and only if (1−
F (1− 12θ ))12 > 1−θ (See Proposition 26). The straight line is 1−θ and the curves are (1−
F (1 − 12θ ))12 for different strictly unimodal F s. When f(0) < 1, (1 − F (1 − 12θ ))12 > 1 − θ
when inequality is low. However, when f(0) > 1, the relationship is reversed.
For repression to occur, mobilization should take place first. The probability of re-
pression increases with inequality given the poor mobilize. However, anticipating the pos-
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sibility of repression, the poor abstain from mobilization at certain levels of inequality.
The non-monotone relationship between inequality and mobilization stemming from the
strategic considerations of the poor is consequential for the relationship between inequal-
ity and repression. The following corollary states the implications. Figure 3.3 illustrates
the results.
Figure 3.3: Patterns of relationship between probability of repression and inequality when
the distribution of revolution cost, G(µ), is uniform and that of repression cost, F (ω), is
strictly unimodal.
Corollary 9. Suppose G is uniform, and F is strictly unimodal with F (12) < 1. In equi-
librium, the relationship between inequality and repression can take any of the following
forms:
1. The probability of repression is strictly increasing in inequality, Pr(repress) =
F (1− 12θ ) for θ ∈ (12 , 1].
2. The probability of repression is weakly increasing in inequality, Pr(repress) = 0 for
θ ∈ (12 , θ3] and Pr(repress) = F (1− 12θ ) for θ ∈ (θ3, 1].
3. The probability of repression is strictly increasing in inequality when inequality is
low or high, Pr(repress) = F (1 − 12θ ) for θ ∈ (12 , θ1) ∪ (θ2, 1], but repression does
not occur when inequality is intermediate, i.e. θ ∈ [θ1, θ2].
3.3 Common Knowledge Cost of Revolution
In this section, I allow the cost of revolution to be common knowledge. Recall from ex-
pression (3.5) that the poor revolt if and only if µ < x, in which x is the income share of
the rich, x = (1 − t)θ + t2 (equation (3.6)). Revolution is the worst outcome for the rich,
and hence they maximize their payoff “subject to no revolution”. If they redistribute, they





corresponding to x¯ = µ. (3.13)
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They repress if and only if their payoff from repression exceeds that of redistribution,
x¯y < (1− ω)θy. That is,





in which the last equality follows from equation (3.13). The following lemma summarizes
the rich’s strategy in equilibrium.
Lemma 11. Suppose the cost of revolution, µ, is common knowledge. In equilibrium, the
rich repress if and only if the cost of repression is sufficiently low, i.e. when ω < 1 − µθ .
Otherwise, they redistribute at tax-rate t¯ = θ−µ1
2
−θ .
Thus, if the poor mobilize, there is a chance F (1 − µθ ) that they get repressed and
receive 0. However, with probability 1 − F (1 − µθ ), the rich respond with redistribution,
and the poor receive (1 − x¯)y. Anticipating the response of the rich, the poor mobilize if









That is, if µ = 1, the poor do not mobilize, otherwise,









1− µ θ −
µ
1− µ. (3.16)
If µ = 12 , the equilibrium conditions, i.e. equations (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15), are the same
as the ones appeared in Proposition 26 (See the proof of Proposition 26 or the discussion
following Proposition 26). Therefore, the possibility of a non-monotone relationship be-
tween inequality and repression remains robust in the new setting. The following proposi-
tion characterizes the equilibrium of the game with known revolution cost, and its corol-
lary states the implications for the relationship between inequality and the probability of
repression. See Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
Proposition 27. Suppose the cost of revolution, µ, is common knowledge and F is strictly
unimodal. In equilibrium, if µ = 1, the poor do not mobilize. Otherwise:
If f(0) < 11−µ , either the poor mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (µ, 1] or there exist θ1 and θ2
with µ < θ1 < θ2 < 1 such that the poor mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (µ, θ1) ∪ (θ2, 1].
If f(0) > 11−µ , there exists θ3 ∈ (µ, 1) such that the poor mobilize if and only if inequal-
ity is sufficiently high, θ ∈ (θ3, 1].
The poor’s revolution strategy and the rich’s strategy in equilibrium are stated in equation
(3.1) and Lemma 11 respectively.
Corollary 10. Suppose the cost of revolution, µ, is common knowledge and F is strictly
unimodal. In equilibrium, no repression occurs if µ = 1. Otherwise, the relationship be-
tween inequality and repression can take any of the following forms:
78
Figure 3.4: When revolution cost, µ, is common knowledge and the distribution of repres-










strictly unimodal F s.
Figure 3.5: Patterns of relationship between the probability of repression and inequality
when revolution cost, µ, is common knowledge and the distribution of repression cost,
F (ω), is strictly unimodal. See Corollary 10.
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1. The probability of repression is strictly increasing in inequality when inequality is
high, Pr(repress) = F (1 − µθ ) for θ ∈ (µ, 1], but repression does not occur when
inequality is low, Pr(repress) = 0 for θ ∈ (12 , µ].
2. The probability of repression is strictly increasing in inequality for θ ∈ (µ, θ1) ∪
(θ2, 1], Pr(repress) = F (1 − µθ ), but repression does not occur for θ ∈ (12 , µ] ∪
[θ1, θ2], i.e. Pr(repress) = 0.
3. The probability of repression is strictly increasing in inequality when inequality is
high, Pr(repress) = F (1 − µθ ) for θ ∈ (θ3, 1], but repression does not occur when
inequality is low, Pr(repress) = 0 for θ ∈ (12 , θ3].
Proof: Immediate from Proposition 27 and equation (3.14). 2
3.4 Mobilization Cost
In the previous sections, I assumed that mobilization is not costly. However, a more re-
alistic model must take into account the costs involved in the mobilization stage. In this
section, I integrate a cost of mobilization to the model. Suppose mobilization costs the
poor a fraction m > 0 of their income.12 First, I analyze the effect of mobilization cost
for the case where the cost of revolution is known. Incorporating mobilization cost m to
equation (3.15) reveals that the poor mobilize if and only if












[(1− x¯)y −m(1− θ)y]. (3.17)
Substituting from expression (3.13) and rearranging (3.17) reveals that if µ = 1, the poor
do not mobilize, otherwise,







1− µ θ −
m+ µ
1− µ . (3.18)
To understand the role of mobilization cost, compare expressions (3.18) and (3.16). Ob-
serve that in both cases the right hand side is 1 at θ = 1, however, mobilization cost m
pivots the right hand side around (θ = 1, 1) counterclockwise. Because F (1 − µθ ) is in-
creasing this rotation increases the range of θ where F (1 − µθ ) ≥ 1+m1−µ θ − m+µ1−µ , in which
the poor do not mobilize; that is, mobilization is deterred. In particular, at low levels of
inequality, the poor do not mobilize. When inequality is low, the cost of redistribution for
12Here, I assume that the poor know the mobilization cost. It is worthwhile emphasizing that the in-
formation structure of the mobilization cost is inconsequential for the results. The cost of mobilization
is irrelevant for the response of the rich, and is a sunk cost for the poor in the revolution stage. In the
mobilization stage, the poor either take into account the mobilization cost m or its expectation E[m]
depending on whether they know the cost or not. Therefore, all the results follow when the known mo-
bilization cost m is replaced with its expectation E[m] corresponding to the case where the poor do not
know this cost in the mobilization stage.
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the rich is small, and they are less likely to repress. However, the cost of mobilization ex-
ceeds the small gain from redistribution to the poor, and hence the poor do not mobilize.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the game with mobilization
cost. See Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: When mobilization cost and revolution cost are common knowledge and





< 1+m1−µ θ − m+µ1−µ (See expression (3.18)). The straight lines are 1+m1−µ θ − m+µ1−µ ,




for different strictly unimodal F s. Observe that depending
on the shape (curvature) of F , mobilization behavior of the poor changes (See Proposi-
tion 28).
Proposition 28. Suppose F is strictly unimodal. If µ = 1, the poor do not mobilize.
Otherwise, either there exist θ1, θ2, and θ3 with
µ+m
1+m < θ1 < θ2 < θ3 < 1 such that the
poor mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) ∪ (θ3, 1]; Or, there exists θ4 ∈ (µ+m1+m , 1) such that
the poor mobilize if and only if inequality is sufficiently high, i.e. when θ ∈ (θ4, 1].
The poor’s revolution strategy and the rich’s strategy in equilibrium are stated in equa-
tion (3.1) and Lemma 11 respectively.
Corollary 11. Suppose F is strictly unimodal. In equilibrium, if µ = 1, the poor do not
mobilize, and repression does not occur. Otherwise, either the probability of repression is
strictly increasing in inequality for θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) ∪ (θ3, 1], i.e. Pr(repress) = F (1− µθ ), but
repression does not occur if θ ∈ (12 , θ1] ∪ [θ2, θ3], i.e. Pr(repress) = 0; Or, the probability
of repression is weakly increasing in inequality, Pr(repress) = 0 for θ ∈ (12 , θ4] and
Pr(repress) = F (1− µθ ) otherwise.
Proof: Immediate from Proposition 28 and expression (3.14). 2
Next, I integrate the mobilization cost to the case where the cost of revolution is un-
known in the mobilization stage. With mobilization cost m, the poor mobilize if and only
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if (1 − θ)y < E[V p(M)] − m(1 − θ)y, i.e. if and only if (1 + m)(1 − θ)y < E[V p(M)].
Therefore, Lemma 10 is modified to
the poor mobilize if and only if (1 +m)(1− θ) < s(θ, x∗), (3.19)
in which s(θ, x∗) is defined in Lemma 10. Observe that mobilization cost, m, pivots (1 +
m)(1 − θ) clockwise around (θ = 1, 0) , thus, uniformly (over θ ∈ (12 , 1)) decreases
the attraction of mobilization to the poor relative to the status quo. Similar to the case
with known revolution cost, the effect of mobilization cost is most acute at low levels of
inequality: It prevents mobilization when inequality is sufficiently low. The following two
propositions are counterparts of Propositions 25 and 26 with mobilization cost m > 0.
As shown in Proposition 30 below, the relationship between mobilization and inequality
can be non-monotone, and hence the possibility of non-monotone relationship between re-
pression and inequality remains robust to addition of mobilization cost. See Figure 3.7.
Because the implications of the mobilization behavior of the poor for the relationship be-
tween inequality and repression is clear from the previous discussions, I abstract from the
counterpart corollaries for conciseness.
Figure 3.7: With uniform G, strictly unimodal F , and mobilization cost m > 0, the poor
mobilize if and only if (1 − F (1 − 12θ ))12 > (1 + m)(1 − θ) (See Proposition 30).
The straight line is 1 − θ, the dashed line is (1 − m)(1 − θ), and the curves are (1 −
F (1 − 12θ ))12 for different strictly unimodal F s. Observe that the mobilization cost m piv-
ots the poor’s income share under the status quo, i.e. 1− θ, around θ = 1.
Proposition 29. (Proposition 25 with mobilization cost) Suppose F and G are uniform,
and mobilization costs the poor a fraction m > 0 of their income. There exists θ1 ∈ (12 , 1)
such that, in equilibrium, the poor mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (θ1, 1].
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Proposition 30. (Proposition 26 with mobilization cost) Suppose F is strictly unimodal,
G is uniform, and mobilization costs the poor a fraction m > 0 of their income. In equi-
librium, either there exist θ1, θ2, and θ3 with
1
2 < θ1 < θ2 < θ3 < 1 such that the poor
mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (θ1, θ2)∪ (θ3, 1]; Or, there exists θ4 ∈ (12 , 1) such that the poor
mobilize if and only if inequality is high, i.e. when θ ∈ (θ4, 1] .
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Continuous Repression Policy
I modeled repression as a binary choice of the rich: the rich either repress or not repress.
In this section, I allow for continuous repression policy such that the rich can decide how
much to repress. The more they repress, the higher the likelihood that they successfully
suppress the mobilized poor and avoid revolution. However, more extensive repression
requires more resources, and hence costs more.
Call the original game G1, and define a new game G2 that differs from G1 only in
that the rich can also choose the level of repression. If the poor mobilize, the rich can
choose a level of redistribution via distortionary taxation, t ∈ [0, 1], and a level of re-
pression, r ∈ [0, 1]. Higher levels of repression increase the probability, p(r), that the
rich succeeds in suppressing the poor’s mobilization, in which case the status quo prevails.
For simplicity, I assume that revolution cost in sufficiently low that if repression fails, the
poor mount a successful revolution and the rich get 0. Implementing a repression level r
costs the rich a fraction ω(r) of their income. If repression and redistribution fail and rev-
olution succeeds, the rich get zero, and the poor share the whole income that survives the
revolution. I impose the following assumptions on the probability of successful repression,
p(r), and repression cost, ω(r).
Assumption 3: The probability of successful repression, p(r), is a differentiable strictly
increasing and concave function of the level of repression, that is, p′(r) > 0 and p′′(r) < 0.
Moreover, p(0) = 0 and p(1) = p¯ ≤ 1.
Assumption 4: The cost of repression, ω(r), is a differentiable strictly increasing and
convex function of the level of repression, that is, ω′(r) > 0 and ω′′(r) > 0. Moreover,
ω(0) = 0 and ω(1) = ω¯ ≤ 1.
Obviously, the rich either repress or redistribute, and hence the optimal redistribu-
tion policy of the rich does not change in the new setting. The rich’s expected payoff of
a repression policy r is p(r) (1 − ω(r))θy. The rich choose a repression policy, r∗, that
maximizes this expected payoff. That is,
r∗ = arg max
r∈[0, 1]
p(r) (1− ω(r)). (3.20)
The following lemma proves that Assumptions 3 and 4 are sufficient for the existence and
uniqueness of r∗.
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Lemma 12. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. If p′(1)(1 − ω¯) − ω′(1)p¯ < 0, there is a
unique r∗ ∈ (0, 1). Otherwise, r∗ = 1.
The rich repress if and only if their best expected payoff from repression, correspond-
ing to r∗, exceeds that of redistribution, corresponding to x¯, i.e. when p(r∗)(1−ω(r∗))θy >
(1− x¯)θy. The following lemma summarizes the equilibrium strategy of the rich.
Lemma 13. Define ω¯c ≡ 1 − 1−x¯p(r∗) . The rich repress at level r∗ if and only if ω(r∗) <
ω¯c. Otherwise, they do not repress, but redistribute at tax-rate t¯. r
∗ is defined in equation
(3.20). x¯ and t¯ are defined in equation (3.13) if µ is common knowledge, and in Lemma 8
if µ is revealed after the response of the rich.
From Lemma 13, the poor’s mobilization strategy depends on their belief about the
value of the threshold ω¯c, and hence qualitatively follow the same patterns that were ana-
lyzed in the paper.
3.5.2 Two-sided Private Information with the Myopic Rich (No
Signaling)
Here I assume that before the mobilization stage, the revolution cost, µ, is revealed to the
poor, but not to the rich. This is a two-sided incomplete information setting in which the
dissidents (the poor) have private information about the revolution cost and the rich have
private information about the repression cost. The poor’s decision whether to mobilize is
also a signal to the rich about the revolution cost that they can use to update their prior
via Bayes rule. However, I abstract from the signaling feature of the game because the
purpose of the paper is to show the consequences of taking into account the dissidents’s
expectations about the rich’s response, rather than analyzing “mobilization as signaling”.
Therefore, I assume that the rich are myopic in the sense that they ignore the information
contained in the poor’s mobilization decision.
The equilibrium strategies of the rich is described in Lemmas 8 and 9. And, the equi-
librium strategy of the poor in the revolution stage is stated in expression (3.1). However,
the poor’s expected value of mobilization changes because they know the revolution cost
in the mobilization stage in the new setting:
E[V p(M)] =







max{1− µ, 1− x∗} y ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1],
in which the poor take into account the expected response of the rich. If the rich repress,
which happens with probability F (·), the poor get zero. Otherwise, the rich redistribute
at a tax-rate t¯ that leaves the poor an income share of 1 − x¯. The poor revolt if and only
if this share is lower that the income share that survives revolution, and collect max{1 −
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µ, 1− x¯}. Thus, the poor mobilize if and only if 1− θ < s(θ, x∗) in which
s(θ, x∗) =







max{1− µ, 1− x∗} ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1].
(3.21)
To see that a nonlinear relationship between repression and inequality arises in this set-
ting too, suppose G is uniform. From Lemma 8, x¯ = x∗ = 12 , thus, 1 − µ < 1 − x∗ = 12 .
From equation (3.21), the poor mobilize if and only if 1− θ < (1− F (1− 12θ )) 12 , i.e. when
F (1 − 12θ ) < 2θ − 1. This is the same condition that arises in the proof of Proposition 26
as equation (C.4) shows. Thus, the equilibrium when G is uniform is characterize by that
proposition. Therefore, even when the poor are informed about the cost of revolution in
the mobilization stage, inequality and repression can feature a nonlinear relationship as
highlighted in Corollary 9.
3.6 Empirical Evidence
The empirical literature on determinants of state repression has mostly ignored the effect
of inequality13. The reason might be twofold: Theoretically, mechanisms through which
inequality influences repression are usually perceived as implications of “relative depri-
vation” theories (e.g., Davies (1962); Gurr (1968, 1970)) and inconsistent with rational
action models (e.g., Weede (1987); Muller and Seligson (1987); Muller and Weede (1990)).
Empirically, severe scarcity and poor quality of inequality data until very recently have
caused serious difficulty in large-N analysis. Taking the insights of recent developments
in game-theoretical models of democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b,
2001, 2006); Boix (2003); See Robinson (2006) for a non-technical but comprehensive re-
view.), I showed in the previous section that rational action models can indeed imply that
inequality influences state repression. Moreover, recent inequality data collections have
provided comprehensive inequality data and have significantly improved the quality and
comparability of data, making it more suitable for large-N analysis14. In this section, I
introduce the data and estimation strategy that provide evidence for the empirical impli-
cations of the model in terms of the relationship between inequality and repression.
A full empirical test of the predictions of the model for the relationship between in-
equality and repression requires data on dissidents’ expectations about the possibility of
13Henderson (1991) is an exception. The role of inequality in political violence, usually measured as
the number of deaths in domestic political conflicts, has been studied extensively if inconclusively (e.g.
Midlarsky (1988); Muller (1985); Muller and Seligson (1987); Wang, Dixon, Muller, and Seligson (1993);
Weede (1981, 1987); For controversies, see Hartman and Hsiao (1988); Muller (1986, 1988); Weede (1986);
See also Lichbach (1989)). However, the concern of that literature is mainly the use of violence by the
dissidents, not state repression.
14For example, Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Houle (2009) are two recent empirical studies that have
employed relatively comprehensive inequality datasets.
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repression. However, such data is not available15. Instead, I investigate the empirical re-
lationship between the level of inequality and the likelihood of repression. If data do not
indicate any non-monotone relationship, the results of the model might be theoretical cu-
riosities with little empirical relevance. However, observing some indications of such non-
monotonicities in the data calls for more rigorous investigations in both theoretical and
empirical fronts to understand the determinants of repression by keeping an eye on the
role of expectations and incomplete information in the context of contentious politics.
The measure of repression that I use is Cingranelli and Richards’ (2008) “Physical In-
tegrity Rights Index”, also known as CIRI measure. It is an additive index constructed
from the sum of four indicators of torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment,
and disappearance collected for each country-year from annual US State Department
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International Annual Reports.
Each indicator takes three values of 0, 1, and 2 corresponding to frequent, occasional, and
no occurrence of the relevant incidence respectively. Therefore, “Physical Integrity Rights
Index” is an integer ranging from 0 to 8, that is, from the most frequent violation to no
violation of physical integrity rights respectively (See Cingranelli and Richards (1999,
2008) for more details.). Observe that this measure is based solely on the frequency of
incidents in a country-year and does not account for the country’s population. The ordi-
nal nature of the measure does not allow a meaningful rescaled measure of repression in
which we divide the repression measure by some monotone function of population. There-
fore, in line with the literature, I additively incorporate the log of population as an inde-
pendent variable in all empirical models. Trivially, its coefficient must be positive. (See
Henderson (1993) for a different mechanism.) 16
The measure of inequality is the “Estimated Household Income Inequality”(EHII)
from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). EHII is an estimated Gini coef-
ficient based on a linear model regressing Deininger and Squire (DS) Gini coefficient on a
15Some recent empirical studies in the international relations literature have employed a Bayesian ap-
proach to “construct” priors based on the information available to the uninformed parties such as the past
history of conflict (e.g, Kedziora (2009)). A similar approach could have some merits in our context. For
example, in his study of the working-class protests in the mid-nineteenth century France, Liebman (1980)
argues that dissidents “interpret the threat of repression on the basis of their accumulated experience with
the authorities. The method sets threat squarely within a historical context in which actors perceive the
likelihood of repression as a function of its application in the past. (Liebman, (1980, p.38))” However,
such an estimation of priors, if possible with the available data, requires a fully structural approach. Re-
garding the theoretical orientation of the paper and lacking the courage of our convictions, I leave the
extremely demanding estimation of priors for future empirical research.
16An alternative measure is “Political Terror Scale”(PTS) from Gibney et al. (2010), which uses the
coding scheme introduced in the Freedom House 1980 yearbook (Gastil (1980)), and was popularized by
the seminal works of Carleton and Stohl (1985, 1987) and Poe and Tate (1994). However, PTS also ac-
counts for the “range” of terror, which is defined as the fraction of the population that is affected. More
specifically, PTS penalizes the countries who indiscriminately apply terror vis-a-vis those that are se-
lective. Consequently, ceteris paribus, PTS assigns a better human rights score to countries that direct
violence against labor leaders and political activists than to the countries that direct violence against apo-
litical peasants. For this and several other related reasons, I prefer the CIRI score for the purpose of this
paper. See Wood and Gibney (2010) and Cingranelli and Richards (2010) for further comparisons and
some critiques of each measure.
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Theil measure of industrial pay inequality and other relevant socio-economic information.
Because measures of industrial pay inequality are readily available, EHII is significantly
more comprehensive than DS data. Moreover, it is less prone to bias stemming from dif-
ferent data sources and collection methods because the data on pay inequality is collected
by a single credible international organization, namely United Nation Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO).
Although the literature on state repression has largely ignored the role of inequality
(See discussion above), it has identified several other determinants of repression. Summa-
rizing the development of literature on state repression in the last forty year, Davenport
(2007c) identifies two core findings: “The Law of Coercive Responsiveness” and “Domes-
tic Democratic Peace”. The Law of Coercive Responsiveness states that “when challenges
to the status quo take place, authorities generally employ some form of repressive action
to counter or eliminate the behavioral threat (Davenport (2007c, p. 7))”. A manifestation
of such challenges is civil war and international war, which have been consistently found
to increase the likelihood of state repression (Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005); Davenport
(2007b); Davenport and Armstrong II (2004); Poe and Tate (1994); Poe, Tate and Keith
(1999), Vreeland(2008)). “Domestic Democratic Peace” states that “democratic political
institutions and activities decrease state repressive behavior. (Davenport (2007c, p. 11);
See also Davenport (2004, 2007b))” In line with the literature, I use the POLITY mea-
sure from the POLITY IV dataset to control for the effect of democratic institutions. 17
Besides the core findings, there is no consensus in the literature about other relevant
variables. I control for variables that has been used frequently in the literature: past level
repression, income per capita , and whether the government is a military government
(Davenport (1995, 1996, 2004, 2007a, 2007b); Davenport and Armstrong II (2004); Hen-
derson (1991, 1993); Mitchell and McCormick (1988); Poe and Tate (1994); Poe, Tate,
and Keith (1999); Vreeland (2008)). The sources and definitions of variables are in Table
1 in the Appendix.
The choice of appropriate statistical models is limited by the characteristics of data.
The measure of repression takes discrete integers and is ordinal. Moreover, without know-
ing dissident’s expectation of the likelihood of repression, the theory does not pin down
the functional form of the relationship between repression and inequality even though it
highlights certain patterns. This, in turn, calls for non-parametric methods that allow for
virtually all reasonable relationships between inequality and repression, and can accom-
modate the integration of control variables to the model. A natural candidate is the class
17Some researchers contend that democratic institutions have virtually no effect on state repression until
they pass a threshold after which more democratic institutions decrease repression (Davenport and Arm-
strong II (2004); See also Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005)). More specifically, Davenport and Armstrong
II (2004) suggest replacing the POLITY measure with three dummy variables, say POLITY(-10to7),
POLITY(8to9), and POLITY(10), which are indicators of whether POLITY≤ 7, 7 < POLITY ≤ 9,
and POLITY= 10 respectively. To account for this finding, I also estimated the models with an alterna-
tive specification, in which I replace POLITY with these dummy variables. The results are qualitatively
similar.
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of generalized additive models (GAM)(Hastie and Tibshirani (1990)).
Further complications arise due to the variation of revolution cost and mobilization
cost across country-years. An examination of Figures 3.4 and 3.6 reveals that at each
level of inequality, the effect of inequality on the likelihood of repression can be differ-
ent for different revolution or mobilization costs depending on the shape of the dissidents’
prior about the repression cost. For example, if the cost of revolution or mobilization is
sufficiently high, an increase in inequality has no effect on the likelihood of repression be-
cause the dissident do not mobilize. Lacking information about the dissidents’ prior, I
account for this effect by allowing a flexible interaction between inequality and the costs
of mobilization and revolution.
Obviously, these costs are not observable18. A tentative solution is to employ a vari-
able correlated with the costs of mobilization and revolution as a proxy. Robinson (2006)
argues that the cost of revolution is higher in the economies in which financial and indus-
trial sectors account for a large share of production. Clearly, financial markets are espe-
cially sensitive to disturbances in the normal functioning of economy and, consequently,
to social unrest vis-a-vis agricultural markets. Combining this insight with the fact that
financial sectors account for a larger share of income in more advanced economies high-
lights income as a variable that should be positively correlated with the costs of mobi-
lization and revolution. Moreover, the fact that the opportunity cost of dissent activi-
ties in terms of short-run personal income is higher in more advanced economies further
strengthen this hypothesis.
In the light of the above arguments, I use a generalized additive model with a thin-
plate spline (TPS) of inequality and income per capita. This statistical model allows for
both a flexible relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression, and a flex-
ible interaction between inequality and income per capita. That is, I estimate the follow-
ing model.
g(E[repression| inequality, income]) = f(inequality, income) +Xβ, (3.22)
in which g is a link function, f is a smooth function to be approximated by thin-plate
splines, and X is the vector of control variable.
The choice of link function, g(.), is relatively routine partly due to the accepted con-
ventions (heuristics) of the scientific community. In general, g(.) is unknown, and hence
its specification calls for semi/non-parametric methods (Horowitz (1998)). Convention-
ally, however, a logit or probit link function is accepted as reasonable choices for binary
response GLMs. Of course, the response variable in our data, i.e. the level of repression,
takes more than two values, Y ∈ {0, 1, ..., 8}, which calls for a more elaborate model: a
18Note that the problem of unobservable costs also exists in the formal models of democratization
(Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006); Boix (2003)) which complicates any test of those models as well.
Although some empirical studies ignore the variation of these cost across units (Houle (2009)), I contend
that neglect of such pertinent variables substantially suspects the validity of those empirical studies.
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GAM counterpart of GLM estimator of ordered logit or probit models.
Alternatively, one can collapse the levels of the dependent variable into two, to make
a new binary measure of repression. Although this dichotomization leads to some loss of
information, it has some practical and technical advantages: (i) It is easier to interpret
the fitted model with a binary dependent variable. (ii) A GAM with links suitable to bi-
nary variables, e.g. logit and probit, can be readily and efficiently estimated by available
packages in R such as Simon Wood’s mgcv (Wood (2006, 2010)). (iii) Measurement error
in the measure of repression is less sever. Regarding significant restrictions on the flow
of information specially in dictatorships, a systematic measurement error is not unlikely.
Clearly, the problem is exacerbated as one attempts to measure repression more finely,
thus, coarsening data gives some leverage over the problem of measurement error. (iv)
Ordered logit models are based on the proportional odds assumption that presumes more
conditions as the number of response categories increases.
In the light of the above arguments, I construct a new binary dependent variable, rep,
which takes a value 1 if the CIRI measure of repression is between 4 and 8, and takes a
value 0 otherwise. Then, I employ Wood’s (2010) mgcv package in R to estimate equa-
tion (3.22) with a logit link function and thin-plate splines. The estimation method is
penalized maximum likelihood estimation (P-MLE) in which the smoothing parameter
is automatically chosen via minimizing the mean square error (MSE). More details and
references for the estimation and inference method are in the Appendix B.
The CIRI dataset on repression starts from 1981, limiting the time period of analy-
sis from below, and the UTIP dataset on inequality ends in 1999, limiting it from above.
Therefore, the data contains all countries from 1981 to 1999 for which data is available
which sums up to about 1100 country-years. The estimates of the parametric components
of the model are presented in Table 3.2. Whether the regime is military or whether the
country is engaged in an international war were highly insignificant and were dropped
from the model. Consistent with the previous findings in the literature, democratic insti-
tutions decrease the likelihood of repression, whereas repression in the past, an ongoing
civil war, and higher population increase the probability of repression.
Figure 3.8 depicts the effect of the estimated smooth function fˆ(inequality, income)
on the likelihood of repression. Observe that for some ranges of inequality and income,
the relationship between inequality and repression is non-monotone. To illustrate this
more clearly, Figure 3.9 depicts the predicted probability of repression as a function of
inequality at the mean level of income in a median size (population is set at its median)
country in 1995 with an authoritarian regime (POLITY=-10) which was not engaged in
civil war and had not experienced repression in the preceding year. The results indicate a
non-monotone relationship between inequality and the probability of repression. Consis-
tent with the general insight of the theoretical model, there are ranges of inequality where
an increase in the level of inequality decreases the likelihood of repression.
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Table 3.1: The Sources of Data
VARIABLE SOURCE
Repression Cingranelli and Richards (2008)
Inequality UTIP
POLITY POLITY IV
Income per Capita Penn Tables
Civil War Fearon and Laitin (2003)
International War Correlates of War
Military Regime Cheibub et al. (2010)
Population World Bank (2002) World Population Prospects
Table 3.2: The estimates of the parametric components.










∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
Time cubic splines with 10 df are included.
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Figure 3.8: The fitted thin-plate spline of inequality and income in response scale. The
surface is the probability of repression for different values of inequality and income.
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Figure 3.9: The predicted probability of repression as a function of inequality. The range of
inequality is between 2.5 to 6 to match the range of inequality in the data.
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3.7 Conclusion
The occurrence of repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not
have rebelled at the outset. And if it is to fail, the state should have acquiesced to the
dissidents’ demands at the first place in order to save the unnecessary costs of unsuccess-
ful repression. I call this the repression puzzle to highlight its resemblance to the war puz-
zle in the international relations literature (Fearon (1995)).
I offer an explanation for the repression puzzle based on information asymmetries be-
tween the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the
likelihood of its application by the state. In response to popular mobilization, the state
can either accommodate dissidents or repress them. That decision depends critically on
the costs of repression about which dissidents are not fully informed. Therefore, dissi-
dents base their decision on their expectation about the costs of repression, and mobilize
when the expected gain of protest is worthwhile to take the risk of repression. Like other
gamblers, sometimes they are not lucky and the costs of repression are sufficiently low
that the state responds with repression.
The main contribution of the paper is to investigate the rather surprising consequences
of this information asymmetry for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances
and the likelihood of repression. First, I propose a rational choice approach to contentious
politics by combining the insights from grievance-based and political process theories. I
argue that mixed empirical findings are the result of narrow interpretations of these the-
ories, which consider them as competing, rather than complementary. Then, I draw from
this synthetic rational choice approach to provide a formal model that accounts for sev-
eral relevant features of the real world such as information asymmetries and learning in
the protest process. The main result is that, under mild assumptions, the relationship
between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.
That is, when the dissidents’ grievances increase, the likelihood of repression might de-
crease depending on the dissidents’ expectation about the costs of repression. I show that
this finding is robust to a wide range of information structures, and hence is an intrinsic
feature of conflict in environments with asymmetric information. I formulated the model
with inequality as the salient grievance factor. At the cost of redundancy, I again empha-
size that the results apply to any grievance over which the state and dissidents have con-
flicting interests.
I discuss some of the repercussions of my theoretical findings for the empirical studies
of repression. In particular, I argue that we need to think about finding reliable methods
and data to estimate the dissidents’ expectations about the likelihood of repression. Lack-
ing the data or an appropriate method to estimate the dissidents’ expectations, I employ
a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS) as a tentative alterna-
tive to estimate the effect of inequality on the likelihood of repression. This statistical
model allows for both a flexible relationship between inequality and the likelihood of re-
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pression, and a flexible interaction between inequality and the proxy for repression and
revolution costs (income per capita), and hence mitigates the potential specification prob-
lem in parametric models. The empirical evidence confirm the prediction of the model
that, for some ranges of variables, the likelihood of repression does decrease as inequality
increases.
This paper is a first attempt to understand the roles of expectations and asymmet-
ric information in the occurrence of repression. As such, it leaves several questions unan-
swered for future research. On the empirical front, more rigorous empirical studies are
necessary to test the empirical implications of the theory, and to investigate the rela-
tionship between inequality and repression more accurately. Regarding the nature of the
game and unobservable costs, I contend that such studies should take a structural rather
than a reduced form approach.
On the theory front, the implications of my model for the war puzzle in the interna-
tional relations and formal models of democratization in the comparative politics remain
unexamined. Moreover, I intentionally kept the model simple to isolate the underlying
mechanisms that derive the results. A natural extension is to investigate the interactions
between dissidents and the state in a dynamic setting in which expectations are formed
endogenously. That is, the dissidents and the state use their history of conflict to form
expectations. Such a dynamic environment provides a natural setting to study protest-
repression nexus, and offers an overarching framework in which revolution, civil war, and
democratization emerge as different trajectories of contentious interactions between the
state and dissidents in the context of domestic conflict.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1: That ki(∞) = ∞ and ki(−∞) = wb is immediate from the struc-
ture of payoffs. For any k−i ∈ R, from equation (1.5), limsi→−∞∆(si; k−i) = −µ < 0 <
limsi→∞∆(si; k−i) = ∞. Therefore, since ∆(si; k−i) is continuous in si, given any finite
k−i, there exists a ki ∈ R such that ∆(ki; k−i) = 0.




































































The right-hand side is strictly increasing in si and onto; while the left-hand side is strictly
decreasing in si, because Φ is logconcave (and the argument, k
−i−b si
a , of Φ and φ is de-
creasing in si). Thus, there is a unique kˆ such that ∂∆(s
i;k−i)
∂si




si < kˆ, and ∂∆(s
i;k−i)
∂si






Next, suppose ∆(k1; k







WLOG, assume k1 < k2. Then, by the continuity of ∆(s
i; k−i) in si, there must exist a
k3 ∈ (k1, k2) such that ∆(k3; k−i) = 0. But then, by the Mean Value Theorem, there exist







a contradiction of the uniqueness of kˆ. Denote the unique solution to ∆(si; k−i) = 0 by
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ki = ki(k−i). Differentiability and continuity of ki(k−i) follows from equation (A.2) and
the Implicit Function Theorem.
Continuity of ki(k−i) ensures the existence of limk−i→±∞ ki(k−i). Because ∆(ki(k−i); k−i)
= 0, limk−i→∞ ki(k−i) = l ∈ R or −∞ leads to contradiction. Thus, limk−i→∞ ki(k−i) =
∞ and limk−i→∞ k
−i−bki(k−i)
a =∞. Similarly, limk−i→−∞ ki(k−i) = wb . 2









From equation (A.2), we have ∂∆(k
i;k−i)
∂ki
> 0, so sgn( ∂k
i
∂k−i ) = −sgn(
∂∆(ki;k−i)
∂k−i ). Define














Since a and φ are positive, sgn(∂∆(k
i;k−i)










From the asymptotic behavior of ki in Lemma 1, limk−i→−∞ δ(k−i, ki(k−i)) = −∞
and limk−i→∞ δ(k−i, ki(k−i)) = ∞. Therefore, by continuity of δ in k−i, there exists a k∗






































φδ + a(1− Φ) . (A.9)
Now, substitute ∂k
i(k−i)
















2 < 1, so δ
′ > 0 if δ ≥ 0. This together with the sign of δ at ±∞ ensures that
k∗ is unique, δ > 0 if k−i > k∗, and δ < 0 if k−i < k∗. 2
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Lemma 14. Suppose f(x) is a continuously differentiable function, and f ′(x) > −1.
Then, f(x1) = f
−1(x1) only if f(x1) = x1.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists an x1 such that f
−1(x1) =
f(x1) where without loss of generality, we assume f(x1) < x1. Then, f(f(x1)) = x1, and
by the mean value theorem, there exists an x2 ∈ (f(x1), x1) such that f ′(x2) = f(x1)−x1x1−f(x1) =
−1, a contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 2: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show ∂k
i
∂k−i > −1. From Proposi-
tion 1 and the definition of k∗, we have ∂k
i
∂k−i < 0 if and only if k
−i ∈ (−∞, k∗). Thus, we
can restrict attention to k−i ∈ (−∞, k∗), where actions are strategic substitutes.
Further, it suffices to show ∂k
i
∂k−i > −1 at the inflection points of ki(k−i), i.e., at the
set {k∗∗ : ∂2ki
∂(k−i)2 |k−i=k∗∗ = 0}, as the derivative reaches a local extremum there, and
ki(k−i) has a unique maximum and limk−i→−∞ ki(k−i) is bounded (implying that ∂k
i
∂k−i is
minimized by k−i finite). To simplify presentation denote ∂k
i
∂k−i by (k
i)′, and write (A.9)











































































































= b(ki)′(1− Φ). (A.13)
Substituting this expression into (A.12) yields







Substitute for δ′ using equation (A.7) into (A.14), divide by 1− Φ and rearrange to get
c
a








Since ca > 0 and (k
































)b < − c
a
.
Dividing both sides by b and rearranging reveals that ∂k
i









































Next, we prove the inequality on the right-hand side must hold. Observe that x1−Φ(x)φ(x) is
increasing in x. Moreover, by Proposition 1, k
−i−bki(k−i)
a is increasing in k
−i for k−i ∈
(−∞, k∗). Thus, it is sufficient to show that k−i−bkia 1−Φφ |k−i=k∗ < 1. Recall from the defi-





bki(k∗)− w + µ
c
. (A.16)
Moreover, from the definition of ki, we have ∆(ki; k∗) = 0. Hence, equation (1.5) implies
(1− Φ)(bki(k∗)− w + µ) = µ− cφ.
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φ |k−i=k∗ < 1 if and only if 1− µcφ < 1, which holds trivially. 2
Proof of Lemma 2: The asymptotic behavior of ∆1(k) follows immediately from in-
spection of equation (1.10). Differentiating ∆1(k) in equation (1.10) yields:
∆′1(k) = −fφ(fk)(bk − w + µ+ cfk) + b(1− Φ(fk)). (A.17)
It follows that ∆′1(k) = 0 if and only if





The left-hand side of equation (A.18) is strictly increasing in k and onto, and the right-
hand side is strictly decreasing. Therefore, there is a unique solution to ∆′1(k) = 0; call it
km. Combining this result with the asymptotic properties of ∆1(k) yields that ∆
′
1(k) > 0
if k < km, and ∆
′
1(k) < 0 if k > km. 2
Proof of Lemma 3: By definition, d∆1(k; w)dk |k=km(w)= 0. ∆′1(km) = 0, and hence km
satisfies equation (A.18), which implies limw→±∞ km(w) = ±∞. Thus, from equation
(1.11), limw→+∞∆m(km(w)) = −µ and limw→−∞∆m(km(w)) = ∞. Moreover, km(w)
is continuous in w and ∆m(km(w)) is continuous in km, so there exists a w
∗ such that
∆m(km(w
∗)) = 0. Further, equation (A.18) implies that ∂km(w)∂w > 0, and equation (1.11)







0. Therefore, w∗ is unique: ∀w < w∗, ∆m(km(w)) > 0 and ∀w > w∗, ∆m(km(w)) < 0.
2
Proof of Lemma 4:
1. From equation (1.10), d∆1(k;µ)dµ = −Φ(fk) < 0 for every k, including km: as a point-














That ∂km(µ)∂µ < 0 is immediate from inspection of equation (A.18).
2. By definition of w∗, ∆m(km(w∗, µ);µ) = 0. From the proof of Lemma 3, ∂∆m∂km
∂km(w,µ)
∂w
< 0 for all w, including w∗. Thus, by the Implicit Function Theorem, w∗ is a differ-















From part 1 of the proof, d∆mdµ < 0. Therefore,
∂w∗(µ)
∂µ < 0.
3. The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium with action 1 for µ = 0 is immediate
from Lemma 2. The asymptotic behavior is immediate from Lemma 3 and the con-
tinuity of w∗(µ) was proved in part 2.
4. Rewrite equation (1.10) as
∆1(k;µ) = (1− Φ(fk)) (bk − w) + cφ(fk)− Φ(fk)µ,
where we include µ explicitly as an argument of ∆1. Observe that
lim
k→−∞
(1−Φ(fk)) (bk−w) + cφ(fk) = −∞, lim
k→∞
(1−Φ(fk)) (bk−w) + cφ(fk) = 0,
and (1−Φ(fk)) (bk−w)+cφ(fk) is bounded for all k ∈ R. Thus, limµ→∞∆1(k, µ) =
−∞ at every k, including km. The result then follows from Lemma 3 and the conti-
nuity of w∗(µ) was proved in part 2.
5. Follows from parts 2 to 4 and the continuity of w∗(µ). 2
Proof of Proposition 3: By Proposition 2 there are no asymmetric equilibria. Sym-
metric equilibria with finite cutoff are fully characterized by the solutions to ∆1(k) = 0.
It is clear that k = −∞ is not an equilibrium, and that there is an equilibrium in which
k = ∞: if −i never takes action 1, then the unique best response for i is to take action 0,
as h > l.
From Lemmas 2 and 3 and the Intermediate Value Theorem, when w < w∗, ∆1(k) = 0
has two solutions as a function of w given the other model primitives. Call the smaller
solution k¯(w) and the larger one k(w). Note that k¯(w) < km < k(w). Thus, if w < w
∗,
there are two symmetric equilibria characterized by cutoffs k¯(w) < k(w), in addition to
the equilibrium with k = ∞. At w = w∗, ∆1(k) = 0 has a unique solution km, which is
the sole equilibrium with coordination. Lastly, if w > w∗, then ∆1(k) < 0, ∀k, so the only
equilibrium has k =∞. 2
Proof of Proposition 4: The stability of the k = ∞ equilibrium is obvious. From
Lemma 1, limk−i→∞ ki = ∞ and limk−i→−∞ ki = w/b, and from Proposition 1, k¯ < k
are the only intersections of ki(k−i) and the 45 degree line. Thus, ki(k−i) crosses the 45
degree line from below at k, and from above at k¯. Therefore,
∣∣∣∂ki(k)∂k−i ∣∣∣ > 1 and ∣∣∣∂ki(k¯)∂k−i ∣∣∣ <
1. By symmetry,
∣∣∣∂k−i(k)∂ki ∣∣∣ < 1 and ∣∣∣∂k−i(k¯)∂ki ∣∣∣ > 1. Thus, ∣∣∣∂ki(k)∂k−i ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∂k−i(k)∂ki ∣∣∣−1 > 1 and∣∣∣∂ki(k¯)∂k−i ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∂k−i(k¯)∂ki ∣∣∣−1 < 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: w < w∗ ensures the existence and differentiability of k¯ and k








Making w and µ explicit in the argument, we have ∆1(k¯(w);w) = 0 and ∆1(k¯(µ);µ) = 0.



















From equation (1.10), ∂∆1(k;w)∂w = −(1−Φ) < 0 and ∂∆1(k;µ)∂µ = −Φ < 0. The results follow.
2






























> 0. Thus, from Proposition 1, k∗ < k. 2
Proof of Proposition 6: Define δ1(k) ≡ δ(k, k), where δ is defined in equation (A.4).
From equation (A.6) in the proof of Proposition 1, to determine whether the equilibrium
features strategic complements or strategic substitutes, it suffices to sign
δ1(k¯(µ);µ) = (b+ cf)k¯(µ)− w + µ, (A.22)
in which we make the dependence of equilibrium outcomes on µ explicit.
To demonstrate that actions are strategic substitutes when µ is sufficiently small, con-
sider µ = 0. Substituting µ = 0 into equation (1.10) yields that k¯(0) solves
∆1(k¯(0);µ = 0) = (1− Φ(fk¯(0))) (bk¯(0)− w) + cφ(fk¯(0)) = 0.
Thus,
(1− Φ(fk¯(0))) (bk¯(0)− w) = −cφ(fk¯(0)) < 0,
which implies that bk¯(0)− w < 0. Rewrite equation (A.22) as
δ1(k¯(0);µ = 0) = bk¯(0)− w + cfk¯(0).
Thus, to prove that δ1(k¯(0); 0) < 0, since bk¯(0) − w < 0, it suffices to show that k¯(0) ≤ 0.
From equation (1.10), ∆1(k¯(0), µ = 0) = 0 implies
k¯(w, µ = 0) = 0 if and only if w = 2cφ(0), and k¯(w, µ = 0) < 0 if and only if w < 2cφ(0).
(A.23)
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Thus, δ1(k¯;µ = 0) < 0 for w ≤ 2cφ(0). Therefore, from equation (A.6)
if w ≤ 2cφ(0), then k¯(µ = 0) < k∗(µ = 0). (A.24)
Fix w, and recall that, from Lemma 4, µˆ is the critical value of µ such that there is
a unique equilibrium with action 1, i.e., w = w∗(µˆ). From Proposition 1, this equilib-
rium has the associated critical signal km, which is the maximand of ∆1(k). Thus, at µˆ,
ki(k−i) must be tangent to the 45 degree line at k−i = k¯ = km, and hence
k∗(µˆ) < k¯(µˆ). (A.25)
Lemma 15 below shows that as a function of µ, the point k∗(µ) at which actions go from
being strategic substitutes to strategic compliments is a decreasing differentiable function
of µ, ∂k
∗(µ)
∂µ < 0. Also, from Proposition 5, k¯ is continuous and increasing in µ if w < w
∗
which, from Lemma 4, is equivalent to µ < µˆ. Thus, from equations (A.24) and (A.25)
and continuity of k¯ and k∗ in µ, there is a µs such that k¯(µs) = k∗(µs), k¯ > k∗ for µ > µs,
and k¯ < k∗ for µ < µs. 2
Lemma 15. The critical point k∗(µ) at which actions go from being strategic substitutes
to strategic compliments is a decreasing differentiable function of µ: ∂k
∗(µ)
∂µ < 0.























From equations (A.3) and (A.5), we have δ(ki(k∗); k∗) = 0. By the definition of k∗,
(ki)′ = 0 at k∗. Substituting (ki)′ = 0 into equation (A.7) yields δ′(ki(k∗); k∗) = ca .




















































































where the last equality follows from equation (A.5), ∂∆
∂k−i |k−i=k∗ = − 1aφ(fk∗)δ(k∗; k∗) =
0, and the inequality follows from equation (A.2) in the proof of Lemma 1. Substituting
equations (A.26) and (A.29) into equation (A.27) yields ∂k
∗(µ)
∂µ < 0. 2
Proof of Lemma 6:
E[U i|li, k−i] = Pr(si ≤ li, s−i ≤ k−i) h+ Pr(si ≤ li, s−i > k−i) w
+Pr(si > li, s−i ≤ k−i) l + Pr(si > li, s−i > k−i)E[θ|si > li, s−i > k−i]
= Pr(si > li, s−i > k−i)(E[θ|si > li, s−i > k−i]− w + µ)
+[Pr(si ≤ li, s−i > k−i) + Pr(si > li, s−i > k−i)] w
+[Pr(si ≤ li, s−i ≤ k−i)− Pr(si > li, s−i > k−i)] h






(E[θ|si, s−i]− w + µ)g(si, s−i)dsids−i






(E[θ|si, s−i]− w + µ)g(si, s−i)dsids−i






(E[θ|si, s−i]− w + µ)g(si, s−i)dsids−i − Pr(si > li) µ






(E[θ|si, s−i]− w + µ)g(si, s−i)dsids−i
−(1−G(li)) µ+G(k−i) (h− w) + w. 2




E[U i(li, l−i)] + E[U j(li, l−i)] s.t. li = l−i, equivalently,
2 max
li,l−i
E[U i(li, l−i)] s.t. li = l−i.
Denote the maximand, when it exists, by ks. The first-order condition is ∇E[U i(ks, ks)] =
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0. Substituting from equations (1.14) and (1.15),






= −g(ks) ∆(ks, ks)− g(ks) (∆(ks, ks) + w − l)
= −g(ks)(2∆1(ks) + w − l) = 0. (A.30)






Recall from Lemmas 2 and 3, that (a) ∆1(k) is single-peaked, (b) limk→−∞∆1(k) =
−∞, (c) limk→+∞∆1(k) = −µ, and (d) ∆m(km) > 0 if and only if w < w∗. Thus, if
l < w < w∗, then ∆1(k) = l−w2 has at least one solution for k. Inspection of equation
(A.30) reveals that if there are two solutions, then the smallest one, denoted by ks, is a
local maximum and ks < k¯. Note that k¯ exists because w < w∗.
Finally, we show that if h < 0 or h < w, i.e., h < max{0, w}, then ks is also a global
maximum of E[U i(k, k)]. From equation (1.12), limk→∞E[U i|k, k] = h, and hence ks is
the global maximum if and only if E[U i|ks, ks] > h.
Suppose h < 0. From equation (1.12), limk→−∞E[U i|k, k] = 0 > h. Moreover, be-
cause the local maximum E[U i|ks, ks] is the smallest extremum of E[U i|k, k] we have
limk→−∞E[U i|k, k] < E[U i|ks, ks]. Thus, ks is also the global maximand.
Suppose h < w. The expected utility in the social optimum is greater that the expected
utility in the equilibrium, i.e., E[U i|ks, ks] ≥ E[U i|k¯, k¯], and hence it is sufficient to
show that E[U i|k¯, k¯] > h. In equilibrium, for all si ≤ k¯, player i takes action 0 and
receive the expected utility Pr(s−i > k¯|si)h + Pr(s−i ≤ k¯|si)w > h, and for all si >
k¯, he takes action 1 and receives the expected utility Pr(s−i > k¯|si) l + Pr(s−i >
k¯|si) E[θ|s−i > k¯, si]. By the optimality of action 1,
Pr(s−i > k¯|si) l+Pr(s−i > k¯|si) E[θ|s−i > k¯, si] > Pr(s−i > k¯|si) h+Pr(s−i ≤ k¯|si) w.
But Pr(s−i > k¯|si) h+ Pr(s−i ≤ k¯|si) w > h, and hence E[U i|k¯, k¯] > h. 2





= −g(ks) (∆(ks, ks) + w − l) = −g(ks) (∆1(ks) + w − l)
= −g(ks) w − l
2
< 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 9: The public signal equilibrium in which action 1 is taken
most often is that where players take action 1 if and only if p ≥ kp = wb . We must identify
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µ = 0. (A.32)
Moreover, from Proposition 5, we have ∂k¯∂µ > 0. Thus, if µ < µ
p, k¯ < wb . Logconcavity of
Φ implies that µp(w) is strictly decreasing in w. 2
Proof of Proposition 10: Suppose k¯ > wb . By assumption, at k¯ actions are strategic
substitutes, so for k−i < k¯ we have ki(k−i) > k¯ > wb . Hence, limk−i→−∞ k
i(k−i) > wb ,
which contradicts the Lemma 1 finding that limk−i→−∞ ki(k−i) = wb . 2
Proof of Proposition 11: With public signals, the probability of coordination on ac-
tion 1 in the equilibrium with highest action 1 is
Ppub(w) = Pr(p > k

















From Proposition 3, with private signals, the probability of coordination on action 1 in
the k¯ equilibrium is the probability that both players receive signals that exceed k¯:
Ppri(k¯(w)) = Pr(s









































where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal pdf and cdf respectively, and g(·) is the pdf











−fφ(fk¯)(bk¯ − w + µ+ cfk¯) + b(1− Φ(fk¯)) . (A.35)
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As an intermediate step, we derive the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium thresh-
old k¯ for high and low w.
Lemma 16. The following limits hold:
lim
w→−∞ k¯(w) = −∞, limw→−∞bk¯(w)− w = 0.
If µ = 0, then lim




w→∞ bk¯(w)− w = −∞,
where we recall that E[θ|si = k¯] = bk¯.
Proof: The first three limits follow from inspection of equation (1.10) and the fact that,
from Propositions 3 and 5, for w sufficiently low: k¯(w) exists and is strictly increasing in





1− Φ(fk¯) . (A.36)
Note that fk¯ < φ(fk¯)




c = fκ. Then, bκ − w = ( bb+cf − 1)w =
− cfb+cf w. Thus, limw→∞ bκ − w = −∞. Also, k¯ < κ, so bk¯ − w < bκ − w and, hence,
limw→∞ bk¯ − w ≤ limw→∞ bκ− w = −∞. The result follows. 2









Recall that ∆1(k¯) = 0. When µ = 0, ∆1(k¯) = 0 together with equation (1.10) implies
bk¯ − w = −c φ(fk¯)




























1− Φ(fk¯) − fk¯
)
= 1. (A.40)





















1− Φ(fk¯) − fk¯ + fk¯
)( φ(fk¯)





1− Φ(fk¯) − fk¯
)( φ(fk¯)












1− Φ(fk¯) − fk¯
)
, (A.41)
in which the last equality follows from limk¯→∞
φ(fk¯)
1−Φ(fk¯) − fk¯ = 0, which is a direct result





















−1 + 2 fk¯(1− Φ(fk¯))
φ(fk¯)




= −1 + 2 = 1. 2
























































dw ] as w → −∞. From Lemma 16, limw→−∞k¯(w) = wb .
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dw ] as w → ∞. From Feller’s inequality (Feller (1968)), for





φ(x) ≤ 1− Φ(x).
Recall that from equation (A.23), k¯ > 0 for w sufficiently high. Evaluating Feller’s in-





φ(fk¯) ≤ 1− Φ(fk¯). (A.46)






































































) ) = 0−. (A.48)




































































































= −∞ < 0. (A.51)
The result follows from equations (A.48), (A.50), and (A.51). 2
Proof of Proposition 12. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1: Prove that pi(θ; k−iL , k
−i
R ) has at most two sign changes, and that there exists a




R ) has exactly two sign changes.
Proof: (θ − (w − µ)) Pr(k−iL < s−i < k−iR |θ) has a unique root at w − µ.
Suppose θ > w − µ. Then θ − (w − µ) is trivially log-concave in θ and Pr(k−iL < s−i <
k−iR |θ) is strictly log-concave in θ. Therefore, their product is strictly log-concave, and
hence is strictly unimodal (single-peaked).
Suppose θ < w − µ. Then −(θ − (w − µ)) is log-concave in θ and Pr(k−iL < s−i < k−iR |θ)
is strictly log-concave in θ. Therefore, their product, −(θ − (w − µ)) (Pr(k−iL < s−i <
k−iR |θ)), is strictly log-concave, and thus strictly unimodal.
Therefore, (θ−(w−µ)) (Pr(k−iL < s−i < k−iR |θ)) has a unique maximum for θ ∈ (w−µ,∞),
and a unique minimum for θ ∈ (−∞, w − µ). Further, limθ→±∞(θ − (w − µ)) (Pr(k−iL <
s−i < k−iR |θ)) = 0. Since pi(θ; k−iL , k−iR ) equals −(θ − (w − µ)) (Pr(k−iL < s−i < k−iR |θ))
minus µ > 0, it inherits the shape, maximum, and minimum (see Figure 1.12). From




R ) > 0 if and only if
w < wθ. Let θˆ be the unique maximand of pi, then it follows that there exists a wθˆ such
that pi has exactly two sign changes if and only if w < wθˆ. 2
One can establish an analogous result by bounding µ < µθˆ for some µθˆ.
Step 2: Prove that the best response to a bounded interval strategy cannot take a cutoff
form with a finite cutoff. Specifically, Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) has either 2 sign changes or no sign
changes. If it has no sign changes, then player i’s best response (to a bounded interval
strategy) is to never take action 1, i.e., it takes a cutoff form with associated cutoff ∞. If
it has two sign changes, then it takes a bounded interval form.
Proof: Step 1 established that pi(θ; k−iL , k
−i
R ) has at most two sign changes. Then by
Karlin’s theorem Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) has at most two sign changes. Observe that
limθ→±∞ pi(θ; k−iL , k
−i
R ) = −µ < 0 implies that pi is negative for sufficiently high or low θ.
Hence, from equation (1.20), if si is sufficiently high or low, almost all of the probability
mass of f(·|si) is on θs that produce negative values of pi. Hence, Γ(si; k−iL , k−iR ) < 0 when
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si is sufficiently high or low, and thus Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) cannot have a single sign change.
That Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) < 0 when s
i is sufficiently high or low can also be derived from equa-
tion (1.18), observing that
lim
si→±∞
Γ[si; k−iL , k
−i
R ] = −µ < 0. (A.52)
This also implies that if Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) has no sign changes, then Γ(s
i; k−iL , k
−i
R ) < 0 ∀si;
i.e., player i never takes action 1.
If Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) has two sign changes, then by Karlin’s theorem and the pattern of
sign changes in pi(θ; k−iL , k
−i
R ), Γ(s
i; k−iL , k
−i
R ) is first negative, then positive, and then neg-
ative again, which implies a bounded interval strategy. 2
Step 3: Fix a signal si. From inspection of equation (1.18), there exists a wsi such that
Γ(si; k−iL , k
−i
R ) > 0 if w < wsi . That Γ(s
i; k−iL , k
−i
R ) > 0 for some s
i is inconsistent with
never taking action 1. This together with Step 1, implies that if w < min{wθˆ, wsi}, the
best response to the bounded interval strategy (k−iL , k
−i
R ) is a bounded interval strategy. 2
Proof to Proposition 13: First, we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 17. (kL, kR) with kL, kR ∈ R and kL < kR is a symmetric bounded interval
equilibrium strategy if and only if Γ[kL; kL, kR] = 0 and Γ[kR; kL, kR] = 0.
Proof: The “only if” part is immediate from the continuity of Γ[si; kL, kR] in s
i for i ∈
{A,B}. Next, we prove the “if” part. If Γ[si; kL, kR] changes sign at both kL and kR,
then from the proof of Proposition 12, Γ does not change sign at any other point, and
hence, from equation (A.52), Γ[si; kL, kR] > 0 if and only if s
i ∈ (kL, kR). Otherwise, Γ
does not change sign at kL or kR or both. We consider two cases:
Case I: Suppose Γ changes sign at only one of the two points of kL and kR. WLOG,
suppose Γ does not change sign at kL, but does change sign at kR. Then kL must be a lo-
cal maximum (minimum). Adding a small positive (negative) constant  to pi in equation
(1.20) adds a constant to Γ,∫ ∞
θ=−∞
(pi(θ; k−iL , k
−i
R ) + ) f(θ|si) dθ = Γ(si; k−iL , k−iR ) + ,
and hence creates kLl and kLr at which Γ changes sign and kLl < kL < kLr < kR. Thus, Γ
changes sign at least three times: at kLl, kLr, and kR. But from the proof of Proposition
12, pi +  has at most two sign changes, which together with the TP3 property of f(θ|si)
implies that Γ +  has at most two sign changes, which is a contradiction.
Case II: Suppose Γ does not change sign at kL and kR. If kL and kR are both local
maxima or both local minima, an argument similar to Case I leads to a contradiction. If
one is a local maximum and the other is a local minimum, then there exists a kM with
kL < kM < kR at which Γ changes sign. Now apply the argument in Case I with kM
instead of kR. 2
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From Lemma 17, (kL, kR) is a symmetric bounded interval equilibrium strategy if and
only if Γ[kL; kL, kR] = Γ[kR; kL, kR] = 0. From equation (1.17),
−w = µ
Pr(ρ−i = 1|kL) − µ− E[θ|kL, ρ−i = 1] =
µ
Pr(ρ−i = 1|kR) − µ− E[θ|kR, ρ−i = 1].
(A.53)








= E[θ|kL, ρ−i = 1]− E[θ|kR, ρ−i = 1],
which implies
µ
Pr(ρ−i = 1|kL) Pr(ρ−i = 1|kR) =
E[θ|kL, ρ−i = 1]− E[θ|kR, ρ−i = 1]
Pr(ρ−i = 1|kR)− Pr(ρ−i = 1|kL) . (A.54)
The left-hand side is positive. Therefore, a necessary condition for the equilibrium to ex-
ist is that the right-hand side be positive. Since E[θ|kR, ρ−i = 1] > E[θ|kL, ρ−i = 1],
existence requires that Pr(s−i ∈ (kL, kR)|si = kL) > Pr(s−i ∈ (kL, kR)|si = kR).
With normality, Pr(s−i ∈ (kL, kR)|si = kL) > Pr(s−i ∈ (kL, kR)|si = kR) if and only
if |bkL − (kL + kR)/2| < |bkR − (kL + kR)/2|, i.e., if and only if |kL| > |kR|. Further,
|kL| > |kR| and kL < kR imply kL < 0. This proves the “only if” part. To prove the “if”
part, fix σ2, σ2ν , and (kL, kR) with kL < E[θ] = 0 and |kL| > |kR|. The right hand side
of the equation (A.54) is positive. Therefore, there exists a µ > 0 such that this equation
holds. Finally, substitute that µ into equation (A.53). There exists a w that satisfies this
equation. 2
Proof of Proposition 14: From Lemma 17, Γ[kL; kL, kR] = 0 and Γ[kR; kL, kR] = 0.
From equation (1.17), if si ∈ {kL, kR}, then
Pr(kL < s
−i < kR|si) (E[θ|si, kL < s−i < kR]− w + µ) = µ > 0,
and hence (E[θ|si, kL < s−i < kR]− w + µ) > 0.
Observe that Pr(k−iL < s
−i < k−iR |si) and E[θ|si, k−iL < s−i < k−iR ] are strictly increas-
ing in k−iR . Thus, from equation (1.17), if Γ[s
i; k−iL , k
−i
R ] ≥ 0, then Γ[si; k−iL , γ′R] > 0 for all
γ′R > k
−i






R )) = min{si : Γ[si; k−iL , k−iR ] = 0} when this minimum
exists, and observe that kL = BR
i













for all k−iR < γ
′












R)) exist. Therefore, kL =
BRiL((kL, kR)) > BR
i
L((kL,∞)).
Suppose kL ≤ k¯. If kL = k¯, then k¯ = kL = BRiL((kL, kR)) > BRiL((kL,∞)) =
BRiL((k¯,∞)) = k¯, which is a contradiction. If kL < k¯, by the stability of the k¯ equi-
librium (see Proposition 4), kL < BR
i
L(kL,∞), which is a contradiction. The proof for
kL < k follows analogously using the instability of k. 2
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Proof of Corollary 4: From Proposition 14, if (kL, kR) is an interval equilibrium,
then k¯ < kL < 0. Thus, if k¯ ≥ 0, no interval equilibrium exists. From equation (A.23),
if w ≥ 2cφ(0) and µ = 0, then k¯ > 0. Moreover, when k¯ exists, it increases in µ (and
bounded interval equilibria exist only if the k¯ equilibrium exists). 2
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Appendix B
Proof of Equation 2.4: Recall that (i) given si, s is distributed normally with mean
bsi and variance σ
2σ2ν
σ2+σ2ν
= bσ2ν ; (ii) given s




j + si) = α1+2α (s
j + si); and (iii) given si, sj is distributed normally with mean
bsi and variance σ
2σ2ν
σ2+σ2ν





2. Further, if X is normally distributed with
mean m and variance v, then
E[X|X < l] = m−√v φ(β)
Φ(β)




where φ and Φ are the normal pdf and normal cdf, respectively. Thus, the expected value
of the status quo given both i’s signal and the information contained in citizen j’s deci-
sion not to revolt is




































where the last line exploits
α
1 + 2α
















si = bsi. 2
Lemma 18. If citizen j’s strategy takes a cutoff form, then so does citizen i’s best re-
sponse. That is, suppose that σj(s
j) = 1 if and only if sj < kj for some kj. Then there
exists a ki such that σ∗i (s
i) = 1 if and only if si < ki . Moreover, if kj ∈ R, then ki ∈ R;
if kj = ∞, then ki = Rb ; and if kj = −∞, then ki = −∞. In addition, if kj ∈ R, then
ki(kj) is differentiable, with the following asymptotic properties: limkj→−∞ ki = −∞,
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limkj→+∞ ki = R/b, and limkj→−∞ k
j−bki
a = −∞.
Proof of Lemma 18: From equation (2.5), given any kj ∈ R, limsi→−∞∆(si; kj) =
+∞ > 0 > limsi→+∞∆(si; kj) = −µ. Therefore, since ∆(si; kj) is continuous in si, given
any finite kj , there exists a ki ∈ R such that ∆(ki; kj) = 0.

































































The right-hand side is strictly increasing in si and onto; while the left-hand side is strictly
decreasing in si, because Φ is logconcave (and the argument, k
j−b si
a , of Φ and φ is de-
creasing in si).Thus, there is a unique kˆ such that ∂∆(s
i;kj)
∂si




si < kˆ, and ∂∆(s
i;kj)
∂si






Next, suppose ∆(k1; k
j) = ∆(k2; k







WLOG, assume k1 < k2. Then by continuity of ∆(s
i; kj) in si, there exists a k3 ∈ (k1, k2)
such that ∆(k3; k
j) = 0. But then, by the Mean Value Theorem, there exist k13 ∈ (k1, k3)






|si=k23 = 0, a contradiction of the
uniqueness of kˆ. Denote the unique solution to ∆(ki; kj) = 0 by ki = ki(kj).
When kj =∞, citizen j always revolts, so Pr(sj < kj |si) = 1. From equation (2.2),
∆(si;∞) = R− E[s|sj <∞, si] = R− E[s|si] = R− bsi,
and hence ki = Rb . When k
j = −∞, citizen j never revolts, so Pr(sj < kj |si) = 0. From
equation (2.2),
∆(si;−∞) = 0 · (R+ µ− E[s|sj < −∞, si])− µ = 0 · (−∞)− µ = 0− µ = −µ < 0,
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where we adopt the convention on (affinely) extended real numbers that 0 · (±∞) = 0
(Royden (1988)). Therefore, citizen i’s expected net payoff from revolt is always negative,
so he does not revolt, and thus ki = −∞.
Denote the unique solution to ∆(si; kj) = 0 by ki = ki(kj). Differentiability and
continuity of ki(kj) for kj ∈ R follows from equation (B.3) and the Implicit Function
Theorem, ki(kj).
Continuity of ki(kj) ensures the existence of limkj→−∞ ki(kj). Because ∆(ki(kj); kj) =
0, limkj→−∞ ki(kj) = l ∈ R or +∞ leads to contradiction. Thus, limkj→−∞ ki(kj) = −∞
and limkj→−∞
kj−bki(kj)
a = −∞. Similarly, limkj→+∞ ki(kj) = Rb . 2











From the proof of Lemma 18, we have ∂∆(k
i;kj)
∂ki
























Since a and φ are positive, sgn(∂∆(k
i;kj)
∂kj
) = sgn(δ(ki; kj)).
From the asymptotic behavior of ki in Lemma 18, limkj→∞ δ(kj , ki(kj)) = −∞, and
limkj→−∞ δ(kj , ki(kj)) = ∞. Thus, by continuity of δ in kj , there exists a k∗ such


























































1+2α < 1. Thus, if δ ≥ 0, then δ′ < 0. This together with the sign of δ at ±∞
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guarantees k∗ is unique, δ > 0 if kj < k∗, and δ < 0 if kj > k∗. 2
Proof of Proposition 16. We employ three lemmas to prove Proposition 16. The first
lemma establishes that ∆1(k) is single-peaked. This shape restricts the maximum number
of equilibria.
Lemma 19. Under symmetry, the expected net payoff from revolt, ∆1(k), has a unique
global maximand, km. Moreover, limk→−∞∆1(k) = −µ and limk→∞∆1(k) = −∞.
Proof of Lemma 19: The asymptotic behavior of ∆1(k) follows immediately from in-
spection of equation (2.6). Differentiating the expression for ∆1(k) in equation (2.6) yields:
∆′1(k) = fφ(fk)(R+ µ− bk − cfk)− bΦ(fk). (B.11)
It follows that ∆′1(k) = 0 if and only if





The left-hand side of equation (B.12) is strictly decreasing in k and onto, and the right-
hand side is strictly increasing. Thus, there is a unique solution to ∆′1(k) = 0, call it km.
Combining this result with the asymptotic properties of ∆1(k) yields ∆
′
1(k) > 0 if k <
km, and ∆
′
1(k) < 0 if k > km. 2
The single-peaked shape of the expected net payoff equation (2.6), ∆1(k), together
with the location of its maximum vis a˜ vis the horizontal axis determine the number and
relative locations of its zeros which, in turn, characterize the symmetric equilibrium cut-
offs. See Figure 2.4.
The next lemma details how the payoff from a successful revolution, R, affects the lo-
cation of the maximum of the expected net payoff equation (2.6), ∆1(k). We write km =
km(R) to emphasize the dependence of the location of the peak of ∆1(k;R) on R. By
substituting for R − bkm + µ from equation (B.12) into equation (2.6), we can write this
peak solely as a function of km(R):








+ cφ(fkm)− µ, (B.13)
where the index m on ∆ emphasizes that we are evaluating the symmetric expected net
payoff from revolution at its peak. We have the following result:
Lemma 20. Both km(R) and ∆m(km(R);R) strictly increase in R. There exists a unique
R∗ such that ∆m(km(R∗);R∗) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 20: By definition, d∆m(k; R)dk |k=km(R)= 0. ∆′(km) = 0, so km satis-
fies equation (B.12), which implies limR→±∞ km(R) = ±∞. Thus, from equation (B.13),
limR→+∞∆m(km(R)) = +∞ and limR→−∞∆m(km(R)) = −µ. Moreover, km(R) and
∆m(km(R)) are continuous in R, so there exists an R
∗ such that ∆m(km(R∗)) = 0. Fur-








∂R > 0. Therefore, R
∗ is
unique; if R > R∗, then ∆m(km(R)) > 0, and if R < R∗, then ∆m(km(R)) < 0. 2
Mirroring the analysis of Lemma 20, we establish a counterintuitive result for the im-
pact of the punishment µ for participating in a failed revolution. Indexing variables by µ,
we have
Lemma 21.
1. ∆m(km(µ); µ) decreases in µ, but km(µ) increases in µ.
2. R∗ is an increasing differentiable function of µ, that is ∂R
∗(µ)
∂µ > 0.
3. If failed revolt is not punished, i.e., if µ = 0, then there is a unique equilibrium with
revolution: limµ→0+ R∗(µ) = −∞.
4. limµ→∞R∗(µ) = +∞.
5. There exists a µˆ > 0 such that R∗(µˆ) = R.
Proof of Lemma 21:
1. From equation (2.6), d∆1(k;µ)dµ = Φ(fk) − 1 < 0 for every k including km. That is, as
a pointwise function of k, ∆1(k) is decreasing in µ. Therefore, the maximum of ∆1
is decreasing in µ. ∂km(µ)∂µ > 0 is immediate from inspection of equation (B.12).
2. By definition of R∗, ∆m(km(R∗, µ);µ) = 0. From the proof of Lemma 20, ∂∆m∂km
∂km(R,µ)
∂R
> 0 for all R including R∗. Thus, by the Implicit Function Theorem, R∗ is a differ-














From part 1 of the proof, d∆mdµ < 0. Therefore,
∂R∗(µ)
∂µ > 0.
3. The existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium with revolution for µ = 0 is imme-
diate from Lemma 19. The asymptotic behavior is immediate from Lemma 20 and
the continuity of R∗(µ) was proved in part 2.
4. Rewrite equation (2.6) as
∆1(k;µ) = Φ(fk) (R− bk) + cφ(fk)− (1− Φ(fk))µ,
where we include µ explicitly as an argument of ∆1. Observe that limk→−∞Φ(fk) (R−
bk)+cφ(fk) = 0, limk→∞Φ(fk) (R−bk)+cφ(fk) = −∞, and Φ(fk) (R−bk)+cφ(fk)
is bounded. Thus, limµ→∞∆1(k, µ) = −∞ at every k including km. The result
then follows from the continuity of R∗(µ) proved in part 2 of the proof.
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5. Follows from parts 2 to 4 and the continuity of R∗(µ). 2
Proof of Proposition 16: From Proposition 2 in Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010),
there are no asymmetric equilibria. Symmetric equilibria with finite cutoff are fully char-
acterized by the solutions to ∆1(k) = 0. It is clear that k = +∞ is not an equilibrium,
and that there is a no revolution equilibrium in which k = −∞: if j does not revolt, then
the unique best response for i is never to revolt, as the revolution always fails without
joint participation so that if i revolted, i would receive the status quo minus the punish-
ment µ > 0.
From Lemmas 19 and 20 and the Intermediate Value Theorem, when R > R∗, ∆1(k) =
0 has two solutions as a function of R given the other primitives of the model. Call the
smaller solution k(R) and the larger one k¯(R), and observe that k(R) < km < k¯(R).
Thus, if R > R∗, there are two symmetric equilibria characterized by cut-offs k(R) <
k¯(R), in addition to the no revolution equilibrium, k = −∞. At R = R∗, ∆1(k) = 0 has
a unique solution km, which constitutes the sole equilibrium in which revolution occurs.
Finally, if R < R∗, then ∆1(k) < 0 for all k, so that only the no revolution equilibrium
with k = −∞ exists. 2
Proof of Proposition 17: Stability of the “no revolution equilibrium” is obvious.
From Lemma 18, limkj→−∞ ki = −∞ and limkj→+∞ ki = R/b, and from Proposition
16, k < k¯ are the only intersections of ki(kj) and the 45 degree line. Thus, ki(kj) crosses
the 45 degree line from below at k, and from above at k¯. Therefore,
∣∣∣∂ki(k)∂kj ∣∣∣ > 1 and∣∣∣∂ki(k¯)∂kj ∣∣∣ < 1. By symmetry, ∣∣∣∂kj(k)∂ki ∣∣∣ < 1 and ∣∣∣∂kj(k¯)∂ki ∣∣∣ > 1. Thus, ∣∣∣∂ki(k)∂kj ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∂kj(k)∂ki ∣∣∣−1 > 1
and
∣∣∣∂ki(k¯)∂kj ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∂kj(k¯)∂ki ∣∣∣−1 < 1.








Making R and µ explicit in the argument, we have ∆1(k¯(R);R) = 0 and ∆1(k¯(µ);µ) = 0.




















From equation (2.6), ∂∆1(k;R)∂R = Φ > 0 and
∂∆1(k;µ)
∂µ = Φ− 1 < 0. The results follow. 2
Proof of Corollary 5: Conditional on the marginal revolter i’s signal si = k¯, cit-
izen j’s signal is normally distributed around E[sj |si = k¯(µ)] = bk¯ with variance a,
i.e., sj |si = k¯ ∼ N(bk¯, a2). In the high revolution equilibrium, the probability that the
marginal revolter is punished equals the probability that citizen j does not revolt:












P (k¯(µ)) decreases in k¯ and k¯(µ) decreases in µ. Thus, P (k¯(µ)) increases in µ. 2
Proof of Proposition 18: From Proposition 16, ∂∆1(k)∂k
∣∣
k=k¯












We prove that under the conditions in the Proposition that ∂∆1(k¯)
∂σ2ν








R− E[s|k¯, sj < k¯])+ Φ(fk¯) ∂
∂σ2ν
(
R− E[s|k¯, sj < k¯])+ ∂Φ(fk¯)
∂σ2ν
µ.




∂E[s|k¯, sj < k¯]
∂σ2ν
< 0.
We show that if µ < 2φ(0) c + R and α > 1√
2
, then the above inequalities are satisfied.
We need the following results:























































































































From equation (2.6), at k¯ = 0 we have
∆1(k¯ = 0) = Φ(0)(R+ µ) + cφ(0)− µ = 0, which implies µ = 2cφ(0) +R. (B.18)
Recall that ∆1(k¯) is single-peaked, ∆1(k¯) = 0, and ∆
′
1(k¯) ≤ 0 where the equality is at
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km = k¯. Thus, equation (B.18) together with Proposition 17 yields
k¯ > 0 if and only if µ < 2φ(0) c+R. (B.19)




























































The logconcavity of Φ and the fact that b < 1 together with (B.16) and k¯ > 0 from (B.19)
imply that the first term is negative. From (B.17), the third term is also negative. From
(B.16), ∂b
∂σ2ν
< 0, and hence it suffices to prove ∂∂b
(
























































where from (2.3), ca =
α




Φ(x) > −1 (see e.g., Sampford (1953)
who proves that ∂∂x
φ(x)












Proof of Corollary 6: Conditional on s, both si and sj are independently normally
distributed with mean s and variance σ2ν . Thus, Pr(σi = 1, σj = 1|s) = Pr(si < k¯, sj <




















σν − (k¯ − s)
)
. (B.20)





Thus, if k¯ − s is not too large a positive number, i.e., if k¯ − s < η for sufficiently small
η > 0, then the derivative in equation (B.20) is strictly positive. 2
Proof of Proposition 19: From Lemma 22 (below), Prep(k¯(µ)) is single-peaked with
a unique maximum at 0. Thus, if k¯ > 0, a decrease in k¯ increases Prep(k¯); and, if k¯ ≤
0, a decrease in k¯ decreases Prep(k¯). From expressions (B.18) and (B.19), k¯ > 0 if µ <
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2cφ(0) +R and k¯ < 0 if µ > 2cφ(0) +R; and from Proposition 17, k¯(µ) is decreasing in µ.













where φ is the pdf of a mean-zero, bivariate normal distribution. Then, P (k) is a symmet-
ric function of k, and P (|k|) is monotonically increasing in |k| with a unique minimum at
k = 0, and lim|k|→∞ P (|k|) = 1.












































where the last equality follows from symmetry, φ(−k, y) = φ(k,−y), and a change of vari-
able in the integration from −y to y. Observe that






where φ is the density of x, and φ(y|k) is the conditional density of y given x = k with
0 < b < 1 and a are the relevant constants corresponding to the conditional mean and





























dy − ∫ +∞k φ(y−bka ) dy > 0, and hence
dP (k)
dk > 0. Similarly, if k < 0, then
dP (k)
dk > 0. The asymptotic limit is obvious. 2
Proof of Proposition 20: From the proof of Proposition 19, k¯ > 0 if and only if µ <
µ¯, and R > −2cφ(0) is necessary and sufficient for µ¯ > 0. Also, by construction, µ¯ ≤ µˆ.
From Proposition 21, Ppro = Prep = 0 for µˆ < µ.
From Proposition 17, ∂k¯∂µ < 0. Thus, from equation (2.10),
∂Ppro
∂µ < 0. The rest follows
from Proposition 19. 2
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Proof of Proposition 21: µ < µˆ is necessary and sufficient for k¯ and ∂k¯∂µ to exist, and
−2cφ(0) < R is necessary and sufficient for 0 < µ¯ so that there exists µ ∈ (0, µ¯). The
first item is immediate from Proposition 19. To prove the second item, recall that from
equation (B.17) in the proof of Proposition 18,
∂(2φ(0)c)
∂σ2ν







The result then follows from Proposition 19. 2
Proof of Corollary 7: From Proposition 22, with public signals, the probability of































R > 0 if and only if R > 0 = E[s]. 2
Proof of Proposition 23: The public signal equilibrium with the most revolution is
the one in which citizens revolt if and only if p < kp = Rb . We must identify the primitives








































which implies µ = µp. Moreover, from Proposition 17, we have ∂k¯∂µ < 0. The result
follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 24: With public signals, the probability of successful revolution
in the equilibrium with highest likelihood of revolution is





















From Proposition 16, with private signals, the probability of successful revolution in the
















































where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal pdf and cdf respectively, and g(·) is the pdf











fφ(fk¯)(R− bk¯ + µ− cfk¯)− bΦ(fk¯). (B.28)
We now present an intermediate lemma on the asymptotic behavior of equilibrium thresh-
old k¯(R).
Lemma 23. The following limit results on cutoff k¯ hold: limR→∞ k¯(R) =∞, limR→∞R−
bk¯(R) = 0, and if µ = 0, limR→−∞ k¯(R) = −∞, and limR→−∞ bk¯(R) − R = ∞, where
E[s|si = k¯] = bk¯.
Proof: The first three limits are immediate from inspection of equation (2.6) and the
fact that, from Propositions 16 and 17, for sufficiently high R, k¯ exists and is strictly in-







Define κ = Rb+cf , i.e.,
bκ−R
c = −fκ. Exploiting Feller’s inequality, we have −fk¯ < φ(fk¯)Φ(fk¯) .
Hence, from equation (B.29), −fk¯ < bk¯−Rc , and hence κ = Rb+cf < k¯. This implies that
bκ− R ≤ bk¯ − R and, consequently, limR→−∞ bκ− R ≤ limR→−∞ bk¯ − R. Moreover, from
the definition of κ, bκ−R = ( bb+cf − 1)R = − cfb+cf R, thus, limR→−∞ bκ−R =∞. 2
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Recall that ∆1(k¯) = 0. When µ = 0, ∆1(k¯) = 0 together with equation (2.6) implies
R− bk¯ = −c φ(fk¯)
Φ(fk¯)































































































where the last equality follows from limk¯→−∞
φ(fk¯)
Φ(fk¯)
+ fk¯ = 0, which follows from Feller’s
inequality.
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−1− 2 fk¯ Φ(fk¯)
φ(fk¯)




= −1 + 2 = 1. 2






























































dR ] as R → ∞. From Lemma 23, limR→∞ k¯(R) = Rb . Substi-

































































φ(x) ≤ 1− Φ(x).
From equation (B.29), k¯ < 0 for R sufficiently low. Evaluating Feller’s inequality at x =








φ(fk¯) ≤ Φ(fk¯). (B.39)










































































































































































































= −∞ < 0 (B.44)
The result follows from equations (B.41), (B.43), and (B.44). 2
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Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 8: θ ∈ (12 , 1), hence, the largest possible range of x is between 12 and
1. The following lemma characterizes the shape of the objective function, (1−G(x))x, for
x ∈ [12 , 1).
Lemma 24. (1−G(x))x has a unique maximum at x∗ ∈ [12 , 1).
Proof of Lemma 24: Observe that (1 − G(12))(12) > (1 − G(1))(1) because G(1) = 1,
and by Assumption 1, G(12) = 0. Thus, the upper bound, x = 1, is not a maximand.
Differentiating (1−G(x))x yields
D(x) ≡ 1−G(x)− g(x)x.
The continuity of G guarantees at least one maximum on the compact set [0, 1], and its
differentiability implies 1−G(x)− g(x)x = 0 at each interior maximum. To prove unique-







Logconcavity of g (Assumption 2) implies logconcavity of 1−G(x) (Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2005)), which implies that (Ln(1−G(x)))′ is decreasing. Thus, the left-hand-side of equa-
tion (C.1) is increasing. The right-hand-side, x−1, is strictly decreasing. Therefore, equa-
tion (C.1) has at most one solution. If D(12) = 0, there is no other local maximum and,
hence, x∗ = 12 . If D(
1
2) < 0 and there is an interior local maximum, then there must be
an interior local minimum which implies at least two solutions for equation (C.1) which I
ruled out. If D(12) > 0, there is a unique interior global maximum. 2
From Lemma 24, (1 − G(x))x is strictly increasing in [12 , x∗), and strictly decreasing
in (x∗, 1]. The result for x¯ follows immediately. The result for t¯ is derived from the defini-
tion of x in equation (3.6). 2
Proof of Lemma 9: If the poor mobilize, the rich can either repress or redistribute at
a tax-rate t ∈ [0, 1]. To decide whether to repress or to redistribute, the rich compare
their expected payoff of repression, (1 − ω)θy, to the highest expected payoff that can be
achieved by redistribution which, by Lemma 8, is (1−G(x¯))x¯y. Therefore, the rich repress
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if and only if
(1− ω)θy > (1−G(x¯))x¯y =
y(1−G(θ))θ ; θ ∈ [12 , x∗]y(1−G(x∗))x∗ ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1]. (C.2)
Define
ω¯ =
G(θ) ; θ ∈ [12 , x∗]1− (1−G(x∗))x∗θ ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1].
Then, expression (C.2) simplifies to: s = 1 if and only if ω < ω¯. Otherwise, the rich
redistribute at a tax-rate that maximizes their expected payoff, i.e. at a tax-rate t¯ defined
in Lemma 8. 2
Proof of Lemma 10: From equations (3.8) and (3.10), substitute for x¯ and ω¯ in the
expected value of mobilization to the poor, E[V p(M)] = s(θ, x¯)y, with s(θ, x¯) derived in
equation (3.12). Therefore, E[V p(M)] becomes






[G(x∗)(1− E[µ|µ < x∗]) + (1−G(x∗))(1− x∗)] y ; θ ∈ [x∗, 1].
The result follows immediately from the comparison of this value to the value of status
quo to the poor, (1− θ)y. 2




G is uniform on [12 , 1], thus, G(x) = 2x−1. From expression (3.9), x∗ = 12 . From equation
(3.10) in Lemma 9, the rich repress if and only if ω < 1 − 12θ . From equation (3.8) in
Lemma 8, x¯ = 12 and t¯ = 1. From Lemma 10, the poor mobilize if and only if








Rearrange (C.3) as 4θ(1 − θ) < 1, or equivalently, 0 < (2θ − 1)2 which is true for θ > 12 .
That is, the poor always mobilize. 2
Proof of Proposition 26: Similar to the proof of Proposition 25, when G is uniform
x¯ = x∗ = 12 , and the rich repress if and only if ω < 1− 12θ which happens with probability
F (1− 12θ ). From Lemma 10, the poor mobilize if and only if 1− θ < (1− F (1− 12θ ))12 , or
equivalently,
the poor mobilize if and only if F (1− 1
2θ
) < 2θ − 1. (C.4)
Next, I prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 25. If F is strictly unimodal, then 2θ − 1 crosses F (1− 12θ ) at most at two point
in (12 , 1).
Proof: Suppose 2θ − 1 crosses F at three interior points of (12 , 1), say 12 < θ1 < θ2 <
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θ3 < 1. Observe that at θ =
1
2 , 2θ − 1 = F (1 − 12θ ) = F (0) = 0. Then by Mean Value
Theorem, there exist λ1 < λ2 < λ3 such that
1
2 < λ1 < θ1 < λ2 < θ2 < λ3 < θ3 < 1 and
(F (1− 12λi ))′ = 2 for i = 1, 2, 3.
F is strictly unimodal and, hence, has a unique inflection point, θ∗. (F (1 − 12λ1 ))′ =
(F (1 − 12λ2 ))′ = 2 together with the strict unimodality of F implies that λ1 < θ∗ < λ2 <
λ3. Thus, (F (1− 12λ3 ))′ < (F (1− 12λ2 ))′, a contradiction. 2
The first-order Taylor expansion of 2θ − 1− F (1− 12θ ) around θ = 12 is





= 2− F (0)− 2f(0)+ o(2)
= 2(1− f(0))+ o(2) (C.5)
If 2θ − 1 does not cross F (1− 12θ ) in an interior point of (12 , 1), the poor always mobilize.
Otherwise, from Lemma 25, the crossing happens at most twice.
If f(0) < 1, 2θ − 1 > F (1 − 12θ ) for θ ∈ (12 , 12 + ) and some  > 0. Therefore, crossing
either never happens or happens exactly twice because by strict unimodality, at θ = 1,
F (1− 12) = F (12) < 1 = 2(1)− 1.
Suppose 2θ − 1 crosses F (1 − 12θ ) at 12 < θ1 < θ2 < 1, then F (1 − 12θ ) < 2θ − 1 in
(12 , θ1)∪ (θ2, 1), and F (1− 12θ ) > 2θ− 1 in (θ1, θ2). Thus, the poor mobilize when the in-
equality level is low, (12 , θ1), or high, (θ2, 1), but do not mobilize in a range of moderate
inequality, (θ1, θ2).
If f(0) > 1, 2θ − 1 < F (1 − 12θ ) for θ ∈ (12 , 12 + ) and some  > 0. Therefore, crossing
happens exactly once because by strict unimodality at θ = 1, F (1 − 12) = F (12) < 1 =
2(1)− 1.
Suppose 2θ − 1 crosses F (1 − 12θ ) at θ3 ∈ (12 , 1). Then, the poor mobilize when the
inequality is high, θ ∈ (θ3, 1), but not when it is low. 2
Proof of Corollary 9: From Proposition 26,
If 2θ− 1 does not cross F (1− 12θ ), then the poor always mobilize, and the probability of
repression, i.e. F (1− 12θ ), is strictly increasing in θ.
If 2θ−1 crosses F (1− 12θ ) only once, say, at 0 < θ3 < 1, then the poor mobilize in (θ3, 1)
and they get repressed with probability F (1− 12θ ) which increases monotonically with θ.
If 2θ − 1 crosses F (1 − 12θ ), say, at 12 < θ1 < θ2 < 1, then the poor mobilize in
(12 , θ1)∪(θ2, 1) and they get repressed with probability F (1− 12θ ) which increases mono-
tonically with θ. However, the poor do not mobilize in [θ1, θ2] and, hence, they do not
get repressed, and the probability of repression becomes 0. In other words, the proba-
bility of repression increases monotonically in (12 , θ1), drops discontinuously at θ1 to 0
in (θ1, θ2), jumps up discontinuously at θ2, and increases monotonically again in (θ2, 1).
2
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Proof of Proposition 27: The proof resembles the proof of Proposition 26 and, hence,
I abstract from the presentation of all the details. Clearly, the poor do not mobilize if
µ = 1. Suppose µ < 1 for the rest of the proof. When θ ≤ µ, F (1 − µθ ) = 0, hence,
the poor do not mobilize. Observe that there exists an  > 0 such that when f(0) < 11−µ ,
F (1− µθ ) < θ−µ1−µ for θ ∈ (µ, µ+), and when f(0) > 11−µ , F (1− µθ ) > θ−µ1−µ for θ ∈ (µ, µ+).
Observe that by strict unimodality, at θ = 1, F (1− µ1 ) < 1 = 1−µ1−µ .
If f(0) < 11−µ , F (1 − µθ ) either never crosses θ−µ1−µ in (µ, 1] in which case the poor mo-
bilize if and only if θ ∈ (µ, 1], or crossing happens exactly twice. That is, there exist
µ < θ1 < θ2 < 1 such that F (1− µθ ) < θ−µ1−µ for θ ∈ (µ, θ1)∪ (θ2, 1], and F (1− µθ ) ≥ θ−µ1−µ
for θ ∈ (12 , µ] ∪ [θ1, θ2].
If f(0) > 11−µ , there exists a unique θ3 ∈ (µ, 1) such that F (1 − µθ ) ≥ θ−µ1−µ for θ ∈
(12 , θ3], and F (1 − µθ ) < θ−µ1−µ for θ ∈ (θ3, 1]. That is, the poor mobilize if and only if
θ ∈ (θ3, 1]. 2
Proof of Proposition 28: Suppose µ < 1 for this proof because the case with µ = 1
was discussed in the text. Observe that the right hand side in equation (3.18) is 1 at θ =
1, and it crosses the horizontal axis at θ = µ+m1+m > µ ≥ 12 . In the same vein as the proof
of Proposition 27, the following results follow immediately from inspection of equation
(3.18).
Observe that by strict unimodality F (1− µ) < 1 and F (µ+m1+m ) > 0. Then, either there
exist µ+m1+m < θ1 < θ2 < θ3 < 1 such that the poor mobilize, i.e. inequality (3.18) holds,
if and only if θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) ∪ (θ3, 1]; Or, there exists θ4 ∈ (µ+m1+m , 1) such that the poor
mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (θ4, 1]. 2
Proof of Proposition 29: Observe that equation (C.3) becomes
1− θ < 1
4θ
−m(1− θ)
That is, the poor mobilize if and only if
−4(1 +m)θ2 + 4(1 +m)θ − 1 < 0 (C.6)
Equation (C.6) has two real solutions, θ1 < θ2. Therefore,
the poor mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (1
2































2 < θ2 < 1. From equation (C.6), the poor mobilize if and only if
θ ∈ (θ2, 1]. 2
Proof of Proposition 30: The proof resembles that of Proposition 26 and, hence, I
abstract from the details to avoid repetition. From expressions (3.19), expression (C.4)
becomes
the poor mobilize if and only if F (1− 1
2θ
) < 2(1 +m)θ − (1 + 2m). (C.8)
Observe that at θ = 12 , F (0) = 0 > −m, thus, by continuity the poor do not mobi-
lize if inequality is sufficiently low. Moreover, at θ = 1, F (12) < 1. Therefore, by the
Intermediate Value Theorem F (1 − 12θ ) crosses 2(1 + m)θ − (1 + 2m) at least once in
(12 , 1). Furthermore, with the same logic as Lemma 25, strict unimodality of F implies
that F (1 − 12θ )′ = 2(1 + m) at most twice and, hence, either crossing does not occur or it
occurs exactly three times. That is, there exist θ1, ..., θ4 with
1
2 < θ1 < θ2 < θ3 < 1 and
1
2 < θ4 < 1 such that either the poor mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) ∪ (θ3, 1]; Or they
mobilize if and only if θ ∈ (θ4, 1]. 2
Proof of Lemma 12: Differentiating p(r)(1− ω(r)) yields
d(r) ≡ p′(r)(1− ω(r))− ω′(r)p(r). (C.9)





assumptions 3 and 4, the second order condition holds,
d′(r) = p′′(r) (1− ω(r))− 2p′(r)ω′(r)− ω′′(r)p(r) < 0. (C.10)
Observe that d(0) = p′(0) > 0 and d(1) = p′(1)(1− ω¯)− ω′(1)p¯. Results follow. 2
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Appendix D
A Short Introduction to GAMs. Generalized additive models (GAMs)
(Hastie and Tibshirani (1990)) are statistical models in which a monotone function g(·),
e.g. the logit function, of the conditional expectation of the dependent variable, E[Y |X],
is assumed to be a sum of smooth functions of, say, p explanatory variables X = (x1, ..., xp).
That is, g(E[Y |X]) = f1(x1) + f2(x2) + f12(x1, x2) + ..., in which an fj can be set to
identity function to incorporate the parametric components of the model. In GAMs, the
distribution of the dependent variable Y is assumed to be a member of the exponential
family distributions which includes virtually all distributions used in practice. I describe
the simplest GAM with linear control variables which features only one unknown smooth
function of only one explanatory variable. GAMs with two dimensional smooth functions
used in the paper are extensions of similar methods and ideas described in details in the
references of this section.
Take the model,
g(E[Y | Z, X]) = f(Z) +Xβ, Y ∼ some exponential family distribution, (D.1)
in which f is a smooth function of an explanatory variable Z, X is the vector of con-
trol variables, and β is the vector of coefficients. With a linear g, model (D.1) could be
estimated via a variety of semi-parametric regression methods that would employ some
non-parametric method such as locally linear regression and kernel regression to estimate
the non-parametric part. However, with a non-linear “link” function, g, the model resem-
bles the class of generalized linear models (GLMs) except for the non-parametric compo-
nent f(Z). This, in turn, suggests to approximate f by a series of some “base functions”,
f(z) =
∑q
j=1 γjbj(z), so that the model falls back into the realm of GLMs. That is,







in which the coefficients γj and βk can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE). However, if q is large enough, it is very likely that the model over-fits the data
with an overly wiggly f . One standard way to overcome this problem is to incorporate
penalties for wiggliness of f via penalized maximum likelihood estimation, in which one
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maximizes a penalized log-likelihood, lP (γj , βk), constructed by adding a penalty term to
the usual log-likelihood function, l(γj , βk). The most widely used penalty is the integral
of the second derivative of the smooth term, i.e.
∫
f ′′(z)dz. Then,
lP (γj , βk) = l(γj , βk)− λ
∫
(f ′′(Z))2dz, (D.3)
in which λ is the “smoothing parameter” that controls the intensity of the penalty term.
For example, when λ approaches infinity, maximizing lP (γj , βk) requires choosing γjs
such that f ′′(z) = 0, which in turn implies a linear f , i.e. f(z) = γ1z. The smoothing pa-
rameter λ and the number of terms in the series expansion of f , i.e. q, control the wiggli-
ness of f , and hence control the trade-off between “the best” fit (smaller bias) and large
variability (larger standard error) in much the same way as does a window width in local
smoothing methods such as kernel and local polynomial regressions.
The trade-off between bias and variance is a fundamental feature of semi/non-parametric
methods and calls for a criterion for the “best” estimators. One standard such criterion is
minimizing the mean square error (MSE) of the fitted model, i.e. E[(E[Y |Z,X]− ̂E[Y |Z,X])2]
, in which λ and q influence the estimated conditional mean ̂E[Y |Z,X]. Minimizing MSE
with respect to both q and λ is computationally very costly. However, a crucial observa-
tion is that the smoothing parameter λ can “overrule” the choice of q. That is, although
a large q set the potential maximum wiggliness of the smooth f , it is λ that determines
whether the estimation is settled for this maximum wiggliness or a smoother, less wiggly
f . Therefore, a sensible estimation strategy is to set q at some reasonably large “upper
bound”, and choose λ to minimize MSE.
Next, the choice of bj(z) needs to be fully addressed. In essence, any base, {bj(z)}∞j=1,
that spans the space of smooth functions can be selected; for example, power series
{1, z, z2, z3, ...} is one possibility. However, the following observations suggests that a
certain class of smooth functions known as cubic splines serve our fitting problem better
than others. First, consider the simplest non-parametric regression model Y = f(Z) + .
If one wants to minimize the sum of square errors of the fitted model,
∑n
i=1(yi − fˆ(zi))2,





(f ′′(z))2dz instead, the resulting fˆ is a piece-
wise cubic polynomial with continuous second derivative; such functions are called cubic
splines. Second, it can be shown that cubic splines are the smoothest interpolators in the
sense that they have the minimum
∫
(f ′′(z))2dz among all smooth interpolating functions
for a set of data (Green and Silverman (1994)). Therefore, it is reasonable to restrict f
to be a cubic spline and look for a basis that span the space of cubic spline functions. B-
spline basis is one such basis that is most widely used for its computational advantages.
Any cubic spline is a linear combination of a finite number of b-splines. That is, if we de-
note cubic splines and b-splines by cs(z) and b(z) respectively, cs(z) =
∑q
j=1 γj bj(z).
To define cubic splines on an interval [a, b] more precisely, consider a set of point
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(knots) a = η0 < η1 < ... < ηm < ηm+1 = b that partition [a, b] into intervals




for z ∈ [ηl, ηl+1], such that the consequetive Pl(z)s are joined in a smooth way so that
the resulting curve has continuous first and second derivatives. Cubic splines differ in
two ways: for a given set of knots, various cubic polynomials can be joined smoothly to
form a cubic spline. Alternatively, various splines can be formed by choosing different
set of knots. Clearly, cubic splines with more knots are more flexible, and hence can ap-
proximate functions more easily. However, cubic splines with more knots need a larger
number of b-spline as their basis. That is, for cubic splines with more knots, q is larger
in cs(z) =
∑q
j=1 γj bj(z). It follows that the number of knots in spline regressions cor-
responds to how far one tends to go in a series estimation. In the light of the previous
discussion, a sensible estimation strategy when using cubic splines in GAMs is to choose
a reasonably large number of knots to set an upper bound for the wiggliness of the cubic
spline, and let the smoothing parameter λ determine the exact degree of smoothness of
the fitted model.
Having the estimation strategy laid out, the question of how to draw inference from
the fitted model appears next. One approach is to view the estimation method from a
Bayesian standpoint, and recognize that penalizing wiggliness in the frequentist approach
is the equivalent of imposing some prior beliefs about the likelihood of parameters in
a Bayesian approach; a prior that assigns more probability to parameters that lead to
smooth fits (Nychka (1988); Wahba (1983); Wood (2006)). Then, one can calculate the
posterior probabilities of the parameters given data, and hence the Bayesian covariance
matrix and confidence intervals. Moreover, confidence intervals for non-linear functions of
estimated parameters can easily be calculated by simulation from their posterior distribu-
tions. This is of particular interest in calculating the confidence interval for the predicted
conditional expectation of the dependent variable, i.e. Eˆ[yi|zi, Xi] = g−1(
∑
γˆjbj(zi) +∑
xikβˆk), which is clearly a non-linear function of γˆjs and βˆks due to g
−1(·), the inverse
of the link function g(·).
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